No. 31 January-March 1960

SOVIET SURVEY

A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends



CULTURAL EXCHANGES

THEIR PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS

F. C. Barghoorn — **The Cultural Apparatus**

Leopold Labedz — **The Spirit of Stresa**

Francis Seton — **Asia, Africa and the Soviet Model**

Gerald Segal — **Automation and its Prospects**

J. M. Bochenski — **Philosophy Studies**

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Editor: *Walter Z. Laqueur*

Associate Editor: *Leopold Labedz*

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CULTURAL EXCHANGES

No Truce in Ideology

ORGANISED, government-sponsored, and government-controlled cultural exchanges are an innovation of the mid-twentieth century. The free flow of cultural exchange was an unquestioned article of faith of the 19th century intelligentsia. The great Russian novelists of the last century were translated into all major Western languages soon after the appearance of their works, and Western political, cultural, and social thought nowhere evoked more passionate interest and nowhere provoked more ardent discussion than among Russian intellectuals. Russian was the first foreign language into which *Das Kapital* was translated—despite Tsarist censorship, and it would not be too difficult to find many examples of a similar kind. All this, as we now know, belonged to an era that came to an end in 1914; it was perhaps a less advanced but also a less complicated world.

Agreements on cultural exchanges have been signed in recent months between the Soviet Union and the United States, Britain, and France. Soviet atomic scientists have been to America and Georgian Folk Dancers have toured Britain; Western books and films have been exhibited in Moscow. Scholars, writers, and artists have exchanged visits and participants from West and East confront each other in a growing number of international conferences, congresses, festivals, assemblies, and cultural jamborees of every possible kind.

These recent developments, coming as they do after years of Soviet cultural isolation, are to be welcomed and the exchanges are expected to become more frequent. The materials contained in the present issue should help to clarify current Soviet attitudes towards 'cultural co-existence'; it is intended in coming issues to continue this series on problems of co-existence, which began with Prof. Wetter's article in No. 30.

The Soviet position as outlined in the statements of authoritative spokesmen might be summarised as follows: 1. While political co-existence has become imperative, there is to be no 'ideological disarmament'. Political co-existence does not involve making any concessions in the ideological and cultural field. 2. The extension of cultural exchanges and ties is desirable inasmuch as it helps Soviet scientists to form a better picture of the work done in their respective fields abroad, and inasmuch as it helps to increase abroad the reservoir of good will towards the Soviet Union. 3. It is however undesirable that Soviet people should be exposed to 'alien ideas' that would be brought into the Soviet Union by some 'Trojan horse'. The Soviet Union wants the battle of ideas to continue (see the *Kommunist* editorial quoted below) albeit not necessarily in the old extremist 'Cold War' phraseology; but it does not want this war of ideas to be carried into Soviet territory (G. Zhukov's article below). 4. Such restrictions are not intended to apply to football matches, the appearance of dance ensembles, conferences dealing with sundry technological and other specialised problems, nor to all the natural sciences. They are however relevant to all those subjects on which Soviet ideology has a direct bearing. In theory, this would exclude all those contacts and occasions where political, social, and cultural ideas come into play. Since this differentiation is, however, difficult if not impossible to carry out in practice, friction will ensue: Soviet spokesmen regard the pursuit of the war of ideas as their inalienable right, whereas similar attempts made by the West are considered impermissible interference in Soviet domestic affairs, intolerable efforts to 'impose an alien ideology on Soviet people' (G. Zhukov).

These views, needless to mention, are unlikely to be accepted in the West; and it seems obvious that long and heated debates about the principle of reciprocity in cultural exchanges are yet to come.

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TWO APPROACHES TOWARDS CULTURAL CONTACTS

The following passages are taken from an article, published under this title in the Soviet journal International Affairs, *1959, No. 11, by Mr. G. Zhukov, Chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.*

WE would, however, be acting against our conscience if we were to say nothing about another approach towards the development of international cultural relations which is becoming increasingly manifest of late among definite groups in the West, in the USA in particular, an approach which has nothing in common with constructive co-operation and competition. We refer to the growing attempts to exploit the channels of cultural exchange for interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and peoples, for imposing an alien ideology upon them.

A leading statesman of the capitalist world already last year formulated with astonishing frankness the aim, which, in his opinion, the capitalist countries should set themselves when they enter into cultural relations with the Socialist states: he said that the aim should be to wage a war of ideas in the enemy camp. William Benton, former Assistant Secretary of State, declared with the same frankness at a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it was 'more important to reach the Russian people than to get to the Moon'. He went on to explain that 'a prime objective of American policy should be to achieve direct contact with' the group of 'middle leadership' of the Soviet Union for the purpose of 'indoctrinating' (!) it.

The so-called Atlantic Congress, held in London last June, discussed the question of relations with the 'Communist bloc'; moreover, it devoted special attention to the question of contacts designated, as specified in the report of the political subcommittee of this congress, 'to influence the minds of people living in Soviet Russia'. . . .

An answer to these questions is supplied by a folder circulated among American tourists who go to the Soviet Union by an organization named Arms of Friendship. This folder is handed to the American tourist who goes to the Soviet Union and he is asked to keep it in his pocket or passport.

The authors of the folder write: 'You have a God-given opportunity to plant good will among the Russians and let it grow.' Golden words, are they not? But what comes further leads one to doubt very much whether the seeds the American tourist is asked to plant in the USSR are really seeds of 'good will'.

In the part concerning preparations for the trip, the Americans are recommended to select in advance a 'subject . . . or other activity which you feel sure exists in the Soviet Union and which you are well acquainted with here at home'. Here is some of the advice given to tourists: 'It would be valuable to read up on the situation within the Soviet Union in your chosen field. Find out how and where to obtain knowledge about it during your coming trip. You could even try to make advance written contact with institutions and persons active in this area in the USSR, letting them know of your interest and proposed visit.'

And further: 'When in the Soviet Union, pursue your field and meet the people working in it. Establish friendly relations with these Russians on the basis of your common interest. When you leave them, encourage the idea of corresponding with Americans. Give them your address in exchange for theirs. What for? The authors of the folder leave no doubts on this score: get addresses from the Russians and give them to us, we will be able to use them. How—that is none of your business. The folder has it black on white: *'Obtain addresses from these Russians and we will find (!) American correspondents for them.'* . . .

No, instructions of this type could never inspire in a Soviet citizen confidence in people who would come to win his good graces by means of such methods. All the more so since the folder contains the following advice how to meet Russians: 'Observe how Russians act in various situations—on streets, in parks, in shops, at home, in factories, in offices; with subordinates, with superiors; in groups, alone; in large

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cities, suburbs, outskirts, small towns and in the country. Visit simple eating places, cafes, restaurants, markets, movie theatres. Use public transportation, walk around on your own. Get off the beaten track. . . . Take the initiative in meeting Russians. Participate in what they are doing (dancing, singing, standing in line, playing games, sports).' And this is topped by one more instructive and most meaningful bit of advice: 'Don't be just a passive onlooker taking in the sights.' . . .

'"Don't be afraid to leave your Intourist guide and strike out on your own," was the main theme of his remarks. He urged the would-be tourists to take long walks and use their eyes, to ride buses and other public transportation.'

Persons arriving in the USSR as American tourists of late have been trying more and more often not only to conduct oral propaganda in favour of capitalism, but also to distribute corresponding propaganda literature.

We would not have gone into it in such detail, if attempts to exploit cultural exchanges for tendentious propaganda designed to boost the capitalist system and to undermine the Socialist system freely chosen by the peoples had been made by way of 'private initiative', so to say, of individual organisations, such as the above-mentioned Arms of Friendship. The facts show that such efforts are lately increasingly made on a national scale and raised to a level of official policy of the Western Powers.

In negotiations between countries, representatives of the Western Powers are trying more and more often to replace the question of cultural relations by the question of the so-called 'free dissemination of ideas', seeking to open their propaganda centres in the Soviet Union for the unhindered circulation of their political literature and newspapers containing anti-Soviet propaganda, etc. Attempts are being made to utilize exhibitions for anti-Soviet propaganda purposes, to force upon us corrupting films, performances, and musical compositions which are at variance with the generally recognised æsthetic standards of Socialist society. But when Soviet representatives, acting in accordance with the will of their people, rebuff these attempts, the bourgeois press raises a demagogic cry about alleged opposition of the Soviet Union to the 'freedom' of cultural exchanges. . . .

THOSE who try by every possible means to exploit cultural exchanges for the purpose of spreading in our territory an ideology alien to us expect Soviet people to fly into a rage, lose their composure and say: we are shutting our door and lowering the 'iron curtain', and no contacts henceforth. Perhaps such an outcome would fully suit them. But Soviet people have strong nerves and watchful eyes. They will not succumb to provocation. They are determined to develop and extend their cultural relations with other countries. At the same time, however, Soviet people will not allow these contacts to be used as a Trojan horse stuffed with a hash of obscene refuse. And if anyone in NATO still harbours such illusions, it is high time to cast them overboard.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Extract from a leading article in Kommunist, *1959, No. 16.*

The realistic nature of the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence is borne out by yet another factor: the critics of this concept who believe that 'man is entitled to something better', have put forward no positive proposals. And that is understandable: they have nothing to propose. And, indeed, could the Soviet concept be countered with, say, a plan for peaceful coexistence on the basis of 'ideological unity'? It could not. For in practice this would mean demanding the immediate adoption by all states of either a socialist or a capitalist ideology. Since, however, neither side wishes to 'swap' ideologies, such a plan would not be a programme of peace and friendship among nations, but the programme of a crusade for the triumph of the 'true faith', in other words, a programme of war and mounting international tension.

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Another variant that some might think feasible would be an 'ideological truce'. Let each keep to his system and to his ideology, but abandon from now on all ideological struggle. But this variation, too, is quite unrealistic, and can appeal only to people who do not understand the essence of the social processes going on in the world, who believe that, given agreement, history could be made to stop.

In a world where millions and millions of the masses have been set in motion, and where they want to decide for themselves which social system can ensure for them a better life of human dignity, the eyes of all are firmly riveted on the developments in the socialist and capitalist worlds. In these circumstances it is not so much words as deeds which carry decisive ideological significance—the standards of well-being of the workers in the different countries, their economic and social successes, their achievements in the sphere of democracy, science, and culture, and the speed with which they make progress. People's interest in world events cannot be eradicated, just as it is impossible to divide our planet into mutually impenetrable sectors by creating barriers across which no glance or word may pass.

The ideological struggle is, therefore, not just some ruse or whim, but an irrefutable and real fact which reflects the existence of the different social systems. This fact must be recognised by all who wish to remain within the realm of reality.

* * *

The question today is not: is one, or is one not, to recognise the legitimacy of the ideological struggle? It is going on and will go on as long as there exist in the world different classes, different social systems. The gist of the problem, in the existing conditions of rivalry and ideological struggle between the two systems, is to prevent military clashes and to end the 'cold war', to rebuild international relations on the basis of cooperation and friendship between nations.

Is it possible to realise such a task? Communists answer this question in the affirmative. This is no wishful thinking on their part; it is based on a sober analysis of the contemporary world situation. Such an analysis proves beyond a shadow of doubt that the majority of problems harbouring the threat of war and international tension derive not from ideological causes. It is not, for example, ideological considerations but the unwillingness of the influential monopolies to part from the profits they make from the arms race which forms the stumbling-block along the road to disarmament. It is not the struggle of ideas but the policy of colonialism which is responsible for the never-ending and dangerous tension in South-East Asia, in the Middle East and North Africa.

On this issue history has most strikingly borne out the communist point of view. It has shown, in particular, that the recent large-scale wars broke out certainly not over ideological struggles, over disputes about the advantages and disadvantages of different social systems, but were the outcome of strictly materialistic considerations—the imperialists' chase after profits, colonies, spheres of influence, sources of raw materials and export markets.

In the light of such facts attempts to 'write off' all present-day conflicts and complications as ideological are most unconvincing. Even some Western politicians admit this today. None other than Allen—head of the United States official propaganda centre—declared recently: 'Even if we were to settle ideological differences, we would still have to organise international relations throughout the world in such a way as to prevent serious clashes between sovereign states. Britain and Russia quarrelled for one hundred years, up to 1914. The majority of Christian States fought one another just as readily as the Christians fought the heathens'. And, even before the emergence of the first socialist State, with all its 'ideological unity' unclouded, was the bourgeois world, constantly torn asunder by conflicts and wars, able to solve its disputes by peaceful means?

And yet history supplies ample proof of normal relations between states of different social systems and ideologies. It is known, for example, that the profound differences between a bourgeois-democratic republican country like the United States, and a semi-feudal absolute power like Russia, did not prevent them —for more than 100 years—not only from living in peace but also from building up their relations on a completely amicable basis. Neither did differences in ideology prevent an alliance

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between the country of socialism and such capitalist powers as the United States, Britain, and France in the years of the second world war. And in our modern age, too, there have been many examples of normal and really friendly relations between countries divided by grave ideological differences—such as the USSR on the one hand, and India, Indonesia, and Afghanistan on the other.

The latest and most convincing proof that even the sharpest disputes over ideology cannot prevent mutual understanding between peoples was supplied by Khrushchev's visit to the United States. During his meetings with Americans, Khrushchev, as we know, did not evade ideological discussions, did not gloss over the deep divergencies, but consistently expounded the Marxist-Leninist point of view on all the important problems of our day. Many of these meetings ended in sharp ideological polemics. But would anyone contest the fact that as a result of this visit relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have improved rather than deteriorated, and that this visit has made an enormous contribution to the liquidation of the 'cold war'?

Consequently, both the past and the present prove one thing: if one does not deliberately seek in ideological differences a pretext for the worsening of relations, then these differences cannot prevent successful cooperation between states of different social systems. And if sincere and consistent efforts are made in this direction, then, even given the rivalry of two systems and an ideological struggle, there is every possibility of ending the 'cold war' and achieving not some sort of substitute for peace, as some bourgeois characters maintain, but truly good-neighbourly friendly relations.

Naturally, not everything that we have come to call an ideological struggle is compatible with the principle of peaceful coexistence. It is one thing to have a battle of ideas, disputes over concepts and assessments of the different processes and phenomena of our reality, and ways of achieving the ideals pursued by the majority of mankind, over the advantages of different social systems. Such struggles and disputes must not and cannot hamper the decisive improvement in relations between socialist and capitalist Powers. But it is quite another thing to get slanderous propaganda, provocations, preachings of war, incitement to sabotage and other crimes, the spreading of rumours which bring confusion and discord into the life of society. Such propaganda, even if it touches on ideological problems, is not an ideological battle, but rather an undermining activity, an interference in other countries' internal affairs.

Some opponents of peaceful coexistence obviously try to make capital out of the fact that many people have in the last ten to fifteen years got accustomed to identifying the concept of the ideological struggle with that kind of propaganda, with the 'cold war' unleashed by international reaction against the Soviet Union. This propaganda can indeed inflict, and has in fact inflicted, substantial damage on relations between States, and has sown distrust and mutual hatred.

But the ideological struggle, as communists understand it, is certainly not a 'cold war'. 'Cold war' is a policy envisaging the use of all means, including the means of propaganda, in the first place for the preparation and unleashing of a real, a 'hot' war, and also for establishing constant interference in the internal affairs of other countries for the purpose of overthrowing the existing system there. It is this which determines the nature and methods of the appropriate propaganda (so-called 'psychological warfare') which had and has quite a few adherents in the United States, but which is firmly rejected by the Soviet Union.

Peaceful coexistence has the reverse object: to preclude war as a method of settling disputes between States and to ensure non-interference by the Powers in each other's internal affairs. Therefore, even the ideological struggle presupposed by such a policy cannot be in the nature of a 'psychological war' which poisons the international atmosphere and sets up serious obstacles to strengthening peace and establishing cooperation between peoples. Peaceful coexistence demands not the perpetuation and legalisation of 'cold war' methods, including propaganda, but their firm and resolute rejection.

This is not a question of ideology and social principles but a question of political means. On that question, as on others of inter-State relations, concessions and compromises are

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necessary and possible—concessions whose importance Khrushchev mentioned in his address at the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But there is no justification for the demands made on communists that they show their goodwill by making concessions over ideology, by a tolerant attitude to bourgeois ideas. To those who make such demands we can only say: You'll wait in vain, gentlemen! 'We must not confuse mutual concessions in the interests of peaceful coexistence between States', rightly said Comrade Khrushchev, 'with concessions over principle, over something that touches on the very nature of our socialist system, our ideology. Here there can be no talk of concessions or adjustments. If we should make concessions over principle, over questions of ideology, this would be crawling down to the position of our opponents. It would mean a qualitative change in our policy, and would be treachery to the working-class cause. He who takes this road chooses treachery to the cause of socialism and must be mercilessly criticised'.

That is why peaceful coexistence, even if its principles fully triumph in relations between states, does not eliminate from the agenda the irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois ideology. That is why, whatever the future development of international relations may be, the defence of his ideas and the preservation of their purity will always remain the sacred duty of every communist. Herein lies the profound difference between those who uphold the truly Leninist positions of principle and those who have slid down to positions of opportunism and revisionism.

There are and can be no compromises between bourgeois and proletarian views of the world. Private property or public property, a bourgeois state or a dictatorship of the proletariat, bourgeois democracy or socialist democracy—there is only one or the other position to be adopted on these and all other important questions; there is nothing in between. Communists, urging the principle of peaceful coexistence, do not ask of the bourgeoisie that it should betray itself on any ideological question. But they firmly reject any attempt to try and force them to betray their own ideas and principles.

A consistent, principled, and resolute ideological struggle is one of the important conditions in building socialism and communism in the countries of the socialist camp. And the communists propose a policy of peaceful coexistence not because they wish to retard this building process, but precisely because, above all else, they desire to make it even more successful.

EHRENBURG'S VISION OF SPRING

(Ever since he published his Thaw, *Ilya Ehrenburg has been involved in a running fight with the guardians of orthodoxy in literature. A more detailed account of these exchanges will be published in a future issue of* Soviet Survey. *What follows are excerpts from one of his latest articles* (Literaturnaya Gazeta, *5 November 1959*), *dealing in part with the problems of cultural relations with the West.*)

ONE would have thought it easier for writers to find a common language than for diplomats; but that is not so. There are among writers those who are so inured to the crackling frosts of the 'cold war' that at the sight of the first swallow they are inclined to sound the air-raid sirens. I have just read about the novel of an English poet and the article of an Italian essayist who both cast doubts on the possibility, or even desirability, of dialogue between the writers of the West and Soviet writers.

However useful the personal contacts between writers, artists, or composers may be, it is not they who determine cultural co-operation, but mutual acquaintance with novels, canvases, and symphonies. Diplomacy is one thing; literature is another. Personal contacts, negotiations, and talks can bring about agreement far quicker than the most melodious note; but however pleasant it is to talk to Hemingway (I know and love him), it is more to the point to acquaint oneself with the dialogue of his heroes. Inci-

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dentally, the advocates of 'cold war' in culture object not only to personal meetings, but also to a wider exchange of books. According to them, Soviet literature is 'propaganda', and since they are almost exclusively engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda, they find it far more profitable to provide their readers with the summary of a bad Soviet novel than the text of a good one.

I wish to express my profound conviction that there is no such thing as bourgeois art. There have been, and are, of course, bourgeois substitutes for art. Take a West European country like France, where the capitalist system grew up (and, incidentally, broke down) sooner than in other countries. Let us enumerate her great novelists of the 19th and 20th centuries—from Balzac to Martin du Gard, not forgetting Stendhal, Flaubert, Zola and Anatole France. Who among them preached bourgeois ideology? The artist cannot lie; that is abhorrent to the nature of art. Balzac, as we know, was a man of reactionary beliefs. But in his novels he exposed what in reality he wished to preserve. Of course, there were bourgeois writers in France—taking that same period of time—from Scribe to Paul Morand; it is difficult in this case to remember all the names: books of not very high quality are sometimes successful, but they are quickly forgotten; still, I will mention a few more; the plays by Dumas-fils and many others with the inevitable 'husband-wife-lover' triangle, the novels of Paul Bourget and Paul Adam; the apologia for colonialism by Pierre Loti and Claude Farrère, the syrupy lyrics of Sully Prudhomme. This is indeed bourgeois literature, but how far removed it is from real art!

Let us look at our contemporaries—not those who share our views but the writers who are far removed from us. There are the books of Hemingway and Moravia, Steinbeck and Sartre, Greene and Faulkner, Caldwell and Saroyan; do they defend imperialism, put forward an apology for colonialism, or the capitalist cult, or the idealisation of bourgeois society?

People will tell me: you forget about the 'black literature'. And indeed, the spectacle of grim existence coupled with the absence of all faith in the future has produced and continues to produce in some Western writers a feeling of 'no way out'. (For the same reason the readers like gloomy books and, alongside genuine pessimism, one naturally gets imitations of a pessimistic outlook—after all, fashion is fashion.) Some critics believe that the books of the despairing writers of the West are an attempt at saving capitalism, almost an ideological diversion. They refer with especial frequency to Franz Kafka, who died in 1924 and in whose novels, which are indeed devoid of all hope, there are indeed terrible presentiments of the ferocity and absurdity of impending fascism. But let us recall the books of Chekhov, relevant to the eighties of the last century: liberal critics called them grey, not black literature; some even maintained that Chekhov was, whether he wished it or not, supporting the lawlessness around him. As for the ruling circles of America, they are trying to propagate not Faulkner or Kafka or Sartre, but quite a simple optimism, the essential smile, delight in outward and spiritual comfort, diverting novels, 'comics', the non-stop output of Hollywood's dream factory—in short, anything that prevents a man from pondering the meaning and sense of life.

Some phenomena in Western cultural life testify to a certain decadence, such as the abstract and non-objective forms of art. Nor can they be assigned to the Trojan Horse of capitalism; real capitalists by far prefer the 'pretty-pretty' portraits of their wives or mistresses, and if they do buy canvases of abstract art, then only because one cannot ignore fashion. The non-objective form of art was not born yesterday; it may be found in the decadent period of the Minoan culture—1,500 years before our era. Why have many Western artists taken it up now? They have seen the wonderful works of their predecessors—Cézanne, Picasso, Van Gogh, Matisse, Bonnard—and did not know what to do next, how to avoid direct imitation. Abstract art, in my view, is a temporary eclipse, a ceding of positions, a decorative element that has taken the place of great painting. But even though it testifies to the senility of art in the West, we must pity such artists, for there is no reason to fear them: a child may catch measles or a grown-up become infected with typhoid: but there are no germs of senile decay.

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In Partibus Infidelium

THE CULTURAL APPARATUS

Frederick C. Barghoorn

A FOREIGN cultural policy on the scale pursued by the Soviet regime requires massive financing and organisation. It also presupposes research, a large-scale training programme (for example in the field of foreign languages), and the supplying and processing of foreign cultural materials for the information and instruction of the personnel employed in propaganda, diplomacy, and cultural relations. This logistic support, as it might be called, is impressive in its dimensions, although it must be remembered, in attempting to compare the Soviet effort with that of the United States, for example, that many programmes run by party and government agencies in Russia are carried out in non-communist countries by private foundations, religious organisations, and educational institutions.

The Soviet cultural relations programme is, of course, only one part of a total foreign communications effort which apparently cost the equivalent of about a billion dollars as early as 1950, and by 1953 was estimated to have required an expenditure equivalent to more than $1,167,000,000.[1]

Since May 1957 the most important administrative agency in the Soviet cultural exchange field has been the State Committee on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, a body with ministerial status, directly attached to the USSR Council of Ministers. Yuri Zhukov, former deputy editor of *Pravda,* was named chairman of this committee, and one of his deputies, A. N. Kuznetsov, helped to negotiate the 1958 Soviet-American exchange agreement. B. N. Krylov, a former Tass correspondent in the United States, was made head of the committee's American section.

[1] See Sub-Committee on Overseas Information Programme of the United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Staff Study No. 3, *The Soviet Propaganda Programme,* 82nd Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1952), pp. 18-20.

The State Committee took over some functions formerly handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by VOKS. Its formation reflected the increasing importance of cultural relations in Soviet foreign policy and the accompanying shift of emphasis in worldwide communist propaganda from overtly revolutionary appeals to a 'co-existence' policy requiring some measure of inter-governmental cooperation. It also gave the USSR a governmental agency which could appropriately deal with such bodies as the British Council or the American State Department's East-West Contacts Staff.

A front page *Pravda* account of the arrival in Russia of President Nasser of the United Arab Republic, on 30 April 1958, revealed that among the Soviet notables who greeted the UAR leader was the chairman of the State Committee. This story also mentioned the presence of S. V. Kaftanov, a former minister of higher education, and now Deputy Minister of Culture, but on this occasion it identified him as president of the new Soviet Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with the Countries of the Arab East. The presence of these two executives symbolises both the new significance and the continued organisational duality of Soviet foreign cultural policy. The society headed by Kaftanov is only one of the many under the overall coordination of the new Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, established in February 1958. For all practical purposes the successor to VOKS represented a continuation of that organisation under a new name, but it was made clear at its founding that VOKS had pursued policies and methods now condemned as 'outmoded'. This probably meant that VOKS's previous close association with foreign communist parties, and the crudity of its past policies, especially in dealings with non-communists, were now to be modified and its

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activities coordinated more smoothly with Soviet foreign policy. We can better understand the significance of this change if we briefly survey the activities of VOKS in earlier years, but first it should be noted that the functions of such agencies as VOKS and the State Committee for Cultural Relations intermesh with those of a whole system of propaganda organisations, only a few of which can even be named here.

SYMBOLICALLY, the first president of VOKS was Anna Kameneva, a sister of Leon Trotski, while subsequent presidents, such as F. N. Petrov, Vladimir Kemenov, and A. I. Denisov, who became president in 1947, were scholars who could appropriately act as liaison officers with foreign intellectuals and scientists.

However, VOKS's last president, Mrs. Nina Popova, who became president also of the successor organisation, is a prominent Soviet politician who formerly headed the 'Women's Anti-Fascist Committee'. This fact, together with the circumstances that among the five vice-presidents of the new organisation two at least, Messrs. Kalishyan and Vyzhilin, were formerly vice-presidents of VOKS, made it appear that the new Union was in fact VOKS under another name. After the formation of the new body, as before, the types of exchanges most likely to win favour with non-communists abroad continued to be operated mainly under the auspices of the powerful new State Committee.

Spokesmen for VOKS used to emphasise that it was not a 'state' organisation, and that its republican branches were independent. When, in 1946, the present writer visited Mr. Mikhava, then head of the Georgian branch, the Georgian made the same point. Undoubtedly this emphasis upon the 'voluntary' character of VOKS and upon the autonomy of its branches was intended to facilitate its work among non-communist foreign intellectuals, by making it appear to resemble the types of non-governmental organisations with which they were familiar at home. VOKS had sections for law, literature, natural science, agriculture, theatre, music, etc. It also had geographic sections, specialising in individual countries and areas. Scattered references in the Soviet press revealed the existence of various sections of VOKS, but, as in the case of other Soviet organisations, no comprehensive description was ever given. We learned of the existence of a 'section for Soviet culture' during the first of two visits to VOKS in June 1956. An officer of this section was present at both of the meetings which VOKS arranged with Soviet professors.

In his first 1956 visit to the Moscow headquarters of VOKS this writer, perhaps because he was not an invited guest and in fact had appeared one day unannounced in the office of a Soviet law institute graduate who was at the time in charge of the American section, was treated rather gingerly. The first question put by the officer in charge of the American section was, 'How did you find us?' His perplexity may have been increased by my reply that I would like to meet Soviet intellectuals who could explain what the Soviets meant by 'co-existence'. However, after a rather long wait, two interviews, one with historians and the other with economists, were arranged. On both occasions visitor and hosts drank tea and ate cookies and candies.

According to Soviet sources, VOKS maintained 'plenipotentiaries' in foreign countries, who established contacts with foreign 'friendship societies' and with 'individual progressive leaders of culture in foreign countries'. VOKS invited foreign cultural delegations to the Soviet Union. It also ran a broad programme of exchange of publications and other cultural materials. In addition, from its founding in 1925, it carried on a considerable publications programme of its own. Until October 1956 VOKS published an attractively printed monthly *Bulletin* in French, German, English, and other languages. In January 1956 VOKS took over publication of the newspaper *Moscow News*, to provide English-reading foreign tourists with 'an unbiased picture of the development of the Soviet Union'.[2] In October 1956 the VOKS *Bulletin* was replaced by *Culture and Life*, a magazine published monthly in English, Russian, French, Spanish, and German.

A few Soviet press reports on VOKS activities may illustrate its role in Soviet cultural diplomacy. When a delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic left Moscow in February 1943, after presenting gifts to the Red

[2] *VOKS Bulletin*, No. 1 (96), January 1956, p. 10.

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Army, it was seen off by the then chairman of the Administrative Board of VOKS, V. S. Kemenov, together with Deputy Commissar for Internal Affairs Merkulov and other high officials (*Krasnaya Zvezda,* 7 February 1943). In November 1947 Mr. Kemenov held a reception for delegates of Czechoslovak, Finnish, and Norwegian 'Soviet Friendship Societies', which was attended by G. G. Karpov, chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Orthodox Church; I. V. Polyanski, chairman of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults; N. N. Romanov, chairman of the Committee for Physical Culture and Sports, and a number of leading Soviet artists and scientists (*Pravda,* 11 November 1947). *Pravda* (4 January 1955), reported a reception given by the governing board of VOKS in honour of visiting Afghan physicians and cultural leaders, which was attended by the then new president of VOKS, Professor A. K. Denisov, by three VOKS deputy chairmen, a deputy minister of culture, and members of the medical, theatrical, musical and oriental studies sections. VOKS, together with the Soviet Committee for the Defence of Peace—the Soviet section of the World Peace Council—held a celebration, attended by more than two thousand persons, in honour of the tenth anniversary of the Franco-Soviet Treaty of 1944 (*Pravda,* 11 December 1954). On this occasion, Messrs. Bulganin, Malenkov, Molotov, and Khrushchev were among those present. A list of the top officials of the Ministry of Culture published in *Pravda* (6 February 1955) included the name of Kemenov, who had by this date become a deputy minister of culture.

An illustration of the role of VOKS in action as exporter of Soviet culture was furnished by the mission of a seven-member VOKS delegation to India in 1957. Headed by E. I. Afanasenko, Minister of Education of the RSFSR, this delegation also included a leading Soviet Indologist, the deputy chairman of the Uzbekistan branch of VOKS, and other appropriate personnel. The group spent three weeks in India and its activities were reported in detail in the *Times of India,* though, interestingly enough, neither *Pravda* nor *Izvestiya* published a line about them.

Speaking in Bombay, Afanasenko assured Indians of the 'warm and friendly feelings' of Russians towards India, and in Mysore he declared that new Indian industrial construction was as impressive as the magnificent classical art and culture of India. Personal contact, he said, was an even more important link between peoples than exchange of art and literature.

The functions of Intourist also merit attention. Vladimir Ankudinov, president of Intourist, stated in an article published in the Soviet English-language magazine *USSR* (1957, 12), that the staff of his organisation numbered 5,000. Intourist, he said, was affiliated to the International Union of Travel Organisations and had business relations with sixty-eight travel agencies on four continents.

Some idea of the scale on which Intourist operates was given by Mr. Ankudinov in a press conference, reported in all major Soviet newspapers for 25 July 1957, called by the Press Section of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Ankudinov reported that 487,000 foreigners, from eighty-four countries, visited the Soviet Union in 1956, of whom more than 154,000 came for purposes of tourism or medical treatment, or on family matters. In the same year 88,709 Soviet citizens travelled for similar purposes to foreign countries, of a total of 562,000 Soviet citizens who went abroad in that year.

AN important part in the Soviet foreign cultural programme is played by the International Book Company, a little-known organisation often referred to by the Russian abbreviation *Mezhkniga.* According to the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia,* this organisation was founded in 1923 and it exports books, periodicals, music, and records. An outstanding place in its operations, said the article, was occupied by the 'countries of the democratic camp'. *Mezhkniga* does not, of course, confine its activities to the Soviet orbit. American specialists on Russia are familiar with the huge bookstore operated by Four Continent in New York. Similarly well-known as outlets for the sale of Soviet publications are the Collet bookshops in London. In France, West Germany, Italy, and other western European countries, and particularly in India, where there are six or seven big stores specialising in Soviet publication, the Soviets actively merchandise the printed

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word. However, especially in Western Europe and the United States, *Mezhkniga's* most important function is probably to procure foreign publications rather than sell Soviet publications. According to an article in the *New York Times* (9 April 1955), the American branch of *Mezhkniga* bought $150,000 worth of American publications in 1955.[3] Of this sum about three-fourths was apparently spent on scientific materials. Non-communist countries are at a disadvantage as compared with the Soviet Union both in procurement of Soviet publications and sale of their own publications in the Soviet Union.

Soviet professional organisations, including the Union of Soviet Writers, the Union of Soviet Composers, the Union of Soviet Journalists, and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, play an important part in the conduct of Soviet cultural exchange policy. Major libraries, such as the Lenin Library in Moscow or the Saltykov-Shchedrin Library of Leningrad, are also among the numerous agencies whose activities are, at least to some degree, coordinated for this purpose. During World War II, the present writer received cordial cooperation from several top officials of the Lenin Library in his efforts to expand publications exchange between Soviet and American libraries, and from the chairman of the Foreign Commission of the Union of Soviet Writers, who told me in 1956 that sixty persons were employed in his organisation's section for Polish literature alone. This gives some idea of the contribution which the Writers' Union makes to the large scale international effort discussed here.

MATERIAL support alone cannot explain the vigour and flexibility of Soviet cultural policy Its greatest strength, probably, consists in a training programme designed to provide educated Soviet citizens with a politically slanted but appreciative view of foreign culture. Although the benefits of this policy are limited by ideological orthodoxy, they are still considerable.

Significant illustrations of the curious Soviet compound of doctrinal intolerance and cultural internationalism can be found in the field of education. In a sense, the heavy emphasis in Soviet primary and secondary education on the study of mathematics, biology, physics, chemistry, and astronomy represents a form of cultural internationalism, for the principles of natural science are identical in all lands. At times, of course, unacceptable theories have been suppressed and unorthodox scientists persecuted. Again, despite the ideological distortions in instruction, the requirement of three years of 'world literature' in the eighth, ninth, and tenth grades of secondary school, and the four year courses on ancient, medieval, and modern history, also obligatory for all pupils, give a useful background for future cultural intercourse with foreigners. A knowledge of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and the first part of Goethe's *Faust*, tested by written examination, is among the requirements for admission to all Soviet higher educational institutions. Other requirements in the field of literature include a mastery of the theses of Lenin's article, 'Party Organisation and Party Literature', and of the ideological decrees promulgated in 1946 by the Party Central Committee.[4]

The mass study of foreign languages, with emphasis on their practical application, occupies a central position in Soviet training for intercultural communication. Mass training is accompanied by specialisation of high quality for advanced students. There is little doubt that in this field, even more than in the natural sciences, Soviet primary and secondary schools, and probably higher education institutions as well, are doing a better job than their American competitors. This is especially true in terms of numbers of students involved.

Until 1953, the study of one foreign language, usually English, French, or German, began for all Soviet school pupils in the third grade. Beginning in 1954, all graduates of Soviet secondary, or ten-year, schools have been required to study a foreign language for six years.[5] Before World War II, German was the language most commonly studied in the USSR. Since the war first rank has been accorded to English. It has been estimated that about ten million Soviet students were studying English in 1957.

[3] *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, 2nd ed., Vol. 27, p. 10.

[4] *Spravochnik dlya postupayushchikh v vysshie uchebnye zavedeniya* (Moscow, 1956), p. 23.

[5] *Uchitelskaya gazeta*, 11 December 1954, p. 2.

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In contrast, only about four thousand Americans were studying Russian, in 155 of America's nearly 1,800 colleges, with perhaps, at most, a few hundred high school students of Russian.

Millions of Soviet school children study German and French. Beginning in 1949, Spanish was taught in some elementary schools as the required foreign language, at least for some pupils.[6] *Pravda*, 2 April 1957 published a story entitled 'Children Are Studying Eastern Languages'. Beginning in the second half of the 1956-1957 school year, instruction in Chinese, Hindi, and Arabic was begun in some of the Uzbek secondary schools of Tashkent. 'Specialist-teachers' were assigned to these tasks, and the Ministry of Education of Uzbekistan began preparation of textbooks. Apparently Tashkent was not the only Soviet centre in which oriental languages were being taught in 1957 at the secondary level, for the *Times of India* (10 January 1957) reported that Hindi and Urdu were being taught in some Moscow secondary schools.

Abundant evidence continued to accumulate in 1958 of growing Soviet interest in the languages of India. For example, according to *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* (4 October 1958), in order to satisfy demand for study aids in Bengali, Hindi, Urdu, Marathi and other Indian languages, conversation manuals, grammars and texts were being published by the State Publishing House for Foreign Literature. The same item reported lively interest in India in a Russian grammar published by a former member of the Indian embassy staff in Moscow.

More than a dozen Soviet schools give instruction in Near Eastern and Asian languages to pupils beginning at the age of eight. This programme is likely to be expanded, and it is probable that in a decade or so there will be hundreds of individuals, primarily Uzbeks, Tatars, Azerbaijanis, and other Soviet Asians, combining exotic-language proficiency with a variety of trades and professions.

With a few exceptions, such as training in veterinary science, agriculture, and elementary school teaching, applicants for admission to Soviet higher educational institutions must pass examinations in one foreign language. English, German, French, and Spanish are listed in the official guide to entrance requirements. Work in one or more foreign languages is continued at the university and graduate school level.

FOR several decades the Soviet Union has possessed an excellent system of specialised higher educational institutions which train foreign language teachers, translators, and interpreters. Without them, the work of Intourist and, indeed, the entire Soviet cultural relations programme, would not function with nearly its present effectiveness. In 1956 there were seventeen pedagogical institutes of foreign languages in the Soviet Union.[7] In the same year approximately 10,000 persons were studying English in specialised Soviet higher educational institutions. About the same number were studying German, and perhaps half as many were specialising in French.

Soviet foreign language institutes offer a five-year course. In addition to intensive language study, culminating in two years of study conducted exclusively in the language of specialisation, there are general subjects, such as geography, history, and Marxism-Leninism, and there is a great deal of instruction designed to make the student an expert on the country or countries whose language he is studying. Thus the work in advanced foreign language schools represents in some ways a Soviet equivalent of American 'area studies'. In addition to this type of training there is, of course, a great deal of advanced work in philology and linguistics in Soviet universities, which includes some of the best work in the world on both Western and Oriental languages.

There have been many indications in the last three or four years that practical and theoretical training in foreign languages and cultures, especially those of Asia and Africa, has been rapidly expanding. The chairman of the English Language Department at Moscow University published an article in June 1956 on the importance of intensifying the study of foreign languages in preparation for the 1957 Youth Festival. She thought there were too few Soviet university graduates who could speak a foreign language fluently, despite the fact that

[6] *Inostrannye yazyki v shkole*, No. 1, 1953, pp. 104-8.

[7] *Spravochnik*, op. cit., pp. 212-14.

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the Ministry of Higher Education had recently issued instructions to higher educational institutions to extend the study of foreign languages into the third and fourth years of university work. Logically enough, she pointed out that knowledge of foreign languages was an elementary prerequisite for the development of cultural relations and personal contacts with foreigners.[8] Like many of the numerous other criticisms published in the Soviet press regarding the quality of foreign language instruction, this article, too, indirectly revealed the great scope of the Soviet language training programme. For example, it stated that language instruction in the secondary schools was not yet good enough to permit Soviet university students 'knowing one language' to proceed boldly to the study of a second foreign language.

While, by German or French university standards, this may seem a modest goal, it must be remembered that the number of persons receiving a higher education in the Soviet Union is many times as large, both absolutely and in proportion to the population, as it is in Germany or France, Switzerland or Holland. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (8 August 1957) reported that one of the Indian delegates at the World Youth Festival had said that he felt very much at home because he had learned that many Soviet youths spoke languages such as Hindi, Urdu or Bengali. A keen observer who attended the Festival, wrote:

> It might be worth while to note that the Russians were able to find top rate interpreters for each language spoken by the Festival delegates. Not one, but several. I asked some of the Russians whether it was difficult to find interpreters for some of the dialects and lesser-known languages. The answer was, 'We make sure that we have enough people studying all the different languages to provide for our language needs whenever such things as the Youth Festival come up!'[9]

By contrast, most Americans abroad find themselves entirely dependent on interpreters and translators.

Students at the specialised Soviet foreign language schools must decide, at the end of the second year, whether they wish to become teachers, translators, or interpreters. Those who are accepted for the coveted and difficult translator and interpreter courses often find employment with Intourist, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Soviet UN staff, etc.

In addition there are at least two important Soviet higher educational institutions at which specialised training for foreign service work and related occupations may be obtained. These are the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and the graduate Diplomatic School. Both are under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but actual operation of the Institute is left largely to the Ministry of Higher Education. The Institute, like most Soviet higher educational establishments, offers, in its six-year curriculum, training which corresponds partly to undergraduate and partly to graduate instruction in an American university. The Diplomatic School is solely a graduate institution. Competition for entry to the school is said to be exceptionally keen, partly because so many young people seek an opportunity to travel abroad; it is generally believed that only party members are admitted.

After my own visit in 1956, two acquaintances succeeded in locating and talking to administrators and teaching personnel of the less 'sensitive' of these two institutions, the Moscow Institute. It has about 1,000 students, of whom about two-thirds are in its Western—Europe and Latin America—and one-third in the Eastern department. Heavy emphasis is placed upon language training, but there is also instruction in history, international relations and Marxism-Leninism. While much easier to enter than the Diplomatic School, which is apparently restricted to personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute nevertheless requires a stricter political clearance for admission than do most other institutes.

Some of its graduates work for Intourist, and some receive employment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which also draws, however, on other institutes, and on Soviet universities, for its personnel. Also, if present Soviet practice continues past traditions, the ministry might be expected to obtain many of its officials from the academic and engineering professions and from the ranks of the communist party apparatus.

[8] *Moskovski universitet*, 19 June 1956, p. 3.
[9] George Abrams, 'Talking with Russians,' *The New Republic*, 14 October 1957, p. 14.

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Graduates of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations who do not enter the foreign service may be employed by Soviet foreign language publications, translating and propaganda agencies, and the like.

Perhaps it should be noted here that graduates, and indeed all entrants into Soviet higher educational institutions in general, have a high status in Soviet society. In this respect, as in many others, Soviet society carries on tsarist traditions. Students receive stipends, which vary with grades and with family income but do not in any case cover all expenses, although full tuition is of course covered. Rich fathers (such as professors), sometimes pay the full expenses of their children's education. University students are exempt from the obligations of military service, except for officer reserve training, which takes relatively little time.

Even before the death of Stalin, and on a rapidly expanding scale thereafter, Soviet academic institutions embarked on a large-scale foreign area research and training programme. A notable feature was the revival of Oriental and African studies, which had flourished in tsarist and early Soviet times but had languished since the purges and repressions of Soviet Orientalists in the 1930's. Orientalists were directed to shift the emphasis in their work from antiquarian-philological interests to more urgent, contemporary political problems. The Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences was reorganised in 1940. After sharp prodding —including Mikoyan's derisive remark at the twentieth Party congress that 'although in our day the whole East has awakened, the Institute is still dozing'—a second, more thorough reorganisation was effected in 1956.

IN addition to providing cadres of specialists for the processing of material relating to Asia and Africa, the growing Soviet programme of language and area training and research (probably modelled, in part, on American programmes) helps Moscow to implement its economic and cultural policy in these areas.

In the meantime, as one part of an overall effort in the publication of dictionaries (which far surpasses the corresponding American effort), Soviet scholars have stepped up their work on rare Asian and African languages; Soviet linguists as well as social scientists and historians claim that the attention they pay to 'the peoples of the East' contrasts sharply with the practice of 'bourgeois' scholars who, they assert, neglect and even despise Oriental as well as Slavic cultures.[10]

The recent expansion of Oriental and African studies has not implied any diminished attention to the West, particularly in the crucial field of economics. In his address to the twentieth Party congress, Mikoyan made it clear that Soviet scholars would in future be expected to study deeply all aspects of the economic and social development of the advanced Western countries. He taxed Soviet scholars with having displayed less energy in studying the American economy than Americans had expended in research on the USSR. He appeared to think that Russia could still learn much even from a 'dying' capitalist society, and his audience applauded when he promised that more statistical and archival information would be made available to scholars.

Even before Mikoyan made that speech, the Soviet Academy of Sciences had opened an Institute of Contemporary Capitalist Economy. A leading Soviet authority on American history, Professor Leo Zubok, told me in 1956 that he was giving a special course on American history at Moscow University, and that similar courses were about to be started at a few other major institutions, such as the University of Kiev and the Gorki State University. The Soviet economists with whom we spoke were well informed regarding American economic journals, though they somewhat surprisingly asked if the pamphlets and information bulletins compiled by American banks and corporations were available to the public and could be obtained by Soviet scholars.

The Soviet leaders are fully alive to the importance of other significant techniques for the information and guidance of the cultural cadres. For example, the anniversaries of great foreign writers, artists, and scientists are conspicuously observed. On 28 April 1955, the Soviet Academy of Arts held a memorial meeting in honour of the fiftieth anniversary of the death of the Belgian sculptor Constantine Mene. The Belgian ambassador spoke at the ceremony,

[10] *Pravda*, 11 April 1954; *Sovetskaya Kultura*, 9 *June* 1955; *Kommunist*, 1955, 8, pp. 74-83.

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which was attended also by the president of the section for 'representational art' of VOKS.[11] In the same year, the World Peace Council called upon 'progressive mankind' to mark the 200th anniversary of the death of Montesquieu, who was described in *Sovetskaya Kultura* (15 March) as 'a noble thinker, champion of freedom, and of peaceful life and prosperity of the peoples'. A considerable portion of this very long article was devoted to the alleged friendship between notable Russians, such as the poet Kantemir, and Montesquieu, and to the fact that other outstanding Russian writers, such as Radishchev, had thought highly of the French 'enlightener'. In 1956, extensive ceremonies were organised in Russia in honour of the 2,500th anniversary of Gautama Buddha. Like other Soviet techniques, commemoration is adapted to time and circumstance. And so, with the shift to a somewhat softer line towards the United States after Stalin's death, the Soviet press once again began to publish favourable articles about Walt Whitman, Benjamin Franklin, Abraham Lincoln, and other 'progressive' figures of the American past.

[11] *Sovetskaya Kultura*, 1 May 1955.

On appropriate occasions, such as visits to the Soviet Union of important foreign personages and cultural groups, artistic, literary, or historical exhibitions are arranged. Usually these exhibitions are intended to supplement Soviet propaganda regarding some matter of current interest, but they may also fit into a larger perspective. They serve the dual purpose of acquainting the interested Soviet public with appropriate aspects of foreign cultures, and of demonstrating to foreigners Soviet appreciation of non-Soviet culture. As a representative example of the educational and political function of such exhibitions one might mention the display in the Central Park of Culture and Rest in Moscow, in November 1955, of Indian arts and crafts. A leading Soviet art authority described the exhibition in a two-column article in *Sovetskaya Kultura* (10 November) which combined ecstasy of mood with rich factual detail. An indication of his approach was suggested by his statement that, 'Entering the exposition, the viewer literally enters India, the country of miracles'.

The total effort only partially surveyed in this essay is so vast as almost to defy description. A full study of the Soviet organisation and training for cultural penetration would require several years of effort by a large research staff.

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The 1959 Literary Season

FOREIGN BOOKS IN THE USSR

THE number of books by foreign authors published in translation in the Soviet Union is steadily growing, and a closer look at the imported literary fare offered to the Soviet reader may be of some interest. It is estimated that about 1,200 books of foreign authors were published in the Soviet Union in 1959. This figure is an approximate one, based on the announcements in Soviet library journals, since no official Soviet statistics exist. It does not include, for instance, novels published in instalments in Soviet literary magazines, or foreign authors translated into Soviet languages other than Russian (the total may therefore be slightly higher). It is not perhaps very impressive in comparison with the total number of books published in the Soviet Union in 1959, which is expected to be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 60,000 (63,000 in 1958). It is in fact quite possible that works by all foreign authors together will not reach the figure of those published in Lithuanian (1,416 in 1958) in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, several specific circumstances should be taken into account. Of the 63,000 books published in 1958, a great number were brochures and pamphlets, and about 40-45 per cent were publications commissioned by a ministry or some other institution and given away free of charge. The books by foreign authors, on the other hand, are mostly real books, not booklets, and are sold through commercial channels, not given away. In comparison with 1957 the publication of books by foreign authors has doubled, while in comparison with the dark years of 1951-2 the progress is overwhelming.

English, by a wide margin, comes first among the languages from which foreign books have been translated (about 38 per cent). It is followed by French (16 per cent), and German (14 per cent). Chinese (6 per cent), Czech and Slovak (4 per cent), and Polish (3 per cent), are further down in this list. All these figures are approximate. Other languages are very sparingly represented (Serbo-Croat—2 per cent, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian approximately one per cent each, and other languages even less).

The most striking feature of these figures is the 'Western orientation' of Soviet literary policy, despite the activities of the various societies for promoting cultural ties with Asia. Only a handful of books have been translated from Arabic, Indonesian, Vietnamese or the Indian languages. Even China's share remains very low despite a great effort to boost Chinese literature. If we subtract from the Chinese total the works of Mao Tse-tung and other official documents, translated for obvious political reasons, and the various collections of classical Chinese folk tales, novels, and poetry, we find that of the enormous number of contemporary Chinese novels and other literary works describing China's experience in building Communism, very little indeed has been found of sufficient interest for the Soviet reader. The picture is even more striking if we compare the number of copies of books printed. Despite instructions to refrain from giving too wide currency to certain Western books and to boost the circulation of Asian literatures, Western books are, as a rule, issued in much bigger editions. The average edition of a contemporary Chinese novel is about 25-35,000; Mao Dun (the Chinese Zhdanov) with 45,000 copies, and Tsia Lai's *Spring came to Ya-lu-Tsia* (75,000) are exceptions. But selections from Hemingway and Remarque (writers who have been published in Russia before) were issued last year totalling 300,000 copies each. 320,000 copies of Stendhal's *Collected Works* (15 vols.) were printed, and 540,000 copies of a 30 volume edition of Dickens. All these figures are dwarfed by the foreign favourites among Soviet readers —Alexandre Dumas père, for instance. *The Black Tulip* was printed in 60,000 copies for local consumption in Omsk, and 225,000 copies of *Ten Years After* in Alma Ata for Kazakhstan alone. Soviet publishers have announced that Mao Tse-tung has been published 58 times in

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twenty languages, and that 2½ million copies appeared in the USSR, and yet the author of *On People's Democratic Dictatorship* cannot even begin to compete with the author of the *Count of Monte Cristo*.

NO statistics are available for the total number of books by foreign authors published in the Soviet Union since 1917. The figures given for foreign *belles lettres* published between 1917 and 1957 are as follows:

Total number of books	15,971
Translations from the French	4,124
American	2,572
English	2,414
German	2,233
Polish	593
Hungarian	427
Chinese	395
Czechoslovak	378
Danish	376
Italian	335

A comparison of these figures with the translations published in 1959 tends to show that there has been a certain shift: English and American authors have gone up, while the relative share of French and German translations has fallen. It should be noted, however, that the figures for 1959, in which translations from English take first place, include not only *belles lettres* but also technical books, and that an exact comparison is therefore impossible. Among the most widely published foreign authors between 1917 and 1957 the following are mentioned in the official statistics (in millions of copies):

Jack London	18.5
Victor Hugo	13.1
Jules Verne	12.8
H. Chr. Andersen	11.8
Honoré Balzac	10.1
Mark Twain	9.4
Theodore Dreiser	8.5
Guy de Maupassant	8.3
Emile Zola	7.7
Charles Dickens	7.6
H. G. Wells	6.3
Romain Rolland	5.7
Stendhal	4.6
O. Henry	3.6
Anatole France	3.6
Daniel Defoe	3.5
Swift	3.4
H. Sienkiewicz	3.2
Shakespeare	2.9
Howard Fast	2.9
Stefan Zweig	2.7
Andersen-Nexo	2.6
L. Feuchtwanger	2.6
J. Hasek	2.4
Cervantes	2.4
Galsworthy	2.2
Heine	2.2
B. Prus	2.2
M. Sadoveanu	2.1
Tagore	2.0
B. Vasov	2.0
A. Irasek	1.9
Goethe	1.8

It should be borne in mind that these figures refer to translations into all Soviet languages, not only into Russian. Not included in these statistics are authors that are not considered highbrow (or upper middle brow), such as, for instance, Alexandre Dumas and Conan Doyle, who would otherwise undoubtedly appear high up in our table.

WHAT kind of foreign books have been published in the Soviet Union in 1959? It is of course impossible to provide a full list, and all we can do is to point to certain distinct categories. The majority of foreign books deal either with the natural sciences or with technology. From a political point of view this literature does not present any particular problem, though there are some (on such topics as the theory of games, cybernetics, economic planning) that must have been very carefully checked before approval was given. Another large section of foreign books is harmless enough from the censor's point of view, because written either by Communists or by sympathisers, by leading figures in the world Communist movement, or such well known party writers as Aragon, Pierre Daix, André Stil, Jack Lindsay, Katherine Pritchett, not to mention the East European, Chinese, or North Korean writers.

The remainder—written neither by citizens of the Popular Democracies, nor by Western Communists or technical experts—perhaps 100-200

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in number, are the most interesting in this context. There is one category which is apparently not subject to any limitation: books on military affairs. General Fuller's studies were translated even under Stalin, and 1959 saw the publication of such books as H. Kissinger's, D. Butler's second volume of the history of the second world war, and Nicols and Shaw's *Conquest of Okinawa*.[1] There has been a certain softening with regard to some foreign Marxists who fell out with Lenin in 1917 and who have not been published for a quarter of a century. Some of Kautsky's minor writings, for instance, appeared again in 1959, and Hilferding's *Finanzkapital* is again available in the Eastern bloc. This liberalism does not, however, extend to books by Western Socialists written after 1917. Western social sciences are poorly represented in translation. Some books on modern history are now published which, though not Communist in inspiration, do not offend Soviet ideological susceptibilities and are evidently welcome as 'independent evidence from bourgeois writers'. Among them are Taylor's *Struggle for Domination in Europe 1848-1918*, Alexander Werth's recent book on France (1940-1955), Doreen Warriner's study of agrarian reform in the Middle East, and Charles Issawi's *Egypt in Mid-Century*.

Many Western novelists of the 18th and 19th, and to a lesser degree of the 20th century, have always been published in the Soviet Union; notable additions in 1959 are Thomas Hardy (*Jude the Obscure* and others), Joseph Conrad (*Selections*—225,000) copies), Sherwood Anderson, Dorothy Parker, Katherine Mansfield (for language students) in English, Maeterlinck, F. Duerenmatt and Stefan Zweig in German. Lastly, there is a category of entirely unpolitical books: Hagenbeck the German zoo pioneer on animal life, Heyerdahl's *Aku-Aku*, and, last but not least: R. Izzard *On the traces of the abominable snowman* in 200,000 copies.

Soviet literary policy as revealed in the choice of translations from Western and other languages is a fascinating subject, but it cannot be discussed in detail here. It may be stated, *grosso modo*, that only such books as are politically or culturally inoffensive from the Soviet point of view are published (with the notable exception of military subjects), that the choice of Western books is now more liberal than it used to be, but that, outside the natural sciences and technology, it is not yet representative of 20th century Western literature.

Soviet spokesmen have frequently complained that there is but little interest in the West for Soviet books, whereas so many Western writers have been translated in recent years in the Soviet Union. But the published figures do not seem to bear out this complaint. In comparison with about 1,200 books by non-Soviet authors published in Russia in 1959, around 9,000 Soviet books have been published abroad each year since 1957. It is an impressive figure, even if one takes into account that probably the great majority of these books and booklets were sponsored by Soviet representations abroad and local Communist parties rather than published through ordinary commercial channels.

[1] It has unfortunately been impossible to trace in all cases the original titles.

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The Spirit of Stresa

SOCIOLOGISTS IN CONFERENCE

Leopold Labedz

THERE were over 100 delegates from the Soviet bloc at the Fourth Congress of Sociology at Stresa in September 1959. By now many of them have published their reports on the Congress, and these make one doubt whether one had been to the same place. Psychologists and sociologists have for a long time been concerned with the problems of perception. Distortions due to selective preconceptions, different cultural background, political bias are universal, and there would be nothing exceptional in their being reflected in articles on the Congress published in different countries.

But the Eastern European reports on the Congress do not contain merely such 'normal' ingredients. There is in them an 'abnormal' element of politically 'built-in' bias.

Raymond Aron, in his introductory speech to the Congress, remarked that the American and Soviet reports on the state of sociology in their respective countries shared one distinction: they were both very satisfied with it. What the grounds are for such satisfaction and whether they are comparable can, of course, be argued, but there was no unanimity among the Americans about the merits of American sociological achievements, and differences of opinion on this could be and were publicly expressed. There was no parallel in this respect between the Soviet and the American participants. There was even less parallel in their reports on the Congress.

It is not just that the Congress looked different under Western and Eastern eyes. It is rather than its presentation has different motives under Western and Eastern skies. In one case one is dealing with more or less adequate individual impressions and reflections, in the other with politico-pragmatic considerations overriding any individual impressions and reflections which may have in fact occurred.

For reasons of space only some excerpts from Eastern assessments of the Congress can be quoted.

According to *Kommunist* (No. 17, 1959) 'the French professor, Raymond Aron, well-known for his anti-Marxist views, was compelled to say at the Congress, despite all his qualifications, that there are two most influential sociological "schools" in the contemporary world: the Soviet and the American'. Another Soviet delegate declared in the international Communist organ, *World Marxist Review* (No. 12, 1959): 'If at the previous Congress in Amsterdam bourgeois sociologists clearly realised that Marxist sociology could no longer be ignored, at Stresa they were forced to enter the lists against it. . . . Even such a zealous advocate of the capitalist West as Raymond Aron, the French publicist, who does not conceal his hostility to Marxism and communism, acknowledged that "the sociology of Marx, whether one likes it or not, belongs to the present. . . . No one, whether Marxist or anti-Marxist, can deny that millions of people regard themselves as followers of Marx".'

A Polish participant reported (*Polityka*, 3 October 1959): 'The basic characteristic of the Congress was the undeniable increase of the role and participation of Marxists and the fact that Marxist sociological problems came into the centre of attention in the discussions. . . . The opponents of Marxism (for instance, Raymond Aron) could no longer pass over in silence its existence and its role. . . .' A Czech delegate echoed these sentiments (*Kultura*, No. 44, 1959): 'The practical success of Communist construction, the grand achievements of Soviet science, and the real strength of Marxism as the theory of the socialist camp, have placed Western ideologists in an extremely difficult position. This is proved by the close attention devoted to Marxism by the representatives of various sociological trends at the Fourth International Congress of Sociology. . . . This is also proved by the new form of polemics against Marxism in which direct gross attacks are rare. The old adversary of Marxism, the French sociologist

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Raymond Aron, still opposed Marxism in his report to the Congress. Marxism, he says, is a limited expression of the working class. American empirical sociology represents modern society. He admits, however, that Marxism must be taken into account and he advocates "peaceful competition".' In an article, 'Bourgeois Sociology on the Defensive' (*Predvoj*, 12 November 1959), a Slovak participant similarly argued: 'It can be said that the Fourth World Congress of Sociology took its course in the wake of Marxism-Leninism, which came to the fore on a broad front and substantially influenced the discussions at the Congress, its themes and deliberations. . . . Even such an openly bourgeois ideologist as Raymond Aron declared that "beyond the boundaries of mutual aggression a broad field of empirical research extends far and wide".' The new editor of *Voprosy Filosofii*, however, reported in the December issue of that journal:

> There are reasons to believe that some organisers of the congress hoped that Professor Aron's paper would set the tone and steer it into a definitely anti-Marxist direction . . . the basic conclusion of the paper was that since sociology in each country is 'tied up with its social context', there is not and cannot be any mutual understanding or scientific cooperation between the sociologists of the socialist and of the capitalist camps. . . . In his remarks, P. N. Fedoseev showed that R. Aron was really trying to prove the inevitability of 'cold war'.

These excerpts provide samples of reporting on just two themes: one general (Marxist influence at the Congress), and one particular (what did Raymond Aron really say?). One need hardly add that there is a uniform tendency to (though not uniform degree of) distortion in these reports, and that the distortion has nothing to do with the theme of the Congress, 'sociology of sociology'; it must be analysed not so much in terms of 'sociology of knowledge' as in terms of knowledge of politics.

What Raymond Aron was really saying can be easily checked. As to the interest in Marxism, even Western Marxists at a session devoted to it lamented the Soviet Marxo-sclerosis, which resulted in a complete refusal to apply Marxian ideas to the analysis of Soviet society, a clear duty of Soviet sociologists.

The interest in the East European delegates was, of course, very great and indeed it would have been surprising were it otherwise. Whether the impressions, once the curiosity was satisfied, were as unambiguous as the Eastern reports imply, is another matter.

Some of the conversations with the Soviet delegates were interesting, some were revealing. Some were unintentionally funny, and some were just plain dull. Some were pathetic.

'BUT I tell you, Professor, it will really be very tiring. To go by car to Venice from Stresa and to return on the same day—*ça n'en vaut pas la peine*. Most of the time you will be on the road and there will hardly be any time left to see things in Venice. I've just returned from there and it took me over six hours to drive one way. . . .'

The venerable Academician shook his head: 'No, *Gospodin* Labedz, it will be worth while. To be in Italy and not to see Venice? I cannot miss such a chance.'

I could understand. For him it was the first opportunity since the Revolution to see the Piazza San Marco, to go by *vaporetto* on the Canale Grande, to watch the sunset from Ponte Rialto, to absorb the charm of a city which does not change. With all his privileges as a member of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences and his two Orders of Lenin, this was for him a unique occasion. And so early next morning, together with some of his colleagues, the Academician set out on a journey by car to Venice. He returned late at night and I saw him next day in his hotel room relaxing in pyjamas after a strenuous trip which coincided with the landing of the Soviet *lunik* on the moon.

I had the uneasy feeling that I had been through this situation before. But it could not have been in my previous incarnation and *karma* had nothing to do with it. A similarly ironical juxtaposition occurs in one of Marek Hlasko's short stories, *We Take Off For Heaven*, where a conversation referring to the squalor of the life of workers in Poland is punctuated by an announcement through the factory loudspeaker that a lecture is to be given

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in the trade union hall on 'When and How We Will Fly To The Moon'. And a Czech citizen listening to a similar lecture is supposed to have asked *à la manière de* Schweik: 'Please, Comrade Lecturer, and when will we be able to travel to Vienna?'

Well, *se non e vero e ben trovato*. In this case *certamente* ben trovato. Here we were at the Fourth World Congress of Sociology in Stresa and the Soviet Professor did not even realise the irony of the situation. I myself felt that the irony was somehow too pointed, that the coincidence was almost too striking at a Congress where one of the themes was 'Sociology in its Social Context'.

From Amsterdam to Stresa

THE first occasion when delegations from the Soviet bloc countries attended an international congress of sociology was in Amsterdam in 1956. They were not numerous then, but this time they appeared in force: there were 26 Russians, 25 Poles, 16 East Germans, and almost as many Czechs, not to count smaller delegations from other East European countries. The 1959 Stresa Congress, mainly devoted to a discussion on the 'sociology of sociology', also provided an opportunity to see how the changes in the Communist countries were reflected in the various delegations, and in particular how their attitude to sociology had been affected by its formal recognition as a special branch of knowledge.

As in 1956, the Soviet delegation was led by P. N. Fedoseev, the director of the Institute of Philosophy, charged with the task of giving out the official line from the platform. In Amsterdam he fulfilled this task with that air of self-satisfied *hauteur* which an *apparatchik* assumes who does not realize that he is making himself ridiculous. This time Fedoseev was much 'softer'; he even admitted in his opening speech that some of the Soviet writings on Western sociology were 'incorrect' and were based on ignorance (an ignorance which, he said, was rapidly vanishing). His report on 'Sociology in the USSR' (printed in the *Transactions of the Congress*) is an attempt to present the ideological outpourings of the Party philosophers as scientific contributions to sociological research. The books he mentions can impress only those who have not read them. The authors he refers to, like Stepanyan or Yovchuk, are Agitprop hacks who have been engaged for years on such 'sociological' problems as 'non-antagonistic contradictions' and other varieties of ideological casuistry and verbal hair-splitting, which provide the doctrinal rationalisation for the current Party line. The first number of the bulletin of the new Soviet Sociological Association, prepared specially for the Congress and purporting to give a list of Soviet sociological *ouvrages*, is likewise a pathetically poor attempt to smuggle in under a new name the old style of article concerned mainly with propaganda and not analysis, and designed to hide social reality and not to expose it. This bibliography could hardly be regarded as having fulfilled the role attributed to Soviet sociology by Fedoseev (*Kommunist*, No. 17, 1959): 'At the present stage the ideological struggle does not, of course, get "slack" but gets more intensive, and in this struggle there is an honourable role to be filled by the Marxist-Leninist science of society.'

For the last two years Soviet publications have referred to intensive preparations for the Congress, suggesting that sociology is coming to be regarded as one of the most important sectors of the 'ideological front'. Since 'peaceful coexistence' does not imply an abatement of the ideological struggle, one might have expected the Soviet delegates to make a greater effort to pursue it vigorously, and not to be content to produce some weak and primitive papers, and then do little but sit back. Fedoseev himself seemed to be in two minds, perhaps because the Congress was taking place on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to America, and 'peaceful coexistence' required them to be on their best behaviour.

This certainly did not apply to the East Germans, who were prolific in their 'ideological pronouncements', without exception unrepentantly Stalinist in tone. The differences were not accidental, nor were they spontaneous: as one of the East European delegates remarked, the East Germans attending international conferences are told to make themselves heard and felt, in order to impress on the world at large the image of a separate German state. The young Party stalwarts (who looked exactly like their counterparts from the *Hitlerjugend* twenty

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years ago), certainly did their best to fulfil Party orders. A Western Marxist at the Congress observed in the *Manchester Guardian* (17 October 1959) that if Soviet Marxism might be termed the Stone Age variety, that of the East Germans must have evolved along with the anthropoid apes.

The Poles, of course, were at the other end of the spectrum. But the uncritical stereotypes about the 'new winds from Poland' often reflected the ignorance of Western participants about the complexities under the surface. The ritual of *politesse* and the legitimate admiration for the intellectual recovery of Polish sociology were often combined with unawareness that it is facing deteriorating circumstances, that there are new cold winds accompanying the retreat from the Polish October. Even some Polish participants got a bit impatient with praise offered in good faith, but not rarely directed to a wrong address. Because of this tendency to make immediate and superficial judgments, the slight progress made by the Russians since 1956 and the signs of regression threatening the Poles could easily have been overlooked by many participants whose observations were limited only to the contrast in mentality, knowledge, and behaviour of the members of the two delegations. It was certainly no less striking than in 1956 in Amsterdam, but the comparison would be misleading if it did not take into account what the Marxists would call 'the dialectic of development'.

The Soviet Delegation

AT first the Soviet delegation to the Congress moved around in shoal formation: Fedoseev in front, slightly behind him the new editor of *Voprosy Filosofii*, Okulov, and then the main body of the delegates, with the old editor, Kammari, trotting unhappily at the tail. In Amsterdam he was full of self-importance, at Stresa he was rather self-effacing. The collective, in addition to the leader, had a special guide who, together with two other angel-guardians, took care not only of the material but also of the spiritual well-being of the members of the delegation. In this bourgeois environment they might have fallen prey to the corrupting influence of their Western colleagues. But the shoal formation soon broke down and the Soviet delegates began to attend in little groups the separate meetings of various sections of the Congress. They seemed rather lost, took part in the discussions only on rare occasions, and some of them soon got tired of attending their sections and were seen walking around Stresa. As only a few could understand other languages than Russian, and as there was no Russian simultaneous translation provided in the special sections, it is not surprising that the duty of attending meetings became rather wearisome. Some, however, persisted in fulfilling it manfully, sitting through the proceedings and representing their country without understanding a single word of the papers or of the discussion. (In many cases, it was perhaps better that it should be so.) To make contact with them was not easy for Western sociologists; the Soviet delegates could often be seen sitting on the terrace of their hotel assiduously playing chess, another illustration of 'sociology in its social context'.

The Soviet delegation was not only bigger than at Amsterdam, its composition was also slightly different. In 1956 it included the ideological functionaries and a sprinkling of the old professors. This time, in addition to these two categories, there were some younger people, and also some 'specialists' on Western sociology like Sayapina and Frantsev, the President of the newly-created Soviet Sociological Association, who not long ago were writing about 'the lackeys of Western imperialism propagating sociological theories of misanthropy and racism'.

They are not entirely happy with their status and they try to raise it by association. At home, despite the privileges granted to them, their status is low in comparison with the real Soviet scientists, i.e., those working in the natural sciences, who naturally do not have any high regard for them.[1] They are therefore rather eager to attend international conferences which, they feel, confer on them some of the lustre of 'bourgeois science', officially scorned and secret-

[1] The inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* natural scientists is of course not a monopoly of Soviet social scientists, but in the West it can at least be critically assessed and the sociologists can produce ideas as well as compensations.

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ly envied. Such contacts with their 'ideological opponents' provide them with an opportunity to improve their domestic position. On the other hand, having nothing to offer in real intellectual achievement when abroad, they try to get some credit by association with the achievements of Soviet technologists. The title to glory based on Sputniks and Luniks, was expected by some sort of intellectual osmosis to be conferred also on Soviet social scientists. They were annoyed at not being elected to the Presidium of the International Sociological Association, and the complaints raised included the inevitable references to the great-power status of the USSR and to the lunar missiles. Western explanations that the elections reflected individual preferences based on sociological achievement were dismissed with a shrug of the shoulders. Back home, the leader of the Soviet delegation boasted of the impression it had made at the congress and wrote: 'We have all the conditions necessary to liquidate finally in the international arena the inflated prestige of bourgeois sociology in the sphere of so-called concrete sociological investigations'.

These feelings of inferiority *vis-à-vis* 'bourgeois sociologists' are acute and embarrassing. The Soviet delegates tried to compensate by a display of punctilio in protocol, by laying great stress on status deference, and similar symbolic and ritualistic mannerisms. But the pretences were thin; at a party they gave, where the atmosphere was relaxed and alcohol loosened tongues, the hosts complained that they were looked upon as if they were a different breed. One could hardly suppress the reflection that it was the fault of the Soviet government itself, which had for years stressed the eschatological opposition between 'socialist' and 'bourgeois' science.

However, if the Soviet delegation failed to impress the Congress by living up to Fedoseev's claim that the experience of socialist society has shown that it leads to an all-round development of personality, it did contain some personalities which were neither round nor square. The younger members of the delegation were both more straightforward and more intelligent. While the *apparatchiki* and not a few of the older professors resemble walking gramophone records (even in private conversation they talk like *Pravda* editorials), some of the younger delegates showed intellectual curiosity and a sense of humour. In conversation they were both more restrained and more dignified, and sometimes one could catch a glimpse of a *sousentendu*, a critical hint, or even a joke about Khrushchev. Their writings are undistinguishable from those of the others and one can rarely infer subtle differences in mentality and attitude from an analysis of the texts they published.

Although individual contacts between the Soviet and 'bourgeois' sociologists were not very frequent, and those which did occur were on a rather superficial level, the Soviet delegates circulated much more freely than at Amsterdam three years earlier. So much so that Fedoseev (at a closed meeting) had to warn them against too close contacts with the Western participants and to advise them to remain vigilant against the ideological encroachments of 'bourgeois sociologists' in personal conversation.

But the leaders of the delegation were eager for official contacts and attended a series of functions, where they met American, British, and other Western sociologists. On such occasions the notables of the Soviet delegation were courteous but diplomatic. They were cautious when proposals for sociological co-operation were put to them, although they accepted the idea verbally and even agreed to an exchange of an article between *Voprosy Filosofii* and the *American Journal of Sociology*. Okulov added that the article should be unpolitical (which is, of course, precisely what is wanted, provided that it is really so). At home, *Agitprop* continues to hammer into the Soviet scientists' heads that science cannot be apolitical.

Conversations with the individual members of the Soviet delegation provided occasional glimpses not so much into Soviet sociology (which practically does not exist) as into its social context (which is only too real).

All the notables in the delegation were, of course, members of the 'new class'. They were partly *vidvizhentsy* who have arrived, and partly old professors who have survived. In both cases their attitude is conservative. The intellectual *parvenus* are content with arrival, the intellectual opportunists have been adjusting themselves for so many years that it became second nature, and now, having gone through

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all the upheavals, they praise heaven for survival and do not want any change. One man casually admitted that he was arrested during the Great Purge, but added: 'Well, but they soon released me and now I have a *dacha*, two cars, and a Jewish governess to teach my children languages'. (Apparently the 'cosmopolitans' can now be used by the 'new class' for the tasks which the French *Mademoiselle* and the English *Miss* performed for the European aristocracy and *haute bourgeoisie* in the 19th century.)

The notables are intensely patriotic and derive a good deal of satisfaction from the great-power status of the Soviet Union. At a party given by the American sociologists for the Russians, Academician Nemchinov, in the course of friendly conversation with Professor Inkeles and myself, suddenly introduced the subject of American military bases, worked himself into a state of synthetic indignation over the 'encirclement' of the Soviet Union and the military threat it presents, and declared emphatically: *'No my budem zashchishchatsya zubami'* (We will defend ourselves with our teeth).

This was an unprovoked outburst, as the conversation was on subjects of sociological and economic interest. But Nemchinov has a sixth sense in anticipating anything which might conceivably touch upon ideology or politics. His fame in the West rests on the stand he took against Lysenko, but although he is pressing for certain modifications on scientific issues, he is concerned with efficiency rather than heresy. He is highly competent as a statistician, and also as an economist. As a sociologist he has nothing to say and pretends not to see, for instance, what interest there can conceivably be in such problems as social stratification and social mobility in the Soviet Union. He denied the applicability of the concept of stratification to the Soviet Union. (In 1926 he wrote *Statistical Studies on Class Stratification in the Soviet Village.*) He referred to the surveys of family budgets conducted in the USSR (which are not being published), and asserted that the samples are large and that every care is taken to make them representative. The three panels include peasant, industrial worker, and intelligentsia families. This gave me the opportunity to ask for the ratio between the average family income in each group. Faced with such an ideologically sensitive question Nemchinov hedged a bit, but then said that if the average worker's family income is taken as 100, the average peasant's family income would be 75 and that of the intelligentsia 150. But Nemchinov is not really concerned with social or sociological problems; during his long career he has learned to avoid them. He is currently occupied with the new economic techniques (Input-Output, Linear Programming) and believes that with their transplantation to Russia it will be possible to do economic planning much more efficiently, while electronic computers would help to solve the problem of price adjustments in the Soviet economy. (He told me pretty much the same things as those reported by Mr. Levine in the previous issue of *Survey*. He mentioned Prof. Leontief's visit to the Soviet Union and added: 'But he is wrong in attributing to us [in an interview given to the American *Business Week*] *otstuplenie ot Marksizma* [a retreat from Marxism]. On the contrary, he himself benefited from it in developing his I-O analysis. Besides, he was not the first to develop it'.)

As to the study of sociological subjects, the Soviet delegates had little to report, but it seems that in the last year or so some attempts have been made to adapt survey techniques to a few innocent subjects. A study of a factory in the Urals included some investigation into industrial relations (apparently mainly from the angle of the effect of wage-differentials and working-time on productivity). If the elements of industrial sociology are adopted in the Soviet Union, they will be taken from what is aptly called in the West 'cow sociology' rather than from *verstehende Soziologie*.

It is clear however that empirical investigations, or what Fedoseev calls 'concrete investigations', will now be undertaken more often. They will be sociographic rather than sociological, and they will be kept, of course, strictly within the limits of current Party orthodoxy, but they will definitely widen the sphere of activity of Soviet social scientists. They may at first include subjects bordering on the related disciplines. Soviet ethnographers have done some research on the changing structure of the family among non-Russian peoples in the USSR and among the kolkhoz peasantry. Kharchev, a young professor, is now engaged on a more

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general investigation of changes in the Soviet family. On the borderline of economics, it seems possible that consumer surveys will be adopted as one of the techniques which may help in dealing with the problem of the changing pattern of Soviet demand, which will become more of a problem as, with industrial growth, the general scarcity of consumer goods gives way to relative scarcities.

The status of Soviet sociology will be raised. It may even acquire an Institute in the Academy of Sciences, which may eventually publish its own magazine. The President of the new Soviet Sociological Association, Frantsev, said so in a conversation, but added: 'It may however take two or three years'. Fedoseev, on the other hand, dismissed the idea.

Whatever the eventual outcome, it was clear that the Soviet delegates were highly conscious of their limitations in the public forum of a sociological conference. They felt quite lost in the intricate jungle of 'bourgeois sociology'. Perhaps this was one reason why their attitude to the Polish delegates was rather different at Stresa from what it was at Amsterdam. In 1956 they were very cold towards the Poles, not to say hostile, and (at a closed meeting) rebuked them for their revisionist attitude towards Marxism (that was before the Polish October). In 1959 they were quite amiable, and actually looked for help from the much more sophisticated Poles in finding their way in some of the perplexing situations with which they were faced at the Congress.

The Polish Delegation

THERE was a pathetic discrepancy between the attitude of the Western participants towards the Poles, which was nothing short of enthusiastic, and the mood of the Poles themselves, which was to say the least ambiguous.

The Poles came to Stresa as the one delegation from the Communist bloc which could show that a real and not only formal rehabilitation of sociology had occurred in their country. They could show it not only by reference to publications and research done in the last three years, but in the first place by the simplest testimony of all: a decent intellectual level and the ability to take part in a dialogue. However, if the years between the Amsterdam and Stresa Congresses were for them the years of recovery, they now had a feeling that the zenith had been passed and that they are facing not a period of further growth, but of growing difficulties, uncertainty, and Party encroachment on the sphere of sociology.

Western sociologists, full of admiration, were not always aware of the underlying drama. The Poles mixed freely, took an active part in the debates, and were constantly engaged in informal conversations. All these reflected their intellectual recovery, but, for more reasons than one, they were trying to suppress rather than advertise the underlying anxiety.

That it was not without foundations can perhaps be best illustrated by the case of the leading Polish sociologist, Chalasinski, who wrote a report for the *Transactions* of the Congress.

Chalasinski, a pupil and follower of Znaniecki, was involved in various compromises during the Stalinist terror, but during the early thaw he made a strong stand for liberalisation, in particular in the field of sociology.[2] Shortly after the Amsterdam Congress he was called to testify as an expert in the celebrated trial of persons accused of taking part in the Poznan riots in June 1956. As he put it in his report to the Stresa Congress, the testimony included 'the detailed sociological interpretation of the attack on the security police . . . (which)—contrary to the original official version—was not the work of criminals, but a continuation of the workers' demonstration and their reaction to the police regime'.

In Amsterdam Chalasinski was in high spirits, looking forward to a political improvement in Poland which would create conditions for the resumption of sociological work, and he was not mistaken.

This time the prospects did not seem so good. And indeed, shortly after his return from Stresa, he was relieved of his posts as deputy-secretary of the Polish Academy of Sciences, editor of a sociological magazine, and a director of the

[2] Cf. the present writer's articles: 'Spotlight on Poland' in W. Z. Laqueur and G. Lichtheim, *The Soviet Cultural Scene*, 1956-57 (London, 1958), and 'Destinies of Sociology in Poland', *Soviet Survey*, No. 28.

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Institute of Sociology. The Institute itself was closed. The very report given by Chalasinski at the Stresa Congress served as a reason for these measures.

Immediately after the Congress Chalasinski was attacked in the Polish press by two young members of the delegation, who charged him with presenting Polish sociology 'in a light which does not make easier a real understanding of its problems',[3] and with giving 'a one-sided and harmful picture'.[4] There was no attempt to refute any of the specific points made in Chalasinski's report, which took as its theme the relation between sociology and mythology, and which illustrated the suppression of the former and its replacement by the latter during the period of 'errors and distortions' (when Mr. Gomulka was in prison and sociology was banned).

Soon afterwards came an article by Professor Tadeusz Szczurkiewicz condemning Chalasinski in the theoretical organ of the Party, *Nowe Drogi* (No. 12, 1959). Szczurkiewicz, another pupil and follower of Znaniecki, is well known for his readiness to fulfil Party orders. In his article he said that although not present at Stresa, he feels that the tone and level of Chalasinski's report was not appropriate:

> What purpose was there in returning at an international scientific congress to matters settled long ago and explained long ago by the Party itself and in scientific circles? They were discussed in detail in the press, as well as in Party and scientific publications. What real purpose was to be achieved by an extremely subjective outline, tendentious in the selection of facts and pronouncements, of the alleged destinies of post-war Polish sociology given at a sociological conference in 1959? The events which took place in the period 1948-1956 in Poland, were after all known better and in greater detail to the participants of the Stresa Congress.

This is, of course, very flattering to the 1,000 participants at Stresa, but their knowledge of the destinies of sociology in other countries than their own was, after all, limited, and it was the purpose of the national reports to extend it. But Chalasinski's sin in the eyes of the Party stalwarts is real enough. After the Polish October, references to the preceding period have undergone a process of gradual euthanasia: at first open references 'calling a spade a spade' were replaced by euphemistic references to 'the previous period of errors and distortions'; then the euphemism was shortened to the expression 'the previous period'; and now the censorship prevents such critical references, whether euphemistic or not. (A Warsaw wit refers to the present as a 'neo-previous period'.) Chalasinski has not only broken the rule, but has done so in an international forum. Besides, personal feelings play a role. Because of the performances given 'in the previous period' when sociology was suppressed, the actors are extremely sensitive to such references, and mutual recriminations have now given way to the demands of the ideological functionaries to put a blanket over the whole story, so that there is no possibility of assessing the degrees of guilt *vis-à-vis* sociology.

Szczurkiewicz quotes Chalasinski's report that 'conformism was the price paid by the intellectuals for escaping the social void', and then refers to his praise of Stalin's 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR' as 'the highest achievement of the historical trend of humanism', in an article published after Stalin's death.

It was considered disloyal and immoral of him to refer in his report to similar performances by Professor J. Hochfeld in the same period, instead of proclaiming a mutual amnesty, particularly as Chalasinski's own record is not without blemish. But the Party spokesmen who were then busy suppressing sociology in Poland and forcing the sociologists to compromise, and who now resent the open references to what happened, should be the last persons to hand out blame. Besides, it is clear that the matter transcends personalities. Not only has Chalasinski been dismissed, but Hochfeld (who has shown revisionist tendencies) was also dismissed from his post as director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs. And the paper on planning by Professor Ossowski, which created a sensation at the congress, earned the following comment in *Voprosy Filosofii*: 'It is quite obvious that such a treat-

[3] *Polityka*, October 1959.
[4] *Nowa Kultura*, 27 September 1959.

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ment of the problem aimed at sowing doubt about the great superiority of socialism over capitalism.' Thus all sociologists who have shown a tendency to transcend the Party line, whatever their personal relations, are coming under fire.

In the report Chalasinski ironically referred to the fact that 'the new Catholic church (named after the Virgin of Chestochowa, Queen of the Polish Crown) planned for the inhabitants of Nowa Huta is to be located at the junction of three streets; Karl Marx, Great Proletariat, and Mayakovsky. It must be remembered that the newly built steel town of Nowa Huta was considered by the Communist Party the pride of socialism'. Chalasinski concluded: 'The story of Polish sociology in the post-war period should be included among the extreme clinical cases of the impact of social mythology on sociologists. . . . The killing of all sociological research work, all exchange of comparative scientific information concerning contemporary societies, the suppression of statistical publications on various aspects of economic and social relations in the country—all this did not make more attractive the Stalinist model of socialism, but it helped the party to monopolise the moulding of minds according to the socialist-nation myth'.

In 1956 Chalasinski's testimony contributed to the movement of opinion which brought Gomulka to power. In 1959 Chalasinski's testimony on the destinies of Polish sociology caused his dismissal.[5] Little did the Western sociologists at Stresa, who paid so many compliments to the Poles, imagine that a report to an international sociological congress might cause the closing of an Institute of Sociology so recently established.

The facile and not always well-informed enthusiasm about the Poles had another negative side: it created an exaggerated self-satisfaction among the young Polish sociologists, who frequently did not realise that it was not a result of the evaluation of the intrinsic merits of their work, which are still modest, but was rather due to the contrast they presented with the other East European delegates.

[5] *Trybuna Ludu*, 29 November 1959.

But this qualification certainly does not apply to the paper presented by Professor Ossowski, which stood out not only in comparison with the Eastern contributions but also among the mass of often trivial and pedestrian Western sociological efforts, and which became the highlight of the Congress. In this paper, entitled 'Social Conditions and Consequences of Social Planning', Ossowski touched on the unintended consequences of planning, which are of particular interest to sociologists. In this respect cultural creativity has a special place, as it so often falls victim to some form of state planning. Ossowski's observation that 'the same nonconformist currents can be condemned in one country as *Kulturbolschevismus*, and in another as capitalist or imperialist degeneration of art', led him to several pertinent questions:

> If selection of the forms and content of artistic and scientific activity has to be made by conscious planning according to some scale of values superior to that which governs the market selection, a fundamental question arises: Who is the judge of values? And if we agree that there are some reliable experts for some kinds of values and if their opinions are granted by the planning body, who should compare values which have no common measure? Whose subjective hierarchy of values should decide? Who should select the people who have to be maintained by society for creative work? Whose tastes are to have the privilege of shaping the mass culture? And then a number of practical questions follow: How avoid one-sidedness and uniformity? How guarantee the interplay of different tendencies and patterns? How keep the way open for new values, perhaps of vital importance, which do not fit the prevailing patterns and are not in harmony with the modes of thinking of the planning body? And how counteract the pressure of changing political interests in planning the production and expansion of goods that are thought to have a durable value? There will always be reason for concern lest even the most authoritative words about the hundred flowers which ought to bloom get lost in the course of political troubles.

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This is as true under Gomulka as under Mao, and the dismissal of Chalasinski soon after these words were spoken is a case in point. But few Western participants realised in Stresa that what they had taken as a flowering of Polish sociology was actually the beginning of a period of blight.

Sputnik Sociology

AFTER the successful launching of the first earth-satellite by the Soviet Union a story went the rounds in Eastern Europe that Bulgaria had soon afterwards launched its own tiny Sputnik. The astronomers then discovered that it was rotating in the orbit of the big Soviet Sputnik.

The Bulgarian delegation in Stresa was small, consisting of just one person (later joined by another delegate), who moved in Fedoseev's orbit all the time. He consulted him before taking the floor, trotted zealously in his wake, and tried hard to make himself useful. This was not an easy thing to do. At a congress where one of the subjects was the 'sociology of knowledge', ignorance of sociology might have been a helpful, but not a sufficient condition for making intelligent pronouncements on it. And it is really mental cruelty to demand of people who not long ago were not even allowed to use the word 'sociology', that they pontificate about what it should be (without knowing what it is). The Bulgarian satellite presented a pathetic case. The orthodox product of a Party school stuffed with a crude version of Marxism, he seemed the ultimate link in the evolutionary chain of the vulgarisation of Marx (Lenin-Stalin-Khrushchev-Zhivkov).

Czech participants at the Congress were inconspicuous, their reaction to it may be judged from the following report published by the Czech weekly *Kultura* (No. 44, 1959):

> The Soviet space rocket which reached the moon was a portent of a new age in the history of mankind. On the fringe of that fundamental social achievement a small incident occurred which was observed by only one thousand direct participants: up to the moment when the rocket reached its destination the official languages at the Fourth International Congress of Sociology in Stresa were only English and French. From that moment onwards it was possible to present reports and to lead discussions in Russian. A small but significant ideological echo of the great fundamental tendencies of our time.

It is hardly necessary to add that this is just a piece of science-fiction. Okulov reported in *Voprosy Filosofii* that 'the Russian language was not an official language at the congress and this, of course, made our participation in the discussions rather difficult.'

If the Czech delegation was the most self-effacing, the East German was the most conspicuous. They pushed themselves into the foreground and lost no occasion to make ideological pronouncements (in the best 1952 style) both in the plenary sessions and in the discussion in the Congress sections.

One such pronouncement in the section on mass-communication was followed by a question on the operation of censorship. This was met by a blank denial of its existence in Eastern Germany. Whereupon one of the Poles took the floor, expressed his ignorance of the state of affairs in Eastern Germany, and pointedly went on to describe the censorship in Poland. Earlier, in reading his paper on the functioning of the press in Poland the same young sociologist several times referred to its operation 'in the conditions of *a one-Party system in Poland*'. In the mimeographed text of his paper the relevant sentences referred instead to 'the functioning of the means of mass communication under *the system of Socialist democracy*'. It was this delegate who, after his return to 'the Polish system of Socialist democracy', denounced Professor Chalasinski for his report at Stresa.

Under the blue sky of Stresa, when the Soviet Lunik was travelling towards the moon, sociologists who gathered to study 'sociology in its social context' could see for themselves the complexity of inter-satellite relations and catch glimpses of the drama being played here on earth, in sociological and not cosmic space.

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ORIENTALISTS CONGRESS: MOSCOW 1960

The 25th Congress of Orientalists originally scheduled to take place in Leningrad in August 1960, will now take place in Moscow—'taking into consideration the desires expressed by Orientalists of different countries', as the Soviet press announced. The following article by A. Litman, secretary of the organising Committee of the Congress (published in Sovremenny Vostok, *No. 7, 1959), gives a fair indication of the preparations made by the organisers, the innovations they hope to introduce at the forthcoming meeting, and their intentions in general. There is reason to assume that this Orientalists congress is regarded in Moscow as one of the highlights of the 1960 season.*

The 25th International Congress of Orientalists will be held in August 1960 in Leningrad. This Congress, held for the first time in the country of socialism, places great responsibilities on its organisers, the Soviet Orientalists.

The decision to hold the 25th International Congress of Orientalists in our country was made as a result of the increased prestige of Soviet orientalists, whose scope and achievements have been widely acclaimed and greatly appreciated in the international circles of progressive oriental scholars. The implementation of the large programme of measures for the preparation and holding of this Congress must enhance and increase even further the prestige of Soviet orientalists and orientology, whose development is based on the lasting foundation of Marxist-Leninist theories.

Soviet scholars have already implemented a number of measures in connection with this Congress. The Organising Committee has examined and confirmed the structure of the 25th International Congress of Orientalists, which envisages the work of 20 sections concerned with all the branches of oriental studies. In this the Committee was guided not only by the traditions evolved in the course of previous Congresses, but also by the changes in these studies brought about by the new processes of development in Eastern countries at the present epoch—the epoch when the shameful system of colonialism is being crushed and nations are emerging which have gained independence and are now on the road to independent historic creativeness. That is why, in addition to the sections which will deal with the traditional scientific problems of the history of the Middle Ages in the East, archeology, classical eastern philology and so on, the Congress also provides for sections which will examine the whole complex of problems associated with the historical development of the various countries or areas of the East, such as, for example, the sections on Japan, Mongolia, India, South-East Asia, and so on. The problems proposed for discussion include not only the historical past of the peoples of these lands, their culture and way of life in the middle ages, but also the historical experience gained from their national liberation struggle, the paths and laws governing their independent political and economic development. . .

It should be noted that this structure of the Congress not only reflects realistic shifts in modern oriental studies which are in keeping with the objective changes in the life of the Eastern nations today, but also corresponds to the interests of the further development of world oriental studies as a complex science, called upon to conduct thorough research into the problems of the East.

The Organising Committee has already begun to send out information about the 25th International Congress to all the important institutions of scientific and oriental studies abroad. There is no doubt that the leading scientists of Europe and America will take a most active part in the work of the Congress and will make a worthy contribution in working out these problems. At the same time one can be quite certain that, in contrast to previous Congresses, the representatives of the countries of the East will play an active part in the work of the 25th Congress, on an infinitely wider scale than hitherto. This will introduce a new feature into international orientalist congresses: the researches of the scientists of the West will be fortified and enriched by the researches of the scientists of the East, whose essential superiority lies in the fact that they do not simply study certain problems in the history of their nations, but are live and direct participants in that history,

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who base their researches not only on literary sources and historical monuments but also on the concreteness of a reality which they are creating together with their people. Such a mutual enrichment of the science of East and West will no doubt serve the further advance of oriental studies throughout the world.

Particularly important as illustrating this progress will be the worthy place that will be held at the Congress by the orientalists of the Chinese People's Republic, who have not previously taken part in the international Congresses. And if the very fact of the Chinese delegation's presence at the Congress implies the restoration of the really international nature of orientalist congresses, then their reports and speeches, reflecting the magnificent achievements of the great Chinese people in all spheres of science and culture, will be a substantial contribution to the development of world oriental studies. . . .

The reports of the Soviet delegates must fully reflect the achievements of Soviet scientists in the various fields of oriental study; they must demonstrate the invincible force of Marxist-Leninist theory as the methodological basis of Soviet science, must show the wide sources of research and philological basis in the studies of the Soviet scientists.

Another characteristic feature brought out by the preparations for the Congress is that it will give ample representation to the scientific achievements of the Republics of the Soviet East—Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus, where in the years of Soviet administration an entire galaxy of talented research workers has sprung up who, by their labours, have enriched Soviet and world oriental studies. . . .

Inspired by the historical decisions of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our scientists labour fruitfully to implement the grandiose tasks set before Soviet science.

It is the honourable duty of Soviet orientalists to come to the 25th International Congress with fresh scientific achievements. Soviet scientists not only have to represent advanced Soviet oriental studies at the Congress in a worthy manner; they must also ensure that the Congress is held on a high scientific and organisational level.

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PUBLISHING IN THE USSR

Facts and Figures

Maria Nowicki

AT the first approach to the problems of Soviet publishing the imagination is struck by sheer numbers. In 1958 63,641 titles were published in 1,103 million copies, with an average number of 17,300 copies per title; 3,824 periodicals with an annual circulation of 637 million, and 10,463 newspapers with a total annual circulation of 12.8 thousand million.

By comparison with 1957 the number of titles increased by 8.2 per cent, of copies by 5.3 per cent, of pages per title by 7.3 per cent. By comparison with 1940 the number of titles increased 40 per cent, of copies 240 per cent. These numbers were not only greater but were spread more evenly over the country. In 1957 as well as 1958 the number of provincial publications increased at higher rates than that of central publications—the number of titles in 1958 increased by 11 per cent over 1957, the number of copies by 6.3 per cent. In 1958 books were published in 93 languages: 63 of the Soviet Union and 30 foreign. Altogether in 1958 16,600 titles were published in non-Russian languages of the Soviet Union, in 186.5 million copies, of which 10,724 were original titles (104.3 million copies), the rest translations. The Foreign Languages Publishing House has published political and literary classics from Lenin and Khrushchev to Tolstoi and Chekhov in 30 foreign languages, as well as foreign books in their original language, e.g. Graham Greene's *Our Man in Havana* in English for students of the language.

In spite of these figures there is still a book shortage in the USSR, as every librarian in this country knows only too well. It is partly because the production of books cannot catch up with the growing demand, partly (as B. I. Gorokhoff suggests in his book *Publishing in the USSR*) because of the failure of planning occurring from time to time in various branches of publishing. He also tells the story of a distinguished foreign visitor who, driving in Moscow, noticed a long queue in front of a shop. To his question 'What are they queueing for?' the answer was that the bookshop was accepting pre-publication subscriptions for sets of the complete works of Chekhov, Jack London, and Esenin. The visitor exclaimed, 'I've been in most of the globe but this is the first time that I have seen people lined up halfway down a street to buy books'. No doubt the phenomenon is unique. The Russians are great readers.

Taken over the years, except for the years of the Civil War and the last war, when the production of books and even newspapers declined, publishing figures show a steady rise. The increase of population, the almost complete disappearance of illiteracy, create an ever-expanding market. To what extent this market reflects a free adjustment of demand and supply, or to what extent planning of book production takes into account the potential free demand, the figures do not allow us to judge; though any society which could between 1938 and 1947 absorb 33 million copies of what was officially called 'the great work of Stalin's genius', the *Short Course of the history of the CPSU* (in 62 languages), must have a morbid interest in dull political literature unless the supply was indeed planned without regard to demand. The statistics do not help us in the choice of a hypothesis, but they are real enough and impressive enough.

The increase of population and the spread of literacy are not the only explanations of the changes in Soviet book publishing. There is one other reason, the validity of which seems to be independently confirmed. It is that Soviet literature, on whatever subject and in whatever language, is largely educational, popularising, and popular, that is, genuinely planned as mass literature. By education must be understood first and foremost political education, but education in everything else follows close behind.

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THE mass character of Soviet publications is most obviously reflected in the size of editions. But if Mr. Khrushchev hit the best-sellers' top figures with 2,200,000 copies in 36 languages of his *Control figures of the economy of the USSR for 1959-1965,* Lermontov's collected works in 4 volumes at 200,000 copies each exceeded the wildest dreams of bestselling of very many authors, and the collected works of Thomas Mann in 10 volumes (150,000 copies each), and of Dickens in 30 volumes (600,000 copies each), are the highest these authors have reached anywhere in the world. Nor are these figures chosen arbitrarily. A glance at any page of the Soviet official bibliography *Knizhnaia Letopis* will confirm that publication figures are very high.

Another symptom of the popular and mass character of Soviet book publishing can be seen in the thoroughness with which the books are edited. In classics like Tolstoi and Turgenev every foreign word used in the text is carefully translated in a footnote. Political literature frequently has indexes of persons mentioned in the text with short biographies. True, in one of Lenin's works republished just before the war Kautsky was described as a 'watch-dog of the bourgeoisie' *tout court.* This, however, is also educational, in a strictly limited sense of course.

From the technical point of view Soviet books are inferior in quality to English books, though in recent years there has been considerable improvement, particularly in the production of serious large works as opposed to pamphlets, and in the collected editions of the classics. The new edition of Tolstoi, in 12 volumes at 5s. per volume on good paper with excellent type and stiff paper covers, is a bargain, but the production of pamphlets bears unmistakable traces of mass production—yellowish thick paper, not very good print, many printing mistakes.

The mass appeal is enhanced by the low price; Soviet books are very cheap indeed by any standard. In the book quoted above Mr. Gorokhoff says: 'Books are priced according to a regulation which has only a general relationship to the cost, so that a number of Soviet books and pamphlets are published at a loss. In fact, despite the transfer of the risk of unsold copies to the book trade organisations, in 1955 only 115 publishing houses operated at a profit, while 80 did not. But the total profit considerably exceeds total loss, and even if allowance is made for books scrapped by the book trade organisations, the Soviet publishing industry as a whole made money' (p. 62).

However this may be, *Goslitizdat* is probably the only publishing business in the world which offers good literature for less than the price of a bus ticket. Taking the official rate of exchange of *Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga* (the Soviet bookselling agency) as roughly 24 roubles to the £, you can buy in this country a short story by Chekhov, Tolstoi, or Dostoevski, published in mass series, for 6d. or 9d.

The new *History of the October Revolution; documents and materials,* in several volumes in an excellent edition with annotations, indexes, etc. cost £1 3s. 6d. per volume of about 2,073 pages, the new 5th complete edition of Lenin's works cost 3s. 6d. per volume of about 600-700 pages, the new 10 volume edition of Dostoevski, 10s. 6d per volume. All these are bound and printed on good paper.

The popular appeal, the educational purpose, the mass production and mass consumption have imposed a certain pattern on Soviet publishing. The fact is that, though the number of signatures per titles has increased during the years, Soviet book production still consists to a large degree of pamphlets (roughly 100 pages or less).

Listed under social and political subject headings in the bibliography, these pamphlets are mostly propaganda literature. Others, particularly economic, legal, and above all scientific, have a genuinely self-educational and popularising purpose.

Soviet bibliographical and statistical sources do not give the proportion of pamphlets to books, but in one of the latest numbers of *Knizhnaia Letopis* we find under the following headings: Communist Party: 17 pamphlets out of 25 titles; Komsomol: 5 out of 5; Philosophy and Social Sciences: 8 out of 12; Economics: 4 out of 7; Organisation of national economy: 9 out of 14; Planning: 5 out of 8; State and Law: 8 out of 21; Technology and Industry: 8 out of 11. These may not represent the average, but they are fairly characteristic.

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An official yearbook of Vsesoyuznaia Knizhnaia Palata, *Pechat SSSR v 1958* (Publishing in the USSR in 1958), provides interesting though indirect indications of the proportion of pamphlets to books. It divides the total book output into major subject groups and for each subject group gives the proportion of literature published for a particular purpose; some of these are given as: Literature for political agitators and propaganda literature; Research literature, with a subdivision for popular research literature; Literature relating to production and instructive literature; Educational literature including textbooks for external studies.

Of the total of 8,906 titles in the subject group: political, social, and economic literature, propaganda literature represents 3,854 titles; popular research literature (mostly for self-education) 222 titles; instructive literature (again mostly self-education), 824 titles; textbooks, 11,307 titles. Thus, of 8,906 titles (170 million copies), 6,207 titles (147.6 million copies) were either propaganda or self-education.

There is no statistical evidence that all the titles published under the purpose headings listed above (other than propaganda) are in fact popular, self-educational pamphlets, but experience of Russian book-buying strongly suggests it. In other subject groups the proportion of propaganda and self-educational literature is equally high. The only subject group in which propaganda literature is not published is natural sciences and mathematics, while public health and medicine show the low figure of 38 out of 2,896 titles.

The majority of pamphlets appear in various series, the very names of which are significant. To begin with there is a mammoth series of the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, with several subseries on different subjects. There is a Union Society and Republican Societies, each publishing the same series but different titles. There are numerous series entitled *How to . . .* for almost any conceivable profession or amateur occupation, from miners, engineers, and leaders of youth groups to concertgoers and amateur rabbit-breeders. Yet another of the series is the *Library of . . .*, again followed by a variety of professions and interests.

Pamphlets are an instrument of propaganda and education sensitive to change and easily adaptable. Any political event, any law, decree, or order of the Soviet authorities produces wave upon wave of such pamphlets in all languages of the Union, in enormous editions, explaining, clarifying, directing.

Scholarly works, limited in appeal to specialists are published in considerably smaller editions; some of the leading scientific publications run to no more than 3,000-5,000 copies. This state of affairs creates a serious problem for librarians in libraries with serious Russian collections. Nobody wants to commit himself to a pamphlet if a more scholarly treatise is likely to supersede it, but even with pre-publication bibliographies it is difficult to look ahead and if the subjects are important, any library will soon realise that it has acquired a large collection of rather ephemeral pamphlets. On the other hand, the serious scholarly publications put out in small editions frequently go out of print and are obtainable, if at all, only after a long search in the secondhand book market. Almost every library in this country has its tale of woe about missing volumes, unobtainable statistics, gaps filled with repulsive microfilm substitutes.

SOME time about 1937 the word sociology disappeared as a subject heading from the *Knizhnaia Letopis*, where it had appeared regularly from the beginning of this publication. It was replaced by several other subjects, led off by Marxism-Leninism and followed by Communist Party and Komsomol, Social Science, Philosophy, Social and Political theory; History, several varieties of economics, theoretical and practical, and finally law. For the purpose of statistics all these headings are lumped together as Political, social, and economic sciences. These are the sciences most exposed to the pressure of official philosophy, lying near its roots and most vulnerable to its encroachments. They are also subjects most searchingly scrutinised by the censor, both official and unofficial, that is, anybody who thinks that the purity of the Party line is his particular business. Communists have always shown a great interest in theory and were always at great pains to provide a theoretical justification for everything they did. Rules were therefore laid and principles estab-

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lished which cannot now be disregarded with impunity. In consequence research and its results have to conform, even if that means that they are frequently biased. This does not mean that all Soviet research work in these sciences is deprived of scholarly value.

In 1958, of the total of 63,641 titles and more than a thousand million copies, the social science group represented 8,906 titles and 170,000,000 copies, with an average edition of 191,000 per title. An analysis of these figures into particular subjects shows the following proportions: 445 came under Marxism-Leninism, 1,679 under the Communist Party and Komsomol (this includes the history of the Party and Komsomol, speeches of party officials, statutes of the Party, etc.), 466 under Social Sciences and Philosophy, 1,381 under History (902 History of the USSR), 278 for economics, 696 for international relations, political and economic structure of foreign countries (with strong emphasis on colonial countries), 845 for Soviet organisations, 706 for statistics, 254 for finance, 615 for labour, and 1,277 for state and law.

Marxism-Leninism is in fact what the French call *patrologie*, the study of the Fathers of the Church. Between 1917 and 1958, 1,980 titles by Marx and Engels were published in the USSR, in all 98 languages of the Union and in 22 foreign languages, in 72,168,000 copies; 7,701 works by Lenin in 62 languages of the Union and 26 foreign languages, in 301,015,000 copies. The figures for 1958 are 35 of Marx and Engels in 1,176,000 copies, and 210 of Lenin in 3,049,000 copies. The 1958 statistical handbook does not give figures for Stalin, but it will be seen later that up to 1953 Marxism-Leninism was almost synonymous with Stalin, its chief and unchallenged interpreter.

It is common knowledge now that the different editions of Lenin's collected works differ considerably as to comprehensiveness and reliability. The new, 5th edition (the first volume of which appeared in 1958) is reported to be (or going to be) as reliable and comprehensive as the second. So far volumes 1-4 have appeared in Russian only, in 600,000 copies for the first three volumes. The 4th edition, 1941-1958, appeared in 18 languages in 39,933,000 copies, and the supplementary volumes containing originally suppressed material are still appearing.

The works on Social Sciences and Philosophy are, to be frank, exceedingly tedious. They are mainly concerned with discussion of dialectical materialism or the basis and superstructure of society. In terms of philosophical problems, Soviet philosophy does not seem to have progressed far from Haeckel's *Weltraetsel*. The subsection called 'Bourgeois Philosophy' does not contain, as one might suppose, translations of bourgeois 'classics' like Hume, Locke or Kant, but only conventional criticisms of bourgeois philosophy by recognised Soviet philosophers. The section revived a little after Stalin's death and the XXth CPSU Congress, only to be swamped again by criticism of revisionism, home and foreign, and by eulogies of *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* on the fiftieth anniversary of its publication in 1909.

Welcome changes occurred in the history section. Here the propaganda pamphlet type of publication is balanced by solid volumes of documents and materials. The anniversaries of the 1905 Revolution (1955) and the 1917 Revolution (1957) brought a series of historical volumes, such as *The Great Socialist October Revolution; documents and materials*, and, as a separate series; *Chronicle of Events* in 10 volumes which, in the opinion of specialists, reach the highest standards of scholarship.

A word should be said about statistics. The fact that they are in great demand by all students of Soviet affairs, of the genuine as well as the popular variety, indicates that though certain information is withheld, they still provide a good deal.

In 1957 and 1958 the Gosstatizdat (State Statistical publishing House) published a series of statistical handbooks for the administrative areas of the Union down to *Oblast* (district) level, including big towns, called *Khoziaistvo* . . . (The National Economy of . . .) which enjoyed bestsellers' popularity in Russia as well as abroad, and went out of print almost on the day they were published. State and Law is a flourishing section of the Social and Economic Sciences. It covers all official publications of the Supreme Soviets, and their presidiums, of the USSR and the republics, that is the laws

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of the Soviet Union, acts and orders of the Councils of Ministers, stenographic reports of the Sessions of Supreme Soviets; these latter are important because this is where otherwise concealed figures of budgets are often revealed and discussed, but they are difficult to obtain and to read because many are published in the language of the Republic only, without a parallel text in Russian. The *Sobranie postanovlenii i rasporiazhenii Soveta Ministrov* (Collection of Acts and Orders of the Council of Ministers) suddenly disappeared from the bibliographies and bookshops in 1949 and was transferred to the secret list, that is, the publications not listed in bibliographies and not available for export.

It is interesting to note that in the Political, social, and economic sciences section in 1958, 286 titles were translated from 26 languages and published in 7,412,000 copies; of these 60 titles in 1,998,000 copies from the English, 32 titles in 447,000 copies from the Chinese; 88 titles, 2,683,000 copies from the German, and 22 titles, 534,000 copies from the French.

As this article is concerned mainly with publications in the social sciences and literature, it will be enough to say that the Soviet Union, like the rest of the world, shows a pronounced technological bias. In 1958, 18,696 titles in over 111 million copies were published on technology, industry, transport, etc. This was the largest number of titles for any subject group, and it would be even higher if the figures for Agriculture (7,699 titles, 539,000,000 copies) were added.

UNDER the heading of Literature (including literature for children) 7,857 titles were published in 1958. Of these 3,539 titles in 250,000,000 copies were Russian literature, and 1,200 titles with 80,822,000 copies were translations from foreign literature. Pre-revolutionary authors and classics accounted for 44 titles, Soviet authors for 3,025 titles. Of the total number of translations from English literature there were 134 titles in nearly 16 million copies. Between 1946 and 1958 seven titles were translated from the Scottish tongue (distinguished in Soviet statistics from the English). It may be assumed that this represents the translation of a favourite author, Robert Burns.

Among the Russian classics Gorki achieved highest figures (for the same period) with 2,356 titles, followed by Pushkin, Tolstoi, Chekhov, and, at the very bottom, Dostoevski, who was for quite a long time regarded as *nenadezhny* (unreliable).

It is customary nowadays to view the Soviet scene as divided chronologically by Stalin's death and by the XXth Party Congress. The most immediately discoverable characteristic of the latter period is the almost complete absence of Stalin from Soviet bibliographies.

The sole recognised contributor to the doctrine, its chief interpreter and censor, the editions of whose works in 1950 reached 550 million copies, whose works in the Marxism-Leninism section of *Knizhnaia Letopis* for 1946 supplied on an average 30 out of 32 titles (the other two were left to Lenin), disappeared as suddenly and with as little comment as many of his victims.

Some of his works, like *Marxism and the National Question*, or *Foundations of Leninism*, can be discovered every now and then in modest subsections under such headings as 'works about Marxism-Leninism' in pamphlet editions (no more red leather gold-tooled bindings) of a 'Small Library of Marxism-Leninism for Beginners' (60,000 copies), where he appears in the disreputable company of Kautsky.

The disappearance of Stalin from the opening pages of *Knizhnaia Letopis* has produced some interesting changes on the following pages. In the philosophy section, where the majority of books published are still endless commentaries by Soviet philosophers or safe translations from Chinese, Bulgarian and other contributors, some new names appeared recently (1958,1959): Russell's *History of Western Philosophy* was published, Cornford's *Dialectical Materialism*, Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity*, and, most, unexpectedly, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*. This last publication may add interesting overtones to a long-standing discussion between his opponents and followers in this country.

Notable changes occurred in the literature section. For the sake of comparison it may be interesting to recall the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU of 26 August 1946, following the debate about the journals *Zvezda*

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and *Leningrad* and the articles they printed 'which carry no message and are ideologically harmful'. 'It was a gross mistake', stated the C.C. 'on the part of *Zvezda* to provide a literary pulpit for Zoshchenko, whose writings are alien to Soviet literature . . . (who) has long specialised in vulgar, puerile writings and who preached the utterly rotten conception that literature is void of purpose or meaning and is apolitical. . . . *Zvezda* also gives great prominence to the writings of Anna Akhmatova . . . a typical exponent of barren poetry devoid of ideas and permeated with sentiments of pessimism and despondency . . . in line with tastes prevalent in pre-revolutionary drawing-room poetry which went no further than the decadent aestheticism of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy, "art for art's sake", and refused to march in step with the people'. As a result of this essay in literary criticism the journal *Leningrad* was closed. *Zvezda* received a new editor-in-chief who conveniently was also head of the Propaganda Division of the CC of the CPSU, and, needless to say, Akhmatova and Zoshchenko were no longer published.

They reappeared again in 1958. Zoshchenko's short stories and essays were published in 30,000 copies, as well as Akhmatova's collected poems (25,000 copies) and translations from Korean poetry. For the first time since 1926 the collected works of Dostoevski were published in 1956-1958. They still do not include the *Writer's Diary*, but do include *The Devils*.

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PLANNING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH*

Asia, Africa, and the Soviet Model

Francis Seton

THE hall-mark of underdeveloped countries is their low real income per head. Roughly two-thirds of the world's population are having to make do with less than one-seventh of the world's annual product. They eke out a living on a per capita income of barely 6% of that enjoyed by the advanced countries of North America and Western Europe, and the gap between the two is increasing rather than diminishing. Why is this so?

We may find it convenient to distinguish three determinants of per capita income (which is, of course, the same as productivity per head of population): The level of technical, commercial, and organisational skill of the population, including their ability to take calculated risks ('entrepreneurship'), the amount of real capital (buildings, machinery, plant) available per man, and the incentive to use such skills and capital as are available in the direct pursuit of higher income.[1] Of these three factors any or all may be inadequate in underdeveloped countries. Moreover, it is widely believed that such inadequacy is apt to be *self-perpetuating* because it makes these countries captives of the famous 'vicious circles of underdevelopment'. Economists stressing the supply side have pointed out that low incomes reduce the capacity to save, i.e. the source of capital accumulation. Hence there is little capital per man, and productivity and incomes are low. In fact, people save little because they are poor, and they are poor because they save little. Other economists have emphasised the demand side: Low incomes mean small buying power and poor selling prospects. Hence there is little inducement to invest, and the consequent dearth of capital keeps productivity and incomes down. Thus people invest little because the country is poor, and the country is poor because so little is invested. Of course, these circles do not explain first causes (Western countries must have managed to escape from them at some time in the past; why not others?), but they help us to focus on the strategic variables of the problem by prompting a series of propositions starting with the words 'if only'. It seems, in logic at least, that the vicious circles can be broken if only we do the following things:

> Increase the propensity to save out of a given income.
>
> Raise (or rouse) entrepreneurship to invest more in any given state of market prospects, or
>
> Increase income per head in some way without previous savings/investment (for example by redistributing incentives, obtaining loans, etc.) and use the increment for capital accumulation.

Practically all measures that have been advocated for underdeveloped countries can be brought under one or more of these heads.

The question I want to ask now is how far the Soviet model can provide guidance, if any, on ways of overcoming these three types of hurdle.

WHEN we talk of the Soviet economic system as a possible model, I think we have in mind four salient prescriptions which underdeveloped countries might feel moved to follow. There is, first and foremost, the expropriation of largescale owners of the means of production—the hall-mark of Soviet-type economies. Secondly, there is the use of all-pervasive government planning and controls in preference to Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' (consumer sovereignty, the profit motive, a free

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* This article is based on lectures given to seminars at St. Antony's College, Oxford, and the London School of Economics.

[1] This incentive may be weak because of competing social values such as religious self-negation or military prowess which derogate from income-generating activities; or it may be weak because society is so organised that the fruits of effort and risk do not in sufficient measure accrue to those who would otherwise be able and willing to undertake them.

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price system, etc.). Experience and theory teach us that this is entirely distinct from the abolition of private ownership; it can be practised with or without it. Thirdly, there is the retreat to something near autarky, or at least the drastic reduction of dependence on foreign trade. Lastly, there is the redeployment of resources (including the labour force) in favour of industry—particularly heavy industry and construction—if need be to the detriment of agricultural production, and the consequent systematic deprivation of the consumer.

Of course there are more ingredients to the Soviet system than these, and any of them could be adopted without necessarily 'sovietising' an economy; but by and large this is what we mean by the 'Soviet model'. It was originally offered to the world as a panacea for the ills of capitalism, the degenerative diseases of economic old age, and certainly not as a cure for economic immaturity. In fact, the truly orthodox Marxist would have to argue that underdeveloped countries needed *more* capitalism, not *less*. It is only since the Russians have had to resign themselves to a prolonged period of communism in a single backward country and, more especially, since the problems of uncommitted nations came to the fore, that the Soviets have shifted their ground in the presentation of their model and canvassed it as an example for the underdeveloped world to imitate. It is from this point of view that we shall now take up each of the four prescriptions in turn.

LET us start with the expropriation of owners. There is, in the first place, the argument from social justice—that such expropriation abolishes the 'exploitation of man by man' by redistributing the fruits of effort in favour of those who actually undertake it and thereby increasing the income-generating incentives (i.e. direct income-boosting without saving or investment). This argument owes its popular appeal in underdeveloped countries (as it did in Russia itself) to the very dangerous misconception that the expropriation of large owners would entail an equitable dispersal of ownership among the masses: Land to those who work it! Workers' control over their own factories! and slogans of a similar character. Now we know that the Soviets were able to survive precisely because they broke these promises. Workers' control went overboard in the first year of the regime, never to be revived. Peasants' control over their land survived for over ten years, but was then abolished with spectacular cruelty in the so-called Second Revolution, the collectivisation drive. In fact it could not have been otherwise. Development as we know it is inseparable from the *specialisation* of functions between those who labour, those who organise, those who take risks, etc. It is this which makes for the greatest increases in productivity and income per head. To disperse ownership of land and factories, however, means precisely the opposite; for the peasant-owner or the workers' council is at once labourer, entrepreneur, and landlord —and often trader at the same time. However much humanitarian socialists, Russian populists, and others advocated such a fusion of functions in the interest of the integrated human personality, experience teaches that it is the very opposite of what is needed for economic development. I think, therefore, that the argument from social justice falls to the ground. Rewards and incentives need in no way be related to the legal forms of ownership, and economic development may require a kind of social justice very different from egalitarianism.

An alternative argument in favour of expropriation points to a possible increase in savings-propensities: Large owners in underdeveloped countries may enjoy monopoly positions which assure them an ample income. They have no need to save or invest, and every incentive to indulge in luxury consumption. If the land were transferred to the working peasant—it is said—he would acquire a long-term interest in its fertility and spend his increased income and resources improving it, i.e. saving and investing. Thus the nation's overall savings-propensity would be increased by the simple device of transferring income from those who squander to those who save. There may be something in this, but it should not be forgotten that such a measure would also mean a transfer from those who, at least potentially, have entrepreneurial facilities (from education, knowledge, etc) to those who certainly have not, and from a potentially invigorating exchange sector of the economy to the subsistence sector in which

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the division of labour is largely unknown. Surely, a far more powerful fillip to development might be given if such landlords, instead of being expropriated, were merely forced to exchange their land for some other asset (say government scrip) which did not yield them their traditionally assured income, and whose foreseeable depreciation in the future put them on clear notice that only vigorous saving and investment could maintain their position unimpaired. But in this respect underdeveloped countries have nothing to learn from the Soviets; far better to consult the experience of Tsarist Russia after the emancipation of the serfs or of Meiji Japan after the abolition of the feudal system.

A third argument in favour of expropriation points to an investment-boosting effect: If the economic elbow-room is transferred from an unenterprising tradition-bound oligarchy to a development-conscious state, the government can embark on investment programmes which would otherwise not be undertaken. There is considerable force in this, but it is an equally strong or even stronger argument for the taxation of this oligarchy than for their expropriation, especially since such partial expropriation might at the same time spread development-consciousness from the government to individual owners.

On balance it does not appear that the main arguments in favour of expropriation as a power for development are valid. The abolition of private ownership *in itself* does not raise saving propensities or investment inducements, nor does it directly boost productivity.

WE shall now turn to the arguments relating to State planning and control as a power for development.

In the first place I think that the evidence fails to show that it is productivity-boosting *at given levels of capital equipment and skills*. Most increases in productivity in the past were associated with innovation and somebody 'sticking his neck out', while planning and State control put a premium on conformity and routine. However intelligent and high-powered the routine, we know from constant Soviet complaints that the system (as practised up to the middle fifties at least) provoked stubborn resistance to innovation on the part of managers whose premia depended on smooth production flows uninterrupted by sudden changes Furthermore, we know from our own experience that progress in productivity depends immeasurably more on the quick responses of the men on the spot to unforeseen difficulties or opportunities than on blueprints from the centre. Planning undoubtedly narrows the scope for such grass-root adaptation to changing needs, partly by draining the grass roots of the scarce entrepreneurial ability which comes to be required at the centre, partly by enforcing a measure of uniformity and disregard of local peculiarities. It is not for nothing that the Soviets are casting about for regionalisation and decentralisation schemes which could eliminate the more blatant wastes of current planning. My own feeling is that until such new systems have been found and operated with success, the superiority of the centralised planning system as a productivity booster (at given levels of capital endowment) is very far from demonstrated.[2] Whether the planning system has helped this capital endowment to grow, e.g. through pressure on savings etc., is of course an entirely different matter which we shall have to consider below.

The savings-promoting argument in favour of planning is usually based on the belief that in underdeveloped countries the traditional measures for exacting more savings from a given income are inoperative. Government-fostered inflation may merely transfer incomes from the poor to the idle rich who spend it on luxury consumption. Taxation, on the other hand, may reduce the incentives to individual effort and may in any case be met by the rich through cutting savings rather than consumption, while the poor (who are mostly peasants) are notoriously difficult to tax. Indeed, the Soviet example has shown that when the private peasant is squeezed too much by taxation (or inflation of industrial consumer prices) he reacts by restricting his sowings or withdrawing from the market into subsistence agriculture, leaving the towns to starve. In these conditions—so the argument runs—the government can only

[2] The Soviet railways seem to be an exception but even here the growth in capital endowment was considerable. Its often quoted slowness is only relative to that of other branches.

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ensure the necessary flow of savings by backing up financial measures with direct quantitative controls, and the outcome must eventually be a fully-fledged planning system. To my mind this is really an argument for more complete coercion rather than for planning as such, and the relevant question seems to be whether such coercion is necessary or even possible in underdeveloped countries today.

Insofar as present-day underdeveloped countries are ready at all to sweep away the inhibiting traditions of the past to make way for development, it is mainly under the influence of twentieth century ideas of social justice and the welfare state. What they promise themselves is first and foremost the higher living standards of developed nations, and not repression and privations of a new kind, however conducive to development. The moral forces and political aspirations which are able to clear the ground for development in modern societies are at the same time unlikely to permit such development to be carried through with Soviet methods of forced saving—unless of course a second revolution is foisted on the people from above by some determined minority.

There may, however, be a case for state planning on the grounds that it fosters productive *investment*. Most of the arguments supporting this contention—and I think they are very weighty ones—reduce themselves to a critique of the free price system and the profit motive in underdeveloped countries. First of all it is said that though low incomes weaken the inducement to invest in *small* doses (such as an individual might undertake), investment could still yield ample profits if only it were undertaken in *large* and *coordinated* doses. If a single entrepreneur built a shoe factory he would not make a profit in a country too poor to buy shoes. True, he would be increasing incomes by paying wages to his workers, but this would not appreciably add to the people's total outlay on shoes, and accordingly the incentive to build the factory is weak. Suppose, however, that a whole complex of new factories were built simultaneously, supplying the whole range of goods needed by workers' households. Then, it is argued, they could *all* be profitable, though no single one in isolation would have been; for their employees would readily become each other's customers. But such large-scale coordinated investment is only possible under a centralised plan. In other words, 'you cannot do anything until you do everything'—and only the State can do that.

A closely related argument points out that the primitive state of transport, the low level of skills, the scarcity of electric power, etc., make costs of production appear so high in the eyes of potential investors that they despair of making profits and shy away. But if a large array of investments were made simultaneously —in transport, electric power, labour training and so on—the costs of all individual projects would be simultaneously lowered and they would all become profitable. These so-called 'external' economies cannot be gauged by the individual investor who must take the price and cost structure as he finds it, but they *could* be gauged by a central planning commission which can override existing prices and plan in *quantitative* terms.

I believe these arguments to be valid and unanswerable. Comprehensive planning by centralised agencies along a wide front seems to me inevitable in underdeveloped countries today, whether we like it or not. What I doubt is whether the Soviet experience has anything specific to teach here. The initial jump from a weak investment pull to a strong one had already been accomplished in Russia when the Soviets come to power, and if any lesson is to be learned in this respect, it had better be learned from Vishnogradsky and Witte (the Tsarist finance ministers of the late nineteenth century) and not from Lenin or Stalin. By 1913 the so-called overhead capital of the economy (railways, port facilities, etc.) was already available, production costs were sufficiently low and market demand sufficiently high to attract entrepreneurs in large numbers. In fact, the investment proportion in the national income was estimated at somewhere around 10% (net) in the early part of the century. This is higher than the ratio obtaining in practically all underdeveloped countries today, even with a good deal of government-planned investment.

The lesson of how to widen the market and create overhead capital might also be learned from the early development of the United States,

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where collectively planned and sponsored canal, road, and railway building by city governments was far more significant than is commonly supposed. Japan is even more a case in point. What distinguishes Soviet planning from that of the other countries mentioned is the fact that it never confined itself to the *establishment* of industries or overhead facilities (i.e. investment activity which might otherwise not have been undertaken), but insisted on running and administering those industries which were already in existence. It is in fact *production* planning, and not merely *investment* planning. To underdeveloped countries today, however, there may be more relevance in the example of nineteenth century Japan, where the State took the upper hand in establishing industries, but devolved their current operation upon individual entrepreneurs as soon as the initial hurdles had been jumped.

LET us now turn to the third feature usually associated with the Soviet model—the retreat towards greater isolation from the outside world. The argument in favour might run approximately like this: A country which was among the first in the world to industrialise, such as England, could easily establish a new industry in the wake of technological progress, say woollen manufacturing. This meant that clothes could be made more cheaply than by previous handicraft methods—in fact there was an increase in *real income* which allowed new saving and investment without reducing consumption. Not so an underdeveloped country in the modern world; here the growth of new industries would be hampered from the start by foreign competition from countries already industrialised. True, the cheaper foreign imports must in some sense mean a higher real income for the underdeveloped country than its own handicraft could provide—they are after all the vehicle through which the advantages of international specialisation are transmitted—but experience has taught that this may be outweighed in at least two ways. In the first place some countries have accustomed themselves to pay for these imports by exporting primary products (coffee, cocoa, tin, jute, rubber etc.) whose prices fluctuate greatly from year to year with the state of trade in the advanced countries, and are said to be subject to a secular decline. Thus the increased real income may be prejudiced by a measure of economic dependence and insecurity and may be gradually eroded (if not reversed) through steadily worsening terms of trade. Alternatively, in some countries, cheap imports may have squeezed out indigenous craftsmen and forced them back into subsistence agriculture. This may have increased the pressure of population on available land resources, thereby depressing agricultural productivity and dissipating—if not more than dissipating—the real income gain which the cheap imports might have promised. In both these cases, and they are by no means atypical, it is argued that as a preliminary to development a country must first liberate itself from the particular role in the international division of labour which the free play of market forces has assigned to it.

I think these are valid arguments, and the advanced nations might do well to allow underdeveloped countries a measure of protectionism for which they themselves would have little excuse. But if this were driven as far as the Soviet model suggests, it would rule out certain stepping stones to development which have been known to be extremely useful in the past: In the first place not all changes in the export prices of underdeveloped countries are unfavourable. Some of them have been spectacularly favourable, and by suddenly increasing real income via the terms of trade have greatly helped, if not initiated development. As examples we might mention Swedish timber (when West European markets were opened up) and Japanese raw silk. No one doubts that the opportunities for developing Kuwait or Venezuela are vastly greater for their oil exports than they would be without them. In the second place a widespread export industry, even if restricted to primary products, provides the economy with a ready-made exchange sector using money and commercial skills. The transition from subsistence agriculture to partial cash cropping is probably easier than the sudden jump from peasant farming to industrial work, and the country is provided with a useful training ground for the kind of social responses which are conducive to development. It is this first jump away from sheer subsistence which is so difficult, and foreign trade will often make it easier.

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In fact, in the absence of sudden innovation, improvements in the terms of trade are the only way in which income per head can rise without prior saving or investment. But it does remain true that in most countries the foreign trade links forged in the past will need some overhauling in the direction of greater protection and diversification of home output before sustained development can take place.

WE now come to the fourth and most important of the features usually identified with the Soviet model: The redeployment of resources in favour of industry and away from agriculture. This policy has the most powerful appeal in underdeveloped countries which suffer from agricultural over-population —roughly the broad belt from South-East Europe to South-East Asia. In such countries it is believed that a large slice of the rural population could be abstracted from agriculture without reducing agricultural output. The remaining peasants could still produce as much as was produced before without extra effort or investment, but instead of sharing it with unproductive co-workers on the land they would henceforth share it with an equivalent number of new recruits to industry who would be producing something in return.

This opens up attractive enough vistas. Unfortunately, however, it is likely to come up against three major stumbling blocks (as has been pointed out before):

(1) Each new worker in industry must be given *more* to consume than he previously had on the land, partly because of the switch from under-employment to full-time work, and partly in order to induce him (and his like) to move *and stay* out of agriculture.

(2) Each remaining peasant will also tend to consume more since he no longer has to share his (unchanged) output with redundant family members working alongside him.

(3) The abstraction of the surplus population will probably have to be accompanied by a reorganisation of holdings and new tenure arrangements before one can be certain that total output will in fact remain unchanged. For although the remaining peasants may be *technologically* able to maintain the previous output, a rural society which has passed through long periods of overpopulation cannot fail to have evolved a protective network of 'work-spreading' arrangements (land fragmentation, interstripping, etc.) which make the technological potential effectively unrealisable.

Of these three stumbling blocks it appears to be the second which precipitated Soviet collectivisation. Quite generally, it proved impossible to deprive emancipated peasants of a sufficient portion of their incremental output per head for disposal to the towns. The policy of compulsory grain levies under War Communism merely resulted in restriction of sowings for future harvests, while the alternative New Economic Policy (offering a modicum of industrial goods in exchange for food deliveries) threatened to interfere with the government's investment programme. Unless sufficient consumer goods were offered at attractive prices the peasant simply withdrew from the market into subsistence, leaving the towns to starve. Given that the investment policy was to be foisted upon the country immediately and at all costs, the only possible answer was forcible collectivisation at the point of a bayonet—a measure which was effective in bringing agricultural *production* as well as distribution under government control, albeit at tremendous cost in life, freedom, and happiness. Its immediate result was a catastrophic fall in agricultural output as the desperate peasants slaughtered their cattle wholesale and were robbed of all incentives to maintain yields. But the Soviet Union, for all its relative poverty in 1928, was just able to weather this man-made famine; for its agricultural consumption per head was already nearly twice as high as that of India today. As Mr. Hoeffding has pointed out, the bottleneck which the Soviets tackled was a crisis of *distribution*—the misallocation (from the Soviet point of view) between town and country of an annual flow which was already sufficient for a measure of industrialisation. They could afford to solve the crisis in this drastic way, in spite of the fact that production declined and stagnated. In fact, they could afford to neglect agricultural output right up to the middle fifties. It is extremely doubtful whether such a possibility is open to any underdeveloped country today; for none of them may have enough agricultural output to *be* distributed in the first

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place. The basic question still is, and will remain for a long time: 'How can we *increase* that output', and not 'How can we better *distribute* it'.

BUT while the Soviet model appears to be irrelevant in this respect, the fact remains that many underdeveloped countries will somehow need to mobilise the labour going to waste in their overpopulated agriculture, and it is clear that some way of doing this *without reducing agricultural output* still remains to be found. Of course the Soviets, too, had hoped that in the long run the newly formed industries would provide agriculture with tractors and machinery to make good the initial output losses: as we know, it turned out to be dangerously near the Keynesian sort of long run, in which 'we are all dead'. Underdeveloped countries today almost certainly could not wait so long; besides, most of them need land improvement much more than mechanisation. For them it may be vastly better, therefore, to employ the surplus population, not in urban industries, but on capital construction projects *in the countryside*, such as flood control, irrigation, water conservancy, and the like. This makes for faster productivity increases in agriculture and saves existing social overheads in the towns. It might also ease the social or political problems of distribution, since the remaining peasant is only called upon to feed workers who are still in visible proximity to him—engaged on work that obviously contributes to his output—and possibly still sharing his own household as before. It is, moreover, an activity whose success is not dependent on the previous availability of large aggregations of capital. But this is very far from the Soviet model; it is more like the Indian agricultural extension or community development programme in a more determined form.

Even so, there remains the third stumbling block, the need to reorganise tenure arrangements and farming methods in order to realise the technological potential. This, we know, a peasantry inured to work-spreading methods will instinctively and strenuously resist. It seems clear, however, that such opposition must be overcome, and overcome in a way which does not destroy the incentive to produce. A gradual and educative approach seems far more promising here than the destructive frontal assault launched by the Stalinists in the thirties, but we cannot wholly dismiss the notion that eventually some form of State-fostered reorganisation of agriculture may be desirable, and indispensable, as a stepping stone to development, and that it may have to be carried through with some *vigour*.

PRESENT-DAY underdeveloped countries would indeed be foolish to imitate a policy born of self-inflicted isolation in a hostile world and to transplant it gratuitously to a warmer international climate where rival blocs contend for the favour of emergent nations. The bulk of the Soviet model must no doubt be rejected: forcible collectivisation, wholesale resource switching to capital-intensive urban industries, autarky for its own sake, excessive investment rates (not to speak of the attendant political horrors). It would be even more foolish, however, to cut oneself off from development simply because certain of its necessary ingredients seemed to bear some resemblance to an otherwise very different Soviet programme. What we must guard against is the identification with 'Sovietism' of any organised tapping of the agricultural surplus population, without which no substantial progress can be made in many important underdeveloped countries today. In the last analysis the best service economic thinking can hope to render is to consider all development measures on their own merits regardless of their supposed affinities to this or that historical system or its misconceived image. The dispassionate search for valid ideas admits of no guilt (or merit) by association.

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The Case of the Lonely Textbook

ECONOMICS AS SHE IS TAUGHT

Alfred Zauberman

IN the Soviet Union, where the cardinal importance of economics is emphasised as nowhere else, the subject, both as theory and as academic discipline, has had a chequered history.

In the early years after the revolution it was widely believed that economics as a science would move fast to its doom along with the vestiges of capitalism. The seeds of this belief may be found in Marx and Engels, though neither of them is unambiguous on this point. Marx described his colleague's broadside against political economy as 'a brilliant outline of a critique of economic categories'.[1] Rosa Luxemburg wrote that his idea, 'though the child of bourgeois economics, is yet a child whose birth had cost its mother her life'. Marx's economics, she argued, brought economics to its conclusion. 'The last chapter of economic theory', she wrote, 'is the social revolution of the world proletariat'.[2] This view of an apocalypse cum consummation fell on fertile ground in the heroic period of the Bolshevik era. Later, Preobrazhensky was to insist that with the New Economic Policy (1921) the disintegration of economic law had actually set in.[3] Where there is no objective economic 'law', the argument ran, there would be no scope for economic theory. Others contended that under socialism economics would turn from an 'ideographic' into a 'normographic' discipline.[4]

However, the study of economics survived the earthquake of revolution and civil war, and indeed came very much into fashion. It became the chief subject in the new and extensive educational network for adults, communist universities, workers' faculties (rabfaki), Party schools (sovpartshkoly), study groups and courses. For a time a fairly wide measure of tolerance was granted to heterodox views, partly because there was no alternative to 'bourgeois' teachers and textbooks. (A curious manifestation of the spirit of tolerance was the establishment in Moscow in 1919 of a chair of anarchism.) And even when Marxism became firmly entrenched in its exclusive position, it had still to feed on a pre-revolutionary diet, on textbooks written in the previous century, mainly on Bogdanov's *Short Course* (originally published in 1897) and translations of Kautsky's *Marx's Economic Teaching*.[5] (In retrospect, both are acknowledged not without embarrassment.)

By the time the new economics evolved as a teaching subject, the concept of its being, under socialism, merely a 'normographic' discipline, had taken root. Academic curricula in the early thirties refused to take cognisance of any economics but those of capitalism. Gradually, however, as circumstances pressed for some theoretical treatment of the problems of a socialist economy, it tended to infiltrate university courses. The questions were usually dealt with in the context of capitalist 'categories' such as value, rent, etc. The next logical step was to attempt to systematise them as a coherent subject in its own right. The university courses which emerged originally bore labels classifying them as the study of 'economic policies'. Gradually something re-baptised as 'the theory of Soviet economy' took shape, and towards the end of the thirties this process had gone far enough for chairs of economic policy to be transformed in some universities into chairs of the theory of Soviet economy.[6]

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[1] See *Introduction* to *Zur Kritik der Politischen Œkonomie* (1859), and Engels' *Outline of a Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow, 1959 edition).

[2] Rosa Luxemburg, *Einführung in die Nationalökonomie*, ed. Paul Levi (Berlin, 1925).

[3] See E. Preobrazhensky, *The new Economics* (Moscow, 1926).

[4] B. Khmelnitskaya, *Ekonomicheskoe Obozrenie*, 1925, 3.

[5] Kautsky's work first appeared in 1886. By 1924 fifteen editions of Bogdanov's *Kratki kurs ekonomicheskoy nauki* had been issued in Russia.

[6] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1959, 3, pp. 90 ff.

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At that stage it was inevitable that the authorities should try to standardise the still somewhat amorphous subject. But obviously much more than pedagogic considerations was at stake. We need only recall the stir caused in the early war years by the first *volte face* in the official attutude towards economic law under socialism. What was involved was important enough for Stalin himself to take a hand in putting the house of economics in order. True to form, he approached the task from a canonical, a textbook angle. This was the background to his last intervention in the field of economics, the publication in 1952 of his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, preceded by some discussions among economists which he organised, and the origin of *Political Economy* (1954),[7] which he inspired but did not live to see in print. With its appearance the present Soviet course of economics crystallised. It is thus of a rather young vintage.

The British student of the subject is indebted to Dr Meek for reproducing, with a wealth of minutiae, the Soviet academic curriculum in economics as it stands at present.[8] His data came from Moscow university but the curriculum is stereotyped throughout the country. (Something will be said presently about the teaching of economics in centres other than universities.) From the tables compiled by Dr. Meek it appears that the economics course is built up of a range of as many as twenty-seven subjects, totalling four thousand hours spread over five years, which the undergraduate is expected to spend at lectures, seminars, laboratory and practical work. In terms of the time devoted to it, the single largest subject, absorbing 400 hours, is the new 'course' of political economy'. It is supported by four more theoretical disciplines—the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, dialectical and historical materialism, history of philosophy, and history of economic thought, which between them roughly double the time allocation. It will be approximately trebled if one adds special seminars—on *Capital* and on the political economy of imperialism and socialism—which round off the teaching of economics and of the history of economic thought.

AS early as 1921, when he approved the creation of university faculties of the social sciences, to include departments for economics, Lenin laid down as their principal objective the training of practitioners *(podgotovlenie praktikov)*. And even today Moscow University is determined not to 'turn out "abstract economists" who are unable to take an active part in the construction of socialism'[9] although Moscow is one of the three chief centres (the others being Leningrad and Kiev) for training theoretical economists and academic teachers. In addition to statistics, such subjects as planning (120 hours), technology (about 190 hours), and the economics of the principal branches of the national economy (340 hours, including finance), have a generous allocation of study time. The syllabus is arranged in a way to give the future Soviet managers and administrators the basic schooling for their jobs, with a certain amount of specialisation and some experience of work in farm or factory or planning office. A surprisingly high proportion of the time is allocated to the study of foreign languages which comes second to political economy; but presumably linguistic proficiency is viewed also from the angle of its practical uses.

University departments claim merit for stimulating the undergraduate interest in extra-curricular research, and for the scientific work pursued, with the active assistance of the academic staff, in student circles. A report from the Leningrad economics faculty gives an idea of the kind of scientific work in which these are engaged. Students, it says, have revealed a tendency towards the scientific generalisation *(obobshchenie)* of the practice of industrial enterprises and collective and State farms. Members of student circles compose reports under their teachers' guidance. One group of students participated actively in an investigation into the use made of equipment in the Sverdlov plant. The plant's planning department was

[7] Successive editions appeared in 1955 and 1958. A fourth edition is in preparation.

[8] Ronald L. Meek, *Soviet Studies*, April 1959, pp. 338-357.

[9] N. K. Karataev, *Ekonomicheskie Nauki v Moskovskom Universitete* (Moscow, 1956), p. 298.

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supplied with generalised material analysing the reasons for losses in working time, and the management expressed its gratitude to the undergraduates for their research work.[10] This is presumably a not atypical field into which the undergraduates' interests are channelled.

Apart from university faculties, the training of economists at academic level but with a still stronger practical bent, is the job of schools which combine technology and economics; these are the technical-economic high-schools *(inzhenerno ekonomicheskie vuzy),* or special economics institutes, such as the Moscow State Economics Institute. In the latter, for example, the first two and a half study years are devoted to political economy, philosophy, history of the CPSU, statistics, law, accountancy, finance, economic geography, economic history, technology, and a few general educational subjects; in their third year pupils specialise in one of the scheduled 'directions', i.e. economic planning, pricing, labour economics, finance, or in the economics of a chosen branch of the national economy.[11]

Incidentally, a distinctly practical slant is given in the USSR to some borderline subjects which in Western academic schools traditionally provide scope for both theoretical and more utilitarian study. Statistics is a case in point. Here 'basic attention is accorded to the reading of statistical indices without deeper analysis of their content'. This may be not unconnected with the general unsatisfactory position in Soviet statistical studies, which in its turn may be partly accounted for by ideological antipathies towards some contemporary lines of development in statistics.[12]

The predominance of practical study is perhaps also reflected in the fact that only two in every five people engaged in scientific and research work in economics at university level have any academic degree: 39 per cent have the traditional Russian degree of 'candidate', roughly corresponding to that of Master in Western academic schools, and only 2 per cent have a Doctor's degree.[13]

THE present general polytechnical trend in Soviet education must inevitably sharpen still further the accent on practical experience, although because it has already gone so far in this field, the study of economics may perhaps suffer less than others. A schedule suggested[14] at Moscow University would provide for one month's work in industry or agriculture in the second study year, to be followed by two to three months of 'technological preparation' in the third year; in the fourth, pre-graduation year, farm or factory work would occupy eight to nine months, double the present allocation.

As has been seen, the theoretical core of the study of economics is the 'course of political economy'; the scaffolding of this subject is provided by the *Textbook*. In the eyes of Soviet economists the one stands for the other, so much so that it is probably not unfair to describe the young Soviet economist, as far as his theoretical background is concerned, as *homo unius libri*.

In contrast to the works of the twenties or thirties, which were the fruits of individual effort, the *Textbook* is the product of a large collective, issued under the authority of the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences. It has official sanction and a strong, if invisible, imprint of *ne varietur*. Dissatisfaction has been aired by academic teachers that 'in the present practice of teaching no deviations from or experimenting with the programme [of political economy as embodied in the *Textbook*] are tolerated.'[15] The *Textbook* is supplemented by an exegesis of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, by some writings of the latter-day political leaders of the communist world, and by Party documents.

It would take us too far from our main theme to scrutinise in detail the contents of the peculiar crossbreed between a catechism and a propaganda tract which makes the *Textbook*. (There is an adequate English translation to enable readers without knowledge of Russian to acquaint themselves with this basic fare of Soviet economics students and its intellectual standards.)[16]

[10] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1958, 10, p. 158.
[11] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1959, 6, p. 56.
[12] *Ibid.* See also, 1959, 4, p. 33.
[13] *V.E.*, 1956, 6, p. 57.
[14] *Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta*, Seria Ekonomiki, Filosofii, 1959, 1, p. 187.
[15] *V. E.*, 1959, 7, p. 135.
[16] *Political Economy* (London, 1957).

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By a series of revisions, the book keeps abreast of shifts in official attitudes. They have to provide a rationale of current changes in the line of Soviet economic policies. The last revision, for example, reflects the present greater reliance on price and cost mechanisms in Soviet planning and control, the institutional changes brought about by Khrushchev's reforms, etc. More generally, the *Textbook* is expected to mirror Soviet internal and international policies, and changes at the helm of State and Party; as revisions proceed, fallen leaders are discarded as fountains of theoretical wisdom, a fate that befell Molotov and other members of the 'anti-Party group'. As a rule the number and the length of references to various leaders seem to be hieratically rationed according to their political status.

THE anxiety to preserve a strict uniformity in the doctrine professed has the curious result that the same *Textbook* is made obligatory at all levels of the teaching of economics (for non-specialist undergraduates or non-academic students the course, though basically unchanged, is comprised within a shorter study time), but an attempt is at last being made to diversify the course. On the one hand a more popular version of the *Textbook* has been written; on the other, the Minister of Higher Education has appointed a committee from the staff of Moscow University, under the chairmanship of Professor Tsagolov, to produce a version for the specific use of economics faculties.

One of the more interesting suggestions made by Tsagolov is that the university version of the *Textbook* should 'to a certain extent' reflect differences in the treatment of various subjects by different Marxists, and deal with the controversies in Marxist literature from which various tenets evolved. If genuinely pursued, this line would relieve the oppressive dogmatism of the book and it will be interesting to see how far and in what spirit the authors will be permitted to proceed on this path. The dogmatism of the present text has indeed been openly criticised. It is proposed to expand the work to two volumes so as to provide space for logical support of the theorems presented in the current version without support of argument.[17] (I understand that a synopsis for a two-volume version has in fact already been compiled: of seventy-seven chapters thirty-seven, thirteen, and twenty-seven are devoted to capitalism, imperialism, and socialism respectively.) But clearly such support requires something more than extra pages.

Recently there has also been some public discussion about the desirable changes in the general structure of the course in political economy, but on the whole the contributions so far published concern the organisation of the subject matter rather than its substance.[18]

The young economist's acquaintance with the outside world—especially with the development and the present state of Western economies and doctrines—is supposed to be derived primarily from the political economy course supplemented by the teaching of the history of economic thought. As a representative examplar of instruction in this field we may take the official theme dealing with developments in bourgeois political economy in Britain in the period of the general crisis of capitalism. It reads: 'Bourgeois Political Economy in Britain. The economic and political situation of Britain in the period of the general crisis. The crisis of the British Empire. The intensification of economic contradictions. The crisis of the Marshallian school. Keynes as an apologist of imperialism. Keynes's *General Theory of Employment*. The doctrine of the regulation of capitalism. Keynes's eulogy of state-capitalist measures. The justification of the growth of state expenditure in general, and in particular of the militarisation of the economy as a means of combating economic crises. The hopeless attempts to create a 'planned' capitalism without crises. Beveridge's Scheme for Full Employment'. Finishing touches to this caricature are given by the recommended reading of Soviet monographs of the 'unmasking' genre which have come from the pen of the late Professor Blumin and a few others.[19]

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[17] N. A. Tsagolov, *Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta*, series quoted, 1958, 2, p. 203.

[18] *V. E.*, 1958, 1; 1959, 3, p. 89; 1959, 7, p. 139.

[19] Quoted by Meek, *loc. cit.*, p. 351.

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It is only fair to add that Soviet economists have now been called upon to deepen their study of contemporary capitalism. Unfortunately there is not yet much reason to encourage hopes of a change in the fundamental approach from which future generations of economists might eventually profit. The journal of the Institute which is primarily responsible for work in this field defined the expected performance in these terms: 'It is the duty of Soviet economists specialising in international problems to mount in depth the ideological offensive against the positions of the bourgeois and reformist theoreticians in order to smash their apologetic teachings. It is by means of a theoretical investigation into the problems of contemporary capitalism, by studying and propagandising the enormous superiority of socialism over capitalism, that Soviet scholars will contribute to the liberation of the toilers in capitalist countries'.[20] The rapporteur of the Moscow University conference on the *Textbook*, already quoted, stressed that it should supply 'an expanded criticism of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois theories, especially of contemporary opportunist theories', and while suggestions have been made that universities should invite eminent foreigners to lecture on special subjects, this has been qualified by the proviso that they should be 'progressive'.

THE basic feature of the study of economics which has emerged in this essay is the accent on its practical purpose. Partly at least this may be explained by the demand-supply position and the nature of the services the economist is expected to render. An army of economists is employed at the enterprise level. Since the war the number of economists working in the national economy has more than doubled and reached the figure of 140,000, though presumably not all of them would be classified as such in this country.[21] Recent statistics show that Union and Republic institutions employ 32,000 economists.[22] In such circumstances the pressure of demand itself may tend to create a concern for practical instruction at the expense of more refined scholarly accomplishments.

The real dilemma, however, is the quality rather than the size of the theoretical basis, and in this respect mere timetables can tell only a part of the story. Inevitably the enlisting of social sciences into direct service to the State, combined with the monopoly of a particular doctrine, rigidly expounded and adhered to, severely circumscribe the pupil's intellectual horizons.

Dr. Meek is probably right in his conclusion that the British student taking an honours course in economics leaves the university with a smaller stock of practical knowledge than his Soviet counterpart. But there is a strong under-statement in his view that the average British student will emerge with a greater capacity for independent thought. A Polish assessment of the experience of Polish universities with the Soviet teaching system in economics (when it was faithfully copied, which is not true of post-1956 Poland) is closer to reality. A well-known Polish economist remarked that the system amounted to 'the pursuance in Marxist schools of an anti-Marxist, anti-rational, anti-scientific, medieval procedure, systematically causing lopsidedness in the student's mental development, making him unable to examine problems independently, to say nothing of their analysis; a procedure which substitutes apologetics and propaganda for science'. It was a system which put a premium on ' a well-sounding phrase, a coined slogan, an undigested quotation', and which tended to breed two kinds of economists: 'irrational, non-realist, fideistic, naive, but fanatical pseudo-Marxists', and 'intellectually somewhat harder but morally softer cynics', intellectual frauds.[23]

No attempt will be made here to answer the question how such a state of affairs in theoretical teaching may affect the quality of practitioners. One is of course inclined to say that there is a prima facie case for the view that an intellectu-

[20] *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya*, 1959, 8, p. 4.

[21] Their numbers were given as 59,300, and 141,200 'with higher education' for 1941 and 1956 respectively. *Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta*, 1958, 1.

[22] *V. E.*, 1959, 6, p. 51.

[23] Helena Hagemajer, in the debate at the 1956 congress of Polish economists; cf. *Ekonomista*, 1956, 5, p. 107. ff.

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ally crippling scholastic system must impair that quality; but do Soviet realities fully bear out this presumption?

I should like to wind up these remarks by coming back to my point of departure: the fate of Soviet teaching of economics, at least as far as its theoretical basis goes, is indissolubly tied up with that of Soviet economics as a science. In this context one should perhaps mention some recent tendencies towards an assimilation of Western achievements, especially in mathematical economics and electronic computer techniques. Moscow University has started a course on mathematical methodologies, on top of 'traditional' mathematics. Leningrad has taken over the lead in this field: there is now a post-graduate course devoted to mathematics in economic analysis and planning; it has also created a 'laboratory' for mathematical calculus methods under the distinguished economist Professor Novozhilov. I would not like to commit myself here as to how far Western borrowed mathematical methods and techniques can bring relief to the Soviet planner. One must also allow for the effect of their doctrinal sterilisation now in progress, but we should not rule out the possibility that even the most thorough decontamination of these 'imports' may fail to kill that sturdy bacillus, human curiosity, which so often proves to be the fermenting agent of ideas.

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I wish to thank Mr. S. V. Utechin for kindly drawing my attention to some sources.

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AUTOMATION AND ITS PROSPECTS

Notes towards a Study

Gerald Segal

LENIN'S dictum that 'the productivity of labour is the main condition of victory of the new Soviet order' lies at the heart of Soviet thought and action in regard to automation. It is held that by means of all those diverse processes and methods which to a greater or lesser extent are embraced by the word automation, the Soviet Union will be able so to raise the productivity of labour that socialist society will be able to catch up by the end of the current seven-year plan with the most advanced capitalist society—the United States—and at the same time construct the material-technical basis of Communism.

Russian-Soviet Background to Automation

Automation as a technology or a science is indifferent to geographical (East or West), national (Soviet or Western), and socio-economic (bourgeois or communist) divisions; primarily it comprehends two distinct but historically related phenomena—mechanisation and automatic or self regulation. In regard to both these phenomena, Soviet writers make very large claims for Russian priority. According to the Soviet *Encyclopedia* 'the Russian people have made a great contribution to the development of industrial automation from the very beginning. The foremost Russian inventors outstripped in their achievements foreign engineers'; specifically it is asserted that Glinkov in 1760 invented the first automatic spinning machine eleven years before the appearance of such a machine in England, that Nartov (1694-1756) invented the slide rest for the lathe 'seventy years before the Englishman Henry Maudeslay to whom the invention has been incorrectly ascribed', and that Polzunov (1728-1766) introduced the automatic regulation of a steam boiler some nineteen years before James Watt applied the fly-wheel governor to the automatic regulation of a steam engine; it is said in regard to the latter case that Polzunov's invention differed from Watts in its purpose only and that the principles of operation are identical.

Such claims provoke pertinent questions in regard to Marxist theory; it might have been expected that the English as 'the first-born sons of modern industry' would have been the first to invent the means of its development, and that indeed the economic and social relationships of the time would have demanded it: not to accept the principle would, if the Russian claims are true, appear to acknowledge in some measure the great-man theory of historical development. A. V. Khramoi in his work on the history of the development of automation in the USSR[1] shows himself aware of the dilemma by putting the question 'Why did some instruments for the automation of production assemblies first appear in Russia—a technically backward country?' He continues, 'The answer to this question can be given if we take into account the fact that new productive forces and the production relationships corresponding to them arise in the womb of the old order and not after its disappearance'. Khramoi goes on to explain that there are two periods of the development of capitalism in Russia and that the first period, which began in the feudal-serf society of the eighteenth century, was accompanied by the appearance and development of the elements of the new machine technology 'in which were already to be seen the prototypes of the elements of modern advanced technology and in particular automation devices'.

Whatever may be thought of the Soviet position in this matter, the fact remains that all mechanisation depends upon the lathe as developed by Maudeslay (as Marx believed[2]) and its various derivative machine tools.

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[1] *Ocherk istorii razvitiya avtomatiki v SSSR* (Moscow, 1958), p. 10.

[2] *Capital*, Vol. 1. p. 385 (English edition, Moscow, 1954).

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Self-regulation, the second limb of automation, involves what the technologists call the feedback principle, and insofar as it operates in the machine or human being, independently of industrial processes, constitutes the subject of Cybernetics, to which subject Soviet scientists have made outstanding contributions.

Feedback may be explained by an example which is important in itself and also from the point of view of the Russian claim to priority. Consider the remote control of a gun: an automatic gun director can by electrical impulses control the direction of a heavy gun mounted several hundred or more yards away: assume that the gun director is set at a certain angle; electrical impulses will cause the gun to move correspondingly but the inertia of the gun will carry the latter beyond the prescribed position; this error will be fed back to the gun director which it will, by another electrical impulse, endeavour to correct; within certain limitations the gun director will in fact succeed and the system will therefore be self-regulatory and based upon feedback. Soviet writers claim that the Russian inventor A. P. Davydov (1826-1904) was the first to build the prototype (1877) of such a form of remote control. Precisely similar principles were involved in the fly-ball (centrifugal) governor devised by James Watt to control (govern) the speed of a steam engine. It is argued in the work by Khramoi previously quoted that although Polzunov did not in fact employ a fly-ball governor, it can be proved by forming the differential equations for both Watt's and Polzunov's regulators that they do in fact operate according to a common principle.

All systems incorporating feedback are subject to one great limitation: that the more accurate you try to make them the more they tend to 'oscillate' or 'hunt' or become unstable. It will be recalled that in the example of remote gun control given above the inertia (weight) of the gun carried it too far forward and that this error was corrected on feedback principles by another pulse from the director; clearly the response of the gun's inertia to the correcting pulse may carry it too far in the other direction; this will provoke another correcting pulse and the phenomenon will go on being repeated until finally the gun oscillates wildly.

A large part of the mathematics of automation is concerned with the stability of such systems and the spadework was done by Airey, Maxwell and Routh, in Britain. So much is conceded by Soviet writers, but it is maintained that Maxwell's work was with astatic regulators which were unsuitable for the steam engines of that time. The view is put forward that the all important work on this problem was done by Academician I. L. Chebyshev in 1871 (Paper on the Centrifugal Governor), by Professor T. A. Vyshnegradski (Papers on Direct, [1876] and Indirect [1878] Action Regulators), and by A. M. Liapunov (Paper on the General Problem of the Stability of Motion, 1892). Vyshnegradski's methods, and in particular the so-called Vyshnegradski diagram, are still used in contemporary Soviet work on control theory.[3] Liapunov, whose work is better known in the West and whose mathematical methods are sometimes employed[4], is said to have laid the foundations of contemporary work on the non-linear problems involved in control theory.

Soviet Work in Cybernetics

Cybernetics deals with the problem of control in the human being and the machine; it arose when Professor Norbert Wiener saw that the methods of statistical sampling could be extended to the human central nervous system as well as to ordinary predictor theory. Suppose a gun is aimed at the position of an aeroplane as indicated on the radar screen and that a shell is fired: it will of course miss the target for the plane will have moved on; the problem is therefore to predict the future course of the plane and to sight the gun accordingly. Wiener showed how this could be done by introducing the method of statistical sampling. In his book *I am a Mathematician*, he writes: 'When I first wrote about prediction theory, I was not aware that some of the main mathematical ideas had already been introduced in the literature. It was not long before I found out that just before the Second World War an important little paper on the same subject had been published by the Russian mathematician Kolmogoroff . . . all my

[3] See *Avtomatizatsiya proizvodstvennykh protsessov.*
[4] Pipes, *Applied Mathematics for Engineers and Physicists.*

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really deep ideas were in Kolmogoroff's work before they were in my own. Kolmogoroff did not indicate any way of realising his predictors in the metal or of applying them to A.A. fire control. But . . . I am by no means convinced that Kolmogoroff was not independently aware of the possibilities of some of the applications I had made. If that was so he must have had to keep them out of general publication because of their importance for the military scientific work of the Soviets. A recent paper . . . convinces me of this'.

This statement has been quoted at length partly because it constitutes independent testimony to the high standard of Soviet theoretical work and also because of its reference to military preparations. From the point of view of automation in all its ramifications—electronic remote control, computers, satellites, etc.—it must be admitted that military preparation before, during and after World War II acted as a spur to development.

The implications of Norbert Wiener's statement may be contrasted with Professor Lossiyevski's claim given further on that there is no cause to speak of Soviet backwardness in regard to the theoretical work associated with automation.

It may be noted that the sampling theorem which is fundamental to work in electrical communications is attributed by the Russians to Kotelnikov (1930), and finally that a reading of the Russian literature on Control Theory will reveal a series of concepts for which there are no direct English equivalents, as, for example, from the writer's own experience—the *d-razbiyeniia* and the *krivaia razgona.*

The Soviet Practice of Automation

What has already been said about automation will have made clear to the reader precisely why many writers hold that a second Industrial Revolution is imminent or has indeed already begun: the combination mechanisation plus feedback implies that man is not only employing machines to fulfil his purposes but is constructing them and their assemblies in such a way that within the limits imposed by their design they can control themselves; this is manifestly a qualitatively different thing from simple mechanisation.

However, the term automation is not limited to those processes which include feedback (or, as the Russians term it, *obratnaia sviaz*) in their operation. The term was first coined by D. S. Harder in 1936 to describe the operation of a production line at the Ford Automobile Factory, Detroit. This production line was equipped with transfer machines which automatically transferred the work-pieces from one operation to the next (in Soviet practice this is called an automatic line), thereby replacing workers who had hitherto done this job. Harder defined automation in this context as 'the automatic handling of parts between progressive production processes'. Strictly speaking this type of production does not differ qualitatively from advanced mechanisation and Diebold, the leading American authority in the field, does indeed so describe it—although he offers the term 'Detroit Automation' as an alternative.[5]

Soviet writers do in fact sometimes employ the term *kompleksnaia mekhanizatsiya* (integrated mechanisation) for precisely such production line phenomena, and it was apparently so used at the June 1959 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee; they are not however consistent, and frequently call this automation, and it must be admitted that they err in good company. The same phrase occurs continually in the Draft Targets for the current seven-year plan and in the various speeches and resolutions thereon, but usually together with the word automation. It is important, in the writer's opinion, to accept this in good faith, for sometimes automation in the strict sense may be appropriate and sometimes integrated mechanisation; its use is also perhaps pardonable if at a certain stage in the development of automatic techniques the boundary line between the two aspects should become blurred. Everyone interested in Soviet automation developments (and everyone, in the writer's view, ought to be) should bear this in mind, for although the expert is aware of just what kind of automation is involved and, more important, what kind of automation is not involved, the layman is not, and, depending upon his bias, is led by articles in the press and much Soviet propaganda to

[5] Papers delivered at National Conference on Automation, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C.

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believe either that Soviet talk of automation is nothing more than bluff, concealing a reality of just so many conveyor belts, or that the Soviets are about to inaugurate precisely that society run by electronic brains and robot workers, with the citizens enjoying what Diebold calls the seven-day week-end, which has been so often conjured up in popular discussion on this subject.

In point of fact the Soviets are engaged upon doing precisely what is being done in the West —although it is to be feared at a greater rate— namely, making production more automatic, thereby increasing the productivity of labour and cutting the costs of production, and sometimes this is done by way of advanced mechanisation and sometimes by automation strictly so called.

Consider for example the following claims put forward by Professor V. L. Lossiyevski, a leading Soviet authority on this subject, in a recent publication of the USSR Academy of Sciences[6] concerning the degree of automation already (1958) achieved in the Soviet Union.

1. 99 per cent of Soviet hydro-electric power stations have automatic regulation and control of the aggregates.
2. More than 75 per cent of boilers in the Soviet Union electric power stations have been automated and equipped with automatic heat regulators.
3. More than 90 per cent of Soviet pig-iron is smelted in automated blast-furnaces.
4. More than 90 per cent of Soviet steel is smelted in automated Martin-Siemens open hearth furnaces.
5. Automation has infiltrated the oil refining and many other industries on a large scale.

The above figures in no way imply that Western countries are lagging behind in the automation of the various plants and industries mentioned; on the contrary, they appear to be a confession of Soviet backwardness. In regard to the hydro-electric power stations the same can be said for Britain and the United States; as to the second point, there would be no need in either Britain or the United States to hedge at 75 per cent; we should simply substitute 'automatically controlled' for automated, and apply the phrase to all electric power stations; in regard again to point 3, we should more naturally say 'automatically controlled', and would be surprised to discover blast furnaces which were not so controlled. The fourth point is of greater interest; it means either that 90 per cent of Soviet steel is smelted in automatically controlled Martin-Siemens furnaces, as opposed to 10 per cent smelted in non-automatically controlled furnaces; or that this 10 per cent is in fact smelted in Bessemer converters. From the reports of friends who have toured Soviet plants the writer infers that the second alternative presents the truth. The true significance of Professor Lossiyevski's claim does not, however, depend upon whether the writer's interpretation is the correct one; its importance lies in the claim that the furnaces are automated. Consider, by way of clarification, the following quotation from Diebold's book on automation: 'For years the [United States] steel industry has smelted ore and turned out ingots by using the blast furnace and the open hearth. Although electronic devices can be made to open and close the furnace doors and automatically to perform other operations at the furnaces, these devices scarcely tap the full potential of modern technology. Fundamentally, use of the blast furnace and the open hearth is batch processing. . . . Over the years continuous use of this method has built up such a substantial body of empirical operating data that steel men are hesitant to cast it aside for new and untried methods.

'Two years ago I had the opportunity to visit one of our largest steel plants. At a long line of open hearth furnaces the guide proudly explained the use of a new device for determining the optimum time for tapping the furnaces. As we watched, the workmen dutifully referred to this device and noted the readings on log sheets. Yet no furnace was tapped until an old foreman squinted through a piece of coloured glass at a sample of molten metal that had been poured on the brick floor and nodded his approval'.

Diebold concludes that until the process is made continuous, that is until there is no longer any need for the old foreman, it will merely employ automatic controls but will not be fully automated.

[6] *Avtomatizatsiya proizvodstvennykh protsessov* (Moscow, 1958).

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As used by Professor Lossiyevski, the word 'automated' simply refers to such electronic devices as those which open and close the furnace doors, as mentioned by Diebold. It is however known that Soviet as well as Anglo-American technologists are engaged in research to remove the 'old foreman', that the report of a recent British steel delegation to the USSR, confidential in its details, in fact may be summarised in the statement 'ahead in some ways, behind in others, on the whole about even', that the British Iron and Steel Federation has supported the production of a cover to cover translation of the Soviet journal *Steel*, that both the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans are continuously engaged in introducing more automatic control, and that the prize is increased productivity and the markets of the world.

The only reasonable inference from Professor Lossiyevski's fifth point is that Soviet practice in regard to the automatic control of oil refining is a long way behind that of the United States, whose petroleum refineries have been described (not quite accurately in view of the Soviet Automatic Piston Plant) as the nearest thing to a 'fully automatic factory'.

This analysis was undertaken not in order to denigrate Soviet claims, or their work in the field of the automatic control of industrial processes, but simply to indicate to the reader the kind of issues involved in any discussion of this subject. Professor Lossiyevski himself, in the same paper, while asserting that it would be wrong to speak of Soviet backwardness in the field of automatic control theory, admits that 'in regard to the level and extent of automation in industry' the USSR lags considerably behind 'the advanced capitalist countries, in particular the United States'. He goes on to claim, however, that the XXth Congress of the CPSU took a series of decisions which will enable this lag to be overcome in the near future. It would appear that in the light of developments since the XXth Congress—the sputnik and lunik, the Automatic Piston Factory (although this was an earlier development), the trend towards standardisation of machine-tool construction, the drive towards integrated mechanisation and automation as exemplified at the XXIst Congress, the seven-year plan and the decisions of the June Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU—in the light of all this, the above claim must be taken seriously.

Before dealing with these developments, two further automation terms, frequently employed by Soviet writers in this context, must be mentioned. It is said, in a manner once described as criticism and self-criticism, that one of the drawbacks to Soviet production processes is the existence of partial automation (*chastichnaia avtomatizatsiya*) and that this must be replaced by integrated automation (*kompleksnaya avtomatizatatsiya*), By partial automation they mean that in many production processes, alongside automated or automatically controlled units, there are others which are not so controlled, and that the process as a whole does not therefore operate in an optimum regime, the result being that the performance characteristics of the given production line are low. It will be clear to the reader that 'partial automation' is in fact a stage in the development of 'integrated mechanisation'.

The term *kompleksnaya avtomatizatsiya*, which might logically and strictly be interpreted to mean the integrated control by computers of an entire production process and the employment of personnel solely for the duties of watching over the running of the process, is in fact often used synonymously with the term *kompleksnaya mekhanizatsiya*, i.e. integrated mechanisation as defined above.

Through the confusion of terminology the following position emerges from the decisions of the XXIst Congress and the June Plenum; partial automation must be speedily replaced by integrated mechanisation, and where feasible and economically justifiable or indeed necessary, as in the case of the control of nuclear reactors, where it would be dangerous to employ human beings, integrated mechanisation should give way to integrated automation.

Some Soviet Achievements and their Implications

The sputnik has been dismissed as 'a hunk of iron running around the Earth', and praised as a unique scientific achievement; from the point of view of this article it represents an impressive mastery of the techniques of automation. Consider the problem of getting a sputnik into orbit:

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this has to be done in three stages, each precisely synchronized by electrical pulses from Earth. Not only that, but in order to guide a satellite rocket accurately it is necessary to measure the position and velocity of the rocket continuously; this may be done by means of a radar system on Earth and a device called a transponder in the rocket; essentially the transponder receives the signal from the ground radar transmitter and sends out in reply a strong signal which is picked up by the ground radar receiver. The range, direction, velocity, and rate at which the direction changes may be measured from the radar. By means of a fast digital computer these measurements can be converted into position and velocity of the rocket and compared with the desired position and velocity If a difference exists between the actual and desired positions, this difference or error measurement (recall the movement of the gun) will be converted by another computer into a demand for change in missile direction. Sputniks II and III and the Lunik were also equipped with space laboratories to record and to relay to earth information concerning the constituents of the atmosphere, the degree of ionization, cosmic ray bombardment, etc. The Lunik was also furnished with cameras which by remote control from Earth were manoeuvred into position at precisely the right instant to begin photographing the reverse side of the moon. After exposure the films were developed automatically aboard the Lunik and transmitted to Earth by radio pulses.

The mastery of automatic control processes and computer techniques which is proved by the performance of the Sputniks and the Lunik can with equal facility be applied to the control of industrial production processes.

The automatic piston plant started operation in 1950 and in its reconstructed form, which came into operation in 1954-55, converts aluminium ingots into packed pistons by a process which is completely automatic, apart from the visual inspection of the castings for flaws. The Soviets claim that this piston plant is the first truly automatic factory in the world and castigate various American technologists for avoiding all mention of its existence in a series of articles in *The Machinist* which discussed the possibility of constructing just such a factory.[7] It is incontrovertible that, if this factory is in fact fully automatic—and independent evidence is available—in 1950 it represented a solitary pilot plant in a society which lagged far behind the United States in terms of industrialisation and the industrial assimilation of advanced techniques. Its significance therefore lies in the fact that a comparatively backward industrial society did have the resources and the technological know-how with which to build it, and that, given the current seven-year plan, supported as it is by an annually increasing number of graduate scientists, engineers, technologists, etc., and the will, imposed or voluntary, to see it through, the practices of the Automatic Piston Plant may be more universally extended.

It is equally incontrovertible that such resources and know-how as are available in the Soviet Union are far more abundantly at the command of the United States; in the United States, however, a vast automation potential remains largely untapped apparently through fear of the social consequences of the resulting technological unemployment.

Automation and Unemployment

In conclusion, a few comments on one of the by-products of automation, which make no claim to be considered adequate, much less exhaustive, but which cannot be omitted.

It is a truism that if automation is introduced into any particular plant or factory there will be a resulting redundancy amongst the workers then employed. There will, of course, be a demand for skilled workers to maintain the new automated production lines, and it may be that some of those made redundant will have to be retrained accordingly; it nevertheless remains true that unemployment will follow on the introduction of automation.

It is asserted by Soviet theoreticians that this is merely a problem of capitalist society, signifying that automation serves only to sharpen the contradictions of that society. Thus B. V. Briukov writes in an article entitled 'Automation and Society': 'Under socialism automation will result in the steady rise of the standard

[7] See A. Erivansky, *A Soviet Automatic Plant* (Moscow, 1955).

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of living of the workers, the enrichment of the culture of the people', etc. 'Under capitalism, automation will play a quite different role. It will bring not wealth but uncertainty for the morrow, unemployment and hardship to the workers of the capitalist countries. The workers oppose the use of automation as a means of intensifying their exploitation. Automation deepens the crisis of world capitalism, brings nearer the downfall of the rotten capitalist system'.[8]

Unfortunately, B. V. Briukov does not support his happy assertion that under socialism the standard of living of the workers rises with the introduction of automation by any information as to what becomes of those workers made redundant when automation is introduced into a Soviet factory. The absence of such information characterises all Soviet writing in this field, in spite of the fact that the concomitant of a rise in the productivity of labour is a decrease in the prime cost of production (*sebestoimost*), and that a predominant factor in most Soviet analyses of the prime cost with which this writer is familiar is in fact the wage bill.

It will be useful here to consider another paper by Professor Lossiyevski in the collection already mentioned. It would appear that at one stage Soviet writers were prepared to use automation as some kind of talisman and to introduce it hopefully at any and every opportunity, regardless of cost and consequent economic and technical effects. Professor Lossiyevski, in the paper which will now be considered, is concerned to establish what he terms a rational order of priority and volume for the automation of production processes, considered from the economic point of view. He holds that the prime cost is the index which at once incorporates the technological condition of the industrial process, its stage of development, the number of workers employed, the capital outlays, etc. He therefore suggests that analysis of the prime cost will in fact indicate those sections of the industry where the introduction of automation will have the greatest economic effect. In analysing the prime cost of coal from an inadequately mechanised and automated mine, he notes that 66 per cent of the cost price is taken up by the wage bill and therefore proposes that the mechanisation and automation of the mining process shall have first priority. He gives no indication of a social problem arising from the inevitable redundancy of a certain proportion of the miners.

Similarly, N. Razumov, in an important article in *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (July 1959), gives details of the increased mechanisation and automation in several vitally important plants within the control of the Moscow *Sovnarkhoz*, and figures concerning the consequent increase in labour productivity, but offers no information concerning the dismissed workers. The only reference this writer can find to the problem is given in an article contained in *Soviet Weekly* (6 August 1959) by Pyotr Sabbotin, Chairman of the trade union branch at the Saratov ball-bearing works, which deserves to be quoted and remembered. He writes: 'Recently in the foundry the drawing of hot forgings was mechanised. As a result, Comrades Terekhina, Kovalenko, Bochkova and Zuglova were left without a job. Did they grieve over this? No, they were immediately transferred to another job—at higher wages'.

Whatever the truth of the matter, whether a redundant worker can voluntarily find another job in virtue of a supposed manpower shortage in the Soviet Union, or whether he is directed to other employment, the fact remains that automation is being continuously introduced into industry and this does mean increased productivity, and in the end may mean—indeed, if there is no change in the current western attitude, must mean—the fulfilment of the consequences indicated in the opening paragraph of the article.

(It is hoped in a subsequent article to deal with the investment and organisational problems associated with automation.)

[8] *Vestnik istorii kultury*, 1959. 4.

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TECHNOLOGICAL EDUCATION IN THE USSR*

Newman A. Hall

IN November 1958 a delegation of eight engineering educators from the United States made a three-weeks tour of educational establishments in the Soviet Union to observe the detail operations of training engineers. (The visit was organised by the American Society for Engineering Education at the request of the State Department as one of the series of exchanges in cultural, scientific and technical areas resulting from an agreement with the Soviet Union made early in 1958.) The members of the mission were drawn from a variety of American engineering schools and had also made certain studies of educational operations in the Soviet Union.

Certain major observations can be briefly stated. Education in the Soviet Union is directed quite uniformly to the training of individuals for service to the State. The interests of the individual are always subordinate, although nowhere is the use of material incentives more highly developed than in Russia; the rewards for successful performance in engineering education are substantial, while the price of failure is great. There is in effect in the Soviet Union the most intensive and purposeful effort in mass education that has ever been undertaken. This effort is associated very directly with the dominant pattern of state planning and control of purpose in education as well as in economy, particularly significant in relation to the very large number of engineers being trained. At the present time in the Soviet Union approximately 500 engineers are being graduated per year for each million population. The comparable number in the United States is 175 engineers per year per million people. These engineers are being trained with specific purposes in mind and will be used to help the Soviet Union meet its planned objectives in technological developments.

Nowhere are the engineer and scientist held in higher regard than in the USSR; they are among the aristocracy of Soviet society. Engineering students and practising engineers are exempt from military service. An engineering education opens the door to positions of high rank. On the other hand, to achieve such positions without some type of diploma would appear virtually impossible. In general the limit of achievement of the non-graduate in an industrial enterprise is the position of foreman, while this is considered to be the starting position for a graduate.

An incentive not to be underestimated is the strong devotion to a system that greatly encourages education. Such a system, offering unique advantages to the educated, instils a strong desire for education in the youth of both sexes. Girls account for roughly one-third of the total enrolment in the schools of engineering technology. Competition for admission is keen and a seriousness of purpose pervades the classroom and laboratory.

IN the USSR, school begins at the age of seven. Grades one through seven comprise the elementary school, grades eight through ten the middle school. Higher education is offered both at technical institutions and universities. A student entering a university or a technical institution does so after the ten year school and his programme of study lasts from five to six years.

With rare exceptions, engineering education is offered only at the VTUZ's (Higher Technical Educational Institutions). These have the right to award degrees only in the technical sciences. The universities are concerned with mathematics, basic sciences, languages, etc. In general the function of the university is to prepare students to enter teaching; whereas the function of the VTUZ is to prepare students for careers in industry and research.

In addition to the universities and the VTUZ's, there is an intermediate programme of higher education given at 'technicums.' The

* This article is based by permission on the report of the mission to the Soviet Union of the American Society for Engineering Education (*Cf. Journal of Engineering Education*, v. 49, n. 9, May 1959).

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student enters a technicum after the seven year school or after the ten year school. In the first case, the curriculum extends over a four year period, in the latter case, 2½ years.

The entire Soviet educational system is standardised. Curricula at all levels are uniform throughout the USSR. The time schedule is set for each of the various courses and the detail is worked out even to the extent of specifying the number of hours of lecture, laboratory, and practice periods.

A drastic overhauling of the higher educational system, particularly that related to engineering, is now under consideration. It is reported that this reorganisation will be gradual. The new plans will provide for more practical experience during the course of study, in order to make the graduate more immediately useful to industry upon graduation. In addition to these educational considerations, the changes are prompted by the fear that a gap is developing between the working class and the intelligentsia.

Within the framework of a growing 'planned' society, the specific objectives of Soviet higher education have been summed up as: [1] (1) the ideological-political education of the students and instructors in the foundation of the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin; (2) the preparation of specialists of high qualification for all branches of the economy and culture; (3) the conducting of scientific research to assist in the solution of the most important problems of socialist construction; and (4) the popularisation of scientific and technical knowledge among the broad masses of the population.

THE administration of the Soviet higher education system is thoroughly centralised and is entrusted to a number of government agencies, the most important by far being the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR.

In addition, a number of ministries run their own special engineering schools (communications, defence, transport, agriculture, etc.) and other schools (medicine, teaching, fine arts, etc.). Research institutes, where much graduate training goes on, are also separately administered. A quasi-independent agency, the Higher Attestation Commission (VAK), has the responsibility of certifying advanced degrees and professorial qualifications for all institutions.

The Soviet higher education system consists of approximately 750 institutions located in some 260 cities and towns. The total enrolment in 1958 was roughly 2,100,000, of whom 1,200,000 were daytime resident students and 900,000 were evening and extension students. Of these, 400,000 day resident (33%) and 180,000 evening and extension students (20%) were in various fields of engineering. In 1957 240,000 students were graduated, including 80,000 engineers, of whom 66,000 were from day courses and 14,000 from evening and extension courses. Half of the students (30% in engineering) are girls. For 1958, the graduates were 290,000 total and 93,000 engineers.

From these overall figures, the scale of the Soviet effort is apparent. Two other features are significant: the relatively large proportion graduating in engineering (one-third as compared to 8% in the United States in 1958) and the effort lavished on evening and extension programmes.

Of the 186 educational institutions primarily concerned with engineering training, 128 are directly administered by the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education, 28 by the nominally separate Ukrainian Ministry of Higher Education, and the remainder by other ministries. The Soviet Ministry is responsible for the general planning of the higher education system, the opening of new schools, and the consolidation of some of the older ones. In co-operation with the State Planning Commission (GOSPLAN), it is responsible for the planning of enrolment. The five or seven year plan, which is broken down and re-examined each year, specifies the enrolment in each department of each school.

The Ministry also closely supervises the contents of the curriculum of each subject. Curricula are essentially uniform across the country; content is specified and only minor deviations may be permitted. Some 15 leading schools may make major curriculum changes on an experimental basis with the consent of the

[1] E. N. Medynski, *Narodnoe Obrazovanie v SSSR* (Moscow, 1947), p. 166. See also *Vysshaia Shkola*, L. I. Karpov and V. A. Severtsev, eds. (Moscow, 1957), p. 32.

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Ministry. The writing, certification, publication and royalty rates of textbooks and other teaching aids (films, visual aids, records, special booklets for extension course students, etc.) are likewise under the direct control of the Ministry of Higher Education. The planning, training, and placement of adequate numbers of faculty members and the application of sufficient pressure to raise the standards of faculties of all schools also fall within the province of this Ministry.

A second feature of the administrative picture is the position given to research institutes because of the close relation between research and engineering education and the role which these institutes play in graduate training and preparation of the teaching staff. A relatively small proportion of the Soviet research programme is carried out at institutions of higher learning; the major load is carried by two types of institutes devoted exclusively to research.

The more basic research programmes are sponsored, planned, and carried out under the supervision and direct guidance of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, which is not only an honorary society of the leading engineers, scientists, and humanists of the country, but also an active government agency responsible for planning and conducting research on problems of importance to further development. It is responsible directly to the Council of Ministers.

The Academy consists of eight Departments (Mathematics - Physics; Geography - Geology; Chemistry; Biology; Technical Sciences; History; Economics-Philosophy-Law; Literature-Language) but Mathematics-Physics, Chemistry and Technical Sciences make up two-thirds of the membership. The operating agencies of the Academy are 143 research institutes (92 in natural sciences and engineering) concerned with the development of new knowledge and the training of graduate students. In general these research institutes are allied with a scientific discipline (mathematics, soil mechanics, physical chemistry, etc.) rather than with one type of industrial or economic activity.

In addition to the Soviet Academy, there also exist academies of science in most of the Soviet Republics whose general programme is similar to that of the Soviet Academy, but whose scope of activities and level of work depend on the maturity of the Republic concerned.

The second type of institute is more directly related to development work and each is therefore responsible to a specific Government agency. Before the recent decentralisation policy, this was the appropriate ministry. Wherever ministries were preserved, they kept their research institutes (for example, Defence, Aviation, Communications, Transport). Other institutes whose work is considered of national significance (Heavy Machinery Research Institute, Turbine Research Institute, etc.) are now responsible to GOSPLAN and essentially continue as before. The smaller institutes (Food, Industry, Textiles, etc.) are now responsible to the local economic councils of their respective areas.

This second type of institute also participates in the training of graduate students; a large part of its work is essentially the type of development work undertaken at industrial laboratories in the United States.

The third major component of the administration of the higher education system is the Higher Attestation Commission (VAK). VAK consists of 78 senior professors appointed for two years by the Council of Ministers; members may be reappointed and the average length of tenure is six years. From among its members, the Commission selects a chairman, an academic secretary and a ten-man presidium responsible for day to day operations and most decisions. While the Commission is independent of the Ministry of Higher Education and responsible directly to the Council of Ministers, its chairman for the past ten years has been the Minister of Higher Education.

THE dominant characteristic of engineering curricula of the USSR is the high degree of specialisation. An examination of a typical cross-section of curricula indicates that specialisation begins almost from the day the student enters the VTUZ. Although the first two years are devoted to the basic sciences and mathematics, even these courses are oriented with respect to the special subject in which the student is enrolled. As he progresses, courses

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become more and more specialised. Soviet engineers are trained in nearly 200 different subjects spread over some 20 major areas.

The emphasis on specialisation is reflected in the fact that of 187 engineering schools only 29 are Polytechnic Institutes similar to our Institutes of Technology, where several fields of engineering are studied. The majority of Soviet engineering students attend VTUZ's where only one field is taught; they go to a Mining Institute, or an Aviation Institute, or a Railroad Transport Engineering Institute.

The curriculum extends over five years for most schools, 5½ for a few special schools or curricula, six years for evening or correspondence school. Most students who complete the correspondence course, however, take 8 to 10 years.

The first two years are generally devoted to a common core which includes basic sciences (mathematics, physics, chemistry and mechanics), basic skills (drafting and machine shop), and non-technical material (foreign languages, Marxism-Leninism). The third and part of the fourth year are used for applied sciences (thermodynamics, metallurgy, electrical science, etc.), introduction to design (detail machine design, simple circuits, etc.), and some further social disciplines. The fourth and fifth years cover increasingly specific material concerned with the equipment of the special field, including design, performance, and production characteristics. The curriculum is concluded with a 'diploma project' carried out by the student. There are also three periods of industrial practice after the third and fourth year and just prior to the diploma project; these start with general factory experience and are co-ordinated more and more closely with the speciality during the last years.

Laboratory instruction plays a large part in Soviet engineering education. The laboratories are conducted in groups of 12 to 15 students, who work most of their problems in the laboratory discussion periods. In the small sections that were observed, there seemed to be a good interchange of question and answer and discussion between students and teacher. Laboratories are run by assistants and *docents*, but wherever possible each course is supervised by a professor. In some institutes there was a *docent* acting as professor, but it was said that this was because of the shortage of professors.

Freedom and initiative for students is closely related to staff quality. In their educational literature, the Soviets claim that the development of individual initiative in the student is one of the aims of their laboratory-project system of instruction. Some schools, such as the Moscow Aviation Institute, allow third-year students one day a week and fourth and fifth-year students two days a week without scheduled classes as long as they keep up high scholastic records. The better students are permitted to replace some of their term projects by participation in actual sponsored research projects of the staff. Similar arrangements were observed at other VTUZ's in Moscow and Leningrad. In general, except in these leading schools, such opportunities are less likely to arise because the staff has less equipment and fewer opportunities for sponsored research.

EVENING and correspondence course students combine part-time education with essentially full-time industrial work. The evening students work a six-hour day, followed by four hours of classes in the evening from seven to eleven, and complete a regular five year course in six years. In addition to the lectures during the academic year, one month full-time is required each year for laboratory courses and examinations. This is provided at full pay in addition to regularly scheduled vacations.

Apparently some, but by no means all, of the day staff teach evening school, and a number of part-time teachers selected from among leading engineers do much of the evening teaching, especially in the specialised fourth and fifth year courses.

While the general course is supposed to be the same in day and evening school, it is found that basic sciences (mathematics, physics, and chemistry) may not be at as high a level. Evening students who are employed do not receive money grants and have little opportunity to take part in extracurricular activities.

The Soviet correspondence curricula are about the same as those for evening students, with correspondence replacing the regular lectures and homework. They lead to a diploma

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considered equivalent to diplomas from the regular day programme. Each year the student is entitled to an educational leave, with full pay plus expenses, for laboratory work and examinations.

The correspondence programme is one of the most rapidly expanding features of Soviet engineering education. It is administered primarily by some dozen correspondence institutes in Leningrad and Moscow serving the entire Soviet Union.

Graduate study in science and engineering in the USSR is built around the relationship between student and research supervisor. The assignment of graduate study openings in various institutions is made on the basis of the availability of a thesis supervisor. This means, for example, that if at a mining institute there is only one senior staff member whose standing enables him to supervise a thesis, and his field is the theory of plates and shells, there will be no graduate study in mining, but only in the theory of plates and shells; and if such an individual retires or goes elsewhere, the VTUZ will lose the privilege of having graduate students. In order to supervise these, a staff member must be a *docent* or a full professor.

Since the availability of a supervisor is the essential factor, research institutes which do no undergraduate teaching may and often do have graduate programmes built around their senior staff; in fact they now do roughly half the graduate training in the USSR.

Graduate study in engineering plays an increasingly important part in American engineering education, where it fulfils the triple function of preparing new teaching staff, meeting the needs of the economy for applied scientists, and forming a unique vehicle for the carrying out of considerable basic research in circumstances which allow its results to influence the education of young engineers with minimum delay. As a result, some 10% of our engineering students do at least one year of graduate work and some 2½% eventually get a doctor's degree.

The situation is quite different in the USSR. In engineering education which is meant to supply the economy with engineers, the diploma is considered terminal and is not regarded as a degree. Graduate enrolment is somewhat under 1% of the total (some 4,600 out of a total of 580,000), with an additional 4,800 working at research institutes. Leading schools like the Bauman Institute have some 200 graduate students in an enrolment of 10,000; Kuibyshev Aviation Institute reports 7 graduate students in 3,000. Engineering graduate enrolment is planned to supply the educational system with its teaching staff and to provide for the needs of the engineering research apparatus.

OBSERVATIONS of the exchange mission and statements made by officials of the Ministry of Higher Education and in the Soviet press indicate that significant changes are in prospect for the Soviet education system as it concerns the training of engineers.

Secondary education at present centres on the ten-year school, which provides most of the applicants for institutions of higher learning. A small proportion of students enter technicums after only seven years of secondary education. Up to 5% of these graduates may apply for college level work. The ten-year school, in spite of minor changes in 1954-57 which increased the proportion of skill subjects in the curriculum, has remained essentially a college preparatory course. It has been graduating somewhat over a million youngsters a year since 1954, all of them pointed towards higher education both by training and by great social pressure. Of these, only some 200,000 to 250,000 were admitted to institutions of higher learning. The number of secondary school graduates who have no opportunity for higher education is the cause of great concern. It is proposed that the number of students who may enter the institutions of higher learning be increased. At the same time, it is expected that the rate of attrition will be higher in the first year with intensified competition for higher education at a more advanced level.

The engineering curriculum is to be revised. In particular, it is felt that the present three-stage, four-to-six-month, practical working period is not enough to acquaint prospective engineers with the workings of industry, partly because it does not allow enough time and

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partly because it is so chopped up that the student has no time to acquire skill at one position before he is moved to the next, and industry feels that he requires too much attention and produces too little.

The new scheme calls for a period of work of one year, either by splitting the first two years between work and study (six months of each in rotation or on a half-day of each basis), or, for more analytical fields such as aeronautical or electronic engineering, a year of work would be inserted after the fourth, fifth, or sixth term; this plan was the one favoured by all the leading schools, while the plan of having work in the first year was generally preferred by other schools.

There is good reason to agree that most of the industrial practice as carried on at present serves little useful purpose, and in a country short of machinery, some familiarisation programme appears desirable for most engineers; it is likely that one continuous long period is more effective. Industry will benefit from the programme and will therefore co-operate more effectively.

There is some danger that these reorganisations of high school, admissions, and practice period will increase the specialisation by starting it earlier and by tying the schools more closely to their associated industries, and that engineering research and the more analytical parts of engineering will tend to be neglected.

Another important factor concerns enrolment. If high school is lengthened by a year and engineering school is lengthened by six months to a year, this may involve the loss of two 'classes' of engineers, or 160,000 of them at the present rate. Such a gap would seriously interfere with long-range planning; to avoid it and smooth over transition to the new system, the rate of admission is likely to increase sharply for the next few years, possibly to the extent of doubling. Moreover, by 1964 the number of persons reaching 18 years age is expected to increase appreciably. These factors would minimise the disturbance in graduating rates and economic planning due to the new reforms and would permit experimentation with another scheme, which is also designed to decrease the psychological effect of failure to gain admission.

According to First Deputy Minister of Higher Education V. N. Stoltetov, this might introduce a new admissions policy with a permanently higher number of admissions and a thorough weeding out over the first two years; the strain of such a policy on the present teaching staff is clear; the advantage of a larger proportion of high school graduates getting a chance at college before being excluded is clear also.

It does not appear, however, that these changes, significant though they are, will change the broad pattern of Soviet education in engineering. Nor will they affect the goals of the seven-year plan in education which calls for a continuous steady increase in enrolment to a total of 2,300,000 by 1965, of whom 850,000 will be in engineering.

The growth is to be particularly large in the schools in the eastern regions (for example, the Frunze Polytechnic Institute will expand from a present enrolment of 1,400 daytime and 400 evening students to 2,500 daytime and 600 evening students). Another area likely to expand is the extension programme, which is already growing very rapidly (the Moscow Extension Polytechnic Institute went up from 19,000 in 1955 to 36,000 in 1958). The long-established schools apparently are not expected to grow appreciably.

Nor is the growth to be uniform in all fields of engineering. Two areas due for expansion are stated to be chemical engineering and electronic engineering, while the classical machine construction curricula may be in for slight retrenchment. At the same time, entirely new curricula and specialities are making their appearance, for example, atomic power station design at the Moscow Power Institute, or missile and satellite design at the Physics Technical Institute in Moscow, a new school whose four departments are listed as radio physics, radio technology, aero-mechanics, and physical chemistry.

In summary, the Soviets feel that their supply of engineers has fairly well caught up with present and expected needs, and they are now readjusting the machinery for a situation of slower growth and near balance between the supply and demand for technical personnel. At present, plans are no longer limited by a shortage of engineers, and therefore some thought can be given to limiting the frustration and maladjustment among young people due to imbalance between secondary and higher education.

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PHILOSOPHY STUDIES

Subject, Object, and Organisation

Joseph M. Bochenski

Centres of Study and Research

THERE are numerous universities and institutes in the Soviet Union where philosophy is taught and philosophical research carried on. According to statistics published in *Voprosy Filosofii* for the years 1947, 1948, 1951, 1951/52 and 1953/54, philosophical theses were submitted for the degree of Candidate of Science at no fewer than 36 such institutions. This degree is taken at the end of a course of academic study. There must therefore have been regular courses in philosophy at these universities and institutes.[1]

As far as is known, thirteen of these institutions are in Moscow, 23 in the provinces. In 1947 there were only 6, all in Moscow.

Needless to say, these academic centres are not all on the same level, quantitatively or qualitatively. It appears that about 10% of all philosophy students have attended Moscow State University. The following details will give an idea of the range of studies at this University.

According to A. P. Gagarin there were 1,150 philosophy students there in the academic year 1950/51. Of these, 489 were registered in the philosophical, 168 in the psychological department, 272 were correspondence students *(zaochnye)* and 69 were external students. In addition there were 152 aspirants.

As regards the number of teachers, the following details are based on a report by E. D. Klementev and others compiled in 1957 (and referring probably to the academic year 1956/57). For dialectical and historical materialism, 18 professors and instructors; for the history of foreign philosophy, 11; and for the history of philosophy of the Soviet peoples, 12, making a total of 41 for the three *Kafedry*.

The psychology section was, if not larger, at any rate just as large as the history section. It embraced five different laboratories or subdepartments. The *Kafedry* for logic cannot, in view of the great interest in this subject, have been much smaller than the psychology section. It is therefore not unlikely that the corresponding figures for these two departments would, taken together, be 57, of whom 17 were professors.

When one remembers that no fewer than 13 Moscow colleges and institutes give instruction in philosophy, it will hardly be an exaggeration to put the total number of philosophy teachers at these establishments at about 300 instructors, including about 100 (university) professors.

We also possess a few details about the State University in Tiflis (Tbilisi). According to a report by A. A. Gelashvili of 1956 (referring presumably to the year 1955/56) this institution had three departments: Dialectical and Historical Materialism; Logic; History of Philosophy. There were 15 teachers in the first department. Tbilisi is a fairly important centre of philosophical research, thanks above all to the work of Prof. K. S. Bakradze; but the other provincial universities are probably not much smaller. It may be assumed that each of them has a teaching staff of about 30.

[1] In the Soviet Union a university course lasts 4-6 years. The academic year consists of two terms, from 1 September to 23 January and from 7 February to 30 June. The student has to take examinations at the end of each year, otherwise he is not allowed to carry on for another year. Two 'unsatisfactory's' entail automatic exclusion. At the end of his course the student takes an examination. Then, if he has received good marks, he can become an 'aspirant'. As such he acts as assistant to a professor and prepares a thesis for the degree of Candidate of Science (in our case 'philosophical science'). This thesis is then submitted after three years probation and must now (since 1957) be printed before it is submitted. The thesis must display new knowledge and the standard required is that of a doctoral thesis at a German university (K. G. Gallin, *Vysshee obrazovanie i podgotovka kadrov v SSSR*, Moscow, 1958).

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Theses

The lists of philosophical theses for the degree of Candidate of Science throw further light on the extent and distribution of philosophy teaching.[2] In 1947 there were 66, all in Moscow; by 1953-54 the total had risen to 469, of which 300 were submitted in Moscow.

It is impossible to check whether and how far these figures are complete, but it is highly likely that the increase in the numbers is not only due to an improvement in the access to sources of information. The increasing share of the provinces—rising from 0% to 36% within six years—is probably not merely statistical. The final figure is anyway quite significant—469 theses in the year 1953/54.

Among the institutions at which these were submitted, three, namely the Academy of Social Sciences, the Philosophical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Moscow State University, occupy a leading position. At these institutions the following number of theses was submitted:

	1947	1948-51	1951-52	1953-54	Total
Academy of Social Sciences	32	128	34	52	246
Philosophical Institute	10	67	25	37	139
Moscow State University	11	28	60	139	238
Total	53	223	119	228	623
Annual average	53	74	119	228	108
in comparison with 1947 = 100	100	140	225	430	—

These figures enable us to estimate the number of philosophy students in the Soviet Union. In 1950/51 489 persons were studying philosophy in the Moscow State University. If we take away 189 for psychology, there remain about 300 for pure philosophy. In 1951/52 60 theses were submitted at this University, out of a total of 203, i.e. roughly one-third. This suggests that the number of philosophy students in Soviet universities was about 1,000 in that year. In 1953/54 the number of theses more than doubled (from 203 to 469). It will therefore be no exaggeration to estimate that at least 2,000 young men and women were training to be philosophers. Naturally these are only round figures, not precise statistics. All the same, the round figures are remarkable.

Publications

In various respects Soviet philosophical publications differ from those of the West. In the first place they are extremely centralised—only very few institutions publish anything worth mentioning. The editions of the works that are published are much larger than is usual with Western publications of a similar nature. More-

[2] The doctor's degree is awarded after the public defence of a thesis. Only a few of the professors of philosophy have this degree. The number of doctorates is also relatively small: for example, according to I. D. Andreev and others, altogether 14 doctorates in philosophy were awarded in 1953 and the beginning of 1954. The names include: F. V. Konstantinov, F. Ya. Moskalenko, G. V. Platonov, A. V. Savinov, V. I. Selivanov, V. F. Golosov, R. Garaudy, S. M. Kovalev, all of them well-known Soviet philosophers. According to a report by E. V. Sorochova, eight doctoral theses were defended at the Philosophical Institute in the first half of 1956.

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over, there are comparatively few strictly scientific publications and numerous textbooks and writings of a popular character are published. In all these respects, however, there has been some development in the direction of Western conditions: centralisation is becoming less intense and the editions are becoming smaller. Also, more scientific publications are appearing.

As far as periodicals are concerned, the Soviet philosophers had only one professional journal between 1947 and 1957, *Voprosy Filosofii*. At the beginning of 1958 a new philosophical journal, *Filosofskie Nauki*, was founded, which represents the philosophical series of the *Scientific Contributions of the Ministry of Higher Education*.

Philosophical articles can also be published in the Academy's *Izvestiya* and similar series published by the Academies of Sciences and a few universities, and also in other organs. For example, A. A. Maksimov published one of his notorious denunciations in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* and another in the Navy journal. The leading periodicals and newspapers such as *Kommunist*, *Pravda*, etc. also publish articles of philosophical importance from time to time.

Nevertheless, the most important journal is still *Voprosy Filosofii*. It is the main source for every scholar and student in this field and is now one of the most important philosophical journals in the world. Founded in 1947, two issues were published in that year, three a year between 1948 and 1950, six a year between 1951 and 1956 and since 1957 12 issues a year have appeared. The total number of pages rose from 897 in 1947 to over 2,300 in 1958. The edition of 20,000 copies in the years 1947 and 1948 rose to 50,000 in 1956 and was then limited to 32,500 (presumably in connection with the change over to monthly publication). During the first ten years (1947-56) *V. F.* published more than 1,000 articles and notes by nearly 800 different writers. Quantitatively at any rate it represents a tremendous achievement, especially when one remembers that one page of this journal corresponds to about 2½ of the octavo pages normally used in the West. If printed in Western style the contents of the ten years' issues would form a small library of about 50 volumes containing 500 pages each.

As far as the contents are concerned, the history of *V. F.* has often been one of suffering and misfortune. Under the bold and intelligent direction of B. M. Kedrov, it became in 1948 the target of attacks by A. A. Maksimov. After the second number in 1948, publication was suspended and the next issue (1948, No. 3) did not appear until 1 June 1949. Kedrov was no longer Editor-in-Chief, and four members had retired from the editorial staff. Maksimov himself took on the editorship, beginning with the first issue of 1949; before this a similar reactionary, M. B. Mitin, had been nominated to the post. From 1949 to August 1952 the journal was edited by D. I. Chesnokov; then F. V. Konstantinov became Editor-in-Chief for two years (until 1955, No. 4). Maksimov was still a member of the editorial board, when the editor made a sharp attack on him (in the first issue for 1955). For some time after this he disappeared from the editorial board.

Apart from the journals, Soviet philosophers also have at their disposal a number of collective works, which appear within the framework of the publications of various universities and also independently. As far as such symposia on philosophy are concerned, the first known to us during the period from 1947 onwards was published by the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR in 1948. This was followed by *Questions of Philosophy*, published by the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, the *Academic Contributions* of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee, both of which appeared in 1950; then came *Problems of Dialectical and Historical Materialism* from the same Academy in 1953. The year 1955 saw the production of no less than five similar volumes, two of which were published in Leningrad, two in Sverdlovsk, and one in Minsk. Beginning in 1956 publications of this kind have become increasingly numerous.

Bibliographically the situation in Soviet philosophy is unsatisfactory. Current bibliographies were not published in *V. F.* until 1952. According to the *Bibliography of Soviet Philosophy* current bibliographies exist of the publications on philosophy acquired by the library of the Academy of Sciences; but they are only duplicated and hence fairly inaccessible. **The**

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work of G. A. Wetter and the essays of H. Dahm in *Ost-Probleme* contain valuable bibliographies. In 1959 there appeared two issues of the *Bibliography of Soviet Philosophy* in the series *Sovietica* edited by Th. Blakely and the staff of the East European Institute in Freiburg. The first of these contains a list of the articles in *V. F.* for 1947-56; the second contains the titles of books published between 1947 and 1956 and a list (a) of books (b) of articles in *Voprosy Filosofii* and *Filosofskie Nauki* for 1957 and 1958. The book titles were listed on the basis of quotations appearing in *V. F.* and publications of under 100 pages were not included. It is therefore not a complete bibliography, either in regard to books or articles, but it probably includes the most important items. The first issue of *Sovietica* contains a detailed index of subjects and the second a complete index of names for both issues. The present study is based on this bibliography.

For the last twelve years from 1947 to 1958 *Sovietica* list rather more than 2,600 titles, including about 500 book titles (of books of over 100 pages). This gives an average of about 200 titles a year (including 40 books). But the number of publications is not divided equally among the various years and a quantitative progress may be noted. The number of book titles rose from 23 in 1947 to 67 in 1956 (the total for the ten years was 339).

For purposes of comparison the following figures may be quoted. The great *Bibliographia Philosophica 1934-1945*, by G. A. de Brie O.P. (Utrecht 1950-54) contains 48,178 titles for twelve years. This figure is not immediately comparable with the above figures, because, unlike de Brie, the *Sovietica* do not include pamphlets and publications of less than 100 pages and do include a great number of titles on sociology and politics (as, for example, the complete works of Lenin, Stalin, Chernishevsky, etc.). A certain number of articles the titles of which do not appear in *Sovietica* appear either in non-philosophical journals or in collective works. If these and also pamphlets were included, the figures would be considerably larger. No even approximately accurate estimate is feasible, but it would probably be safe to assume that something like 5,000 publications of some philosophical interest have appeared. De Brie covers only literature in eight Western languages, ignoring, for example, the not unimportant Japanese, Polish, Czech and Hungarian literature. On the other hand, *Sovietica* do not include Ukrainian and Georgian literature.

If our estimates are accurate, the ratio between Western Europe and the two Americas on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, is about 10:1, whereas the ratio between the respective populations is probably about 3:1. It follows that in regard to the number of philosophical publications the Soviet Union still lags a good way behind the Western countries but not so far away as one might imagine at first; and the difference is constantly diminishing.

So much for the titles. As regards the size of the editions, the ratio between the Soviet Union and the West is very much in favour of the Soviet Union, since editions there are often very large. Apart from the 'classics', of which millions of copies are printed, other books as well often appear in very large editions. To quote only a few examples; the second edition of the collective work *On Dialectical Materialism* (1953) amounted to 500,000 copies; the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* (3rd edition) of 1951 appeared in an edition of 500,000 copies; the *Foundations of Marxist Philosophy* (1958) in an edition of 250,000 copies. Even specialised works are often published in comparatively large editions: for example, 10,000 copies were published of M. G. E. Omelyanovski's book on *Lenin and the Physics of the Twentieth Century* in 1947. Even the highly academic collective works, *Problems of Logic* and *Problems of Aesthetics* appeared in an edition of 10,000 copies. In the West philosophical books attain editions of this size only very rarely.

Conferences

A special characteristic of philosophical life in the Soviet Union is the great number of conferences at which philosophical problems are discussed. These conferences may be classified as follows.

Firstly, there are from time to time large gatherings of philosophers which are nearly always convened by a high government authority in order to issue important directions. These directions are admittedly dressed up in a wordy

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discussion entitled 'Criticism and Self-Criticism', but the important thing is the line which is promulgated.

Our period began with the conference on the criticism of the *History of West European Philosophy* by G. F. Aleksandrov, which took place from 16 to 25 June 1947. No fewer than 55 speakers took part, and many others only failed to speak for lack of time: their contributions were published. It should be noted that the example set by the Union was copied in the Armenian Republic (in November 1947) when a similar conference was held.

The famous conference 'On the Situation in the Biological Sciences', at which Lysenko's opponents were suppressed or proffered humble self-criticism, took place in 1948. At the end of June in the same year an All-Union conference of teachers of logic was held in Moscow, in order to condemn A. F. Asmus. From 8 to 15 July 1959 the minister S. Kaftanov held his own conference for occupants of chairs of Marxism-Leninism and philosophy. In 1950, from 28 June to 4 July there was the great Pavlovian conference 'on the initiative of Comrade Stalin' at which it was 'decided' to undertake a *perestroika* (reconstruction) of Soviet psychology to bring it into line with the teachings of Pavlov. In December 1951 the heads of the philosophy departments of the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge met at a conference attended by a large number of philosophers. Two years after this the psychologists and philosophers of psychology met again, this time in Kiev, to discuss the same subject. At the end of 1955 a 'coordinating conference for philosophical problems' took place in the Philosophical Institute, and another conference was held in the same Institute from 28 May to 20 June 1956 in which philosophers, university teachers, and representatives of the Academies of the Republics took part. These big conferences have always had a decisive influence on the development of philosophy in the Soviet Union, above all, by virtue of the guiding principles which they have laid down, and also because numerous philosophers have seized the opportunity of producing genuine criticisms. In this respect it will suffice to refer to the speeches made by B. M. Kedrov and M. P. Baskin at the Zhdanov conference of 1947.

A second type of conference is represented by the numerous gatherings which serve the same purpose as those already mentioned, but in which no high officials participate. They are held on the initiative of subordinate organisations and on a purely local basis. The following may serve as examples:

On 13 August 1948 a conference on the situation in biology took place at the Philosophical Institute, evidently in connection with the Lysenko conference; in the same year a conference took place in Kharkov on the subject of physics; in April 1950 at the Philosophical Institute a conference took place on *Pravda's* criticism of writers; in November 1956 one took place at the Academy of Social Sciences on the resolutions of the Central Committee. Above all, a great number of meetings were devoted to the works of the 'genius' Stalin in 1950 and 1952. It is hardly worth while listing them in detail.

A third type of conference is represented by the smaller gatherings in which normally only the philosophers of a single city or sometimes only a single institution take part, together with guest speakers. These meetings are devoted to the criticism of a particular work or project. In the Soviet Union philosophers are in the habit of discussing every important publication very meticulously and collective works are often scrutinised in great detail before publication. A book is sometimes printed twice: first in draft form (available only to professors, members of the Institutes, and the authorities) and secondly all over again for the general public after the draft has been thoroughly discussed. A few examples: a discussion took place at the Academy of Sciences from 15 to 23 January 1948 on M. M. Rozental's *Marxist Dialectical Method*; on A. M. Markov's *On the Micro-World* at the Philosophical Institute on 23 January 1948; on 26 and 30 March 1948 at the P. I. on Stepanyan's *From Socialism to Communism*; in the same year in the Philosophical Faculty of the Moscow State University on a prospectus on the *History of Philosophy;* on 10 March 1950 at the P. I. on I. V. Kuznetsov's *Principle of Relativity in Contemporary Physics*; in October 1950 at the P. I. on the draft of the book on *Basic Laws of Logic* by N. I. Kondakov; in 1951 at the P. I. on the collective work on *His-*

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torical Materialism edited by F. V. Konstantinov: 600 persons are said to have taken part in this conference; on 26 September 1951 at the P. I. on the syllabus for ethics; at the end of the same year on a prospectus of the book on *Dialectical Materialism and Contemporary Science*. At the end of 1954 no less than four such meetings took place to sit in judgment on the second edition of the book on *Historical Materialism* which has already been mentioned; on 30 November and 18 December 1956 B. G. Baskakov's book on *Chernyshevski* was discussed, and so on.

In the fourth place, it is customary in the Soviet Union to hold ceremonial conferences in honour of deceased philosophers or revolutionaries. One such conference in 1948 (Academy of Sciences) was devoted to the 100th anniversary of the *Communist Manifesto* and in the same year the Philosophical Institute held a special meeting in honour of Belinski. On 21 January 1949 the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute (I M E L) held a special meeting to mark the 25th anniversary of the death of Lenin. The same Institute and the Academy of Sciences devoted another meeting to the 40th anniversary of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. In 1949 conferences were held to celebrate the bicentenary of the birth of Radishchev and the centenary of the birth of Pavlov. The Institute of Language and Thought met—very imprudently—to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the death and the 85th anniversary of the birth of N. Ya. Marr who was to be denounced in June of the same year.

Voltaire was commemorated on 29 May 1953; the 30th anniversary of the death of Lenin was commemorated on 18 January 1954 (Academy of Sciences) The Academy devoted a similar meeting to Ludwig Feuerbach on 15 October 1954 to commemorate the 150th anniversary of his birth. At the end of 1955 there was a commemoration of Gassendi.

These conferences are by no means merely formal occasions. Lectures on philosophy and the history of philosophy are delivered, followed by discussion. For some time now we have been hearing increasingly of a different sort of conference at which neither a philosopher nor a book is discussed, but a group of problems. Thus the Academy of Sciences devoted a meeting in 1951 to the philosophical problems involved in the transformation of Nature. In 1956 the editorial staff of *Voprosy Filosofii* devoted a similar meeting to the subject of Aesthetics. In January 1956 a meeting took place to discuss the laws of technical progress, at the Philosophical Institute. On 13 February at the same Institute Aesthetics were discussed again, and about this time a conference on Morality was held at Moscow University. In the spring of 1958 an important conference on Contradictions took place in the Philosophical Institute and in October another was held on the philosophical problems of physics.

The conferences mentioned here have only been given as examples. The press has also contained reports on many other such meetings and others have no doubt been held apart from those on which reports have appeared. It should also be noted that apart from oral discussions, written discussions have also often taken place, such as those devoted to Markov in 1948-49 and to Logic in 1950-51.

The general impression one gets from reading the reports on these conferences may be summed up as follows:

(1) It is certain that Soviet philosophers discuss a great deal—probably more than their Western colleagues.

(2) The level of discussion has risen considerably in the last twelve years; there is now less invective, and more objective argument.

(3) The conferences seem to be developing more in the direction of genuine philosophic discussion and away from the communication and elaboration of Party instructions.

One characteristic of Soviet philosophers is their close cooperation with the natural scientists. Light on the extent of this cooperation is thrown by a report by M. T. Yovchuk and G. A. Kursanov on the philosophical seminars for scientists held in Sverdlovsk in 1951. From this report we learn that one such seminar for physicists held 15 sessions, with an attendance of 150-200. The seminar for philosophical problems of chemistry held eight meetings in the academic year 1951-52, the philosophical seminar of the geologists 11 meetings, with an attendance of 55-65. A similar seminar for biologists met once a month and between 40 and 80 took part. Finally, the philosophical

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seminar for mathematicians is said to have held ten meetings with an attendance of between 50 and 60. This seminar was held under the auspices of the State University whereas the others were organised by the Urals branch of the Academy of Sciences. As is clear from the report, all these seminars had serious ends in view and were attended by numerous leading scientists.

The Dogmatic Ties

Soviet philosophy is tied to a dogma. It is a kind of thinking which has its positive foundations and its limits imposed on it from outside by an authority alien to philosophy. This is categorically denied by the Soviet philosophers themselves: they maintain that they pursue a 'scientific' philosophy, i.e. they claim to rely exclusively on experience and to follow the laws of reason alone. In fact, however, this is not the case. That it is not so may be shown in the following ways:

(1) Soviet philosophers, who are very numerous today, form a compact school in which no one has ever denied or even questioned any of the basic dogmas of Dialectical Materialism. Such a phenomenon would be impossible and has never occurred without prior commitment to dogmas.

(2) All Soviet philosophers acknowledge the authority of the so-called 'classics' and refuse to allow their teaching to be called in question.

(3) Soviet philosophers have been in the habit of denouncing numerous purely scientific theories. Such attacks have been made on the basis of an expressly formulated methodological dogma.

(4) It is openly taught in the Soviet Union that all revisionism, i.e. any attempt to change the foundations of philosophy, is a crime. Freedom in this respect is, however, absolutely essential to a scientific, dogma-free philosophy.

In all these respects it is possible to discern a certain degree of progress in recent times. Some philosophers only retain the letter of communist dogma, and latterly some of the 'classics' have even been criticised directly. And although 'revisionism' has been much attacked, some Soviet philosophers are conducting their criticism with more rational methods than mere vituperation.

In spite of all these signs of change, however, there can be no suggestion that free, undogmatic philosophy is feasible as yet in the Soviet Union. The authorities have proclaimed quite openly and bluntly, until quite recently, the absolutely binding force of Communist dogma. Among the philosophers themselves efforts are being made to obtain freedom from this enslavement, but all such attempts, even the most radical, always take the form of an interpretation of rather than an attack on the dogma. A classical example is that of the Soviet logicians who take an anti-dialectical, Aristotelian stand against 'dialectical' nonsense in logic. These philosophers are aiming fundamentally at a complete rejection of some of the basic theses of Dialectical Materialism, but their attacks always take the form of a 'deeper interpretation' of Dialectical Materialism.

Since the fact that Soviet philosophers are enslaved to dogma has often been questioned in recent times, we propose to quote a few official pronouncements on the subject from recent years.

The following resolution was adopted at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

> The Party Congress instructs the Central Committee to guard the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory like the apple of its eye (March 1956).

This led to the Central Committee ordering the introduction of a course on Dialectical Materialism in all higher schools.

In the Declaration of the twelve Communist parties which met in Moscow in November 1957, to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, we read:

> Dialectical Materialism is the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism. This ideology or conception of the world reflects a universal law of development in Nature, society, and human thought. This conception applies to the past, present, and future. Dialectical Materialism is opposed by metaphysics and idealism. If a Marxist political party does not base its analyses on dialectics and materialism, the inevitable result will be the rise of onesidedness and subjectivism and the ossification of all thought (*Pravda* 22 November 1957).

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Of our own attitude to this enslavement to dogma two things need to be said. On the one hand, the way this enslavement is accepted flies in the face of reason. On the other, it would be wrong to say that it inevitably prevents Soviet philosophers from producing valuable ideas.

We have said that the way in which Soviet philosophers accept the dogmatic foundations of their philosophy flies in the face of reason. One can understand a thinker accepting certain presuppositions on irrational or supra-rational grounds—for example, because he believes that reason is by itself incapable of deciding certain basic questions. One may not share this view but one has to admit that, if the philosopher concerned clearly states that he accepts this or that presupposition for other than scientific reasons, then logically there is no reason to find fault with him.

But the Soviet philosophers do not do this at all. On the contrary, they stand for a scientific philosophy which excludes all irrational methods. Yet they accept the 'classics' quite blindly and do not allow them even to be discussed. This, we say, is contrary to reason. The choice between a fully rational philosophy, acknowledging no authority, and the honest declaration that one is not confining oneself to purely rational methods, is logically binding.

It does not follow inevitably, however, that Soviet philosophy is thereby doomed to sterility. Admittedly, numerous so-called 'liberal' thinkers maintain that this is the case but they are making a dogmatic *a priori* assertion without the support of actual experience. Experience teaches us that thinkers who have accepted a fixed conception of the world have often achieved great things in philosophy. It will suffice to cite Arab and Latin scholasticism, later Buddhism, and the Vedanta to refute the 'liberal' argument. One would have to be very ignorant of the history of philosophy to be able to say that an Augustine, a Thomas Aquinas, Dignaga, Sankari, Ramanuja—to mention only a few great names—had contributed nothing to philosophy. There is therefore no reason why Soviet philosophy, which is also tied to a dogma, should not produce positive results. What is more, we are prepared to maintain that certain positive and valuable contributions have already been made.

The 'Classics'

The special mark of Soviet philosophy is that it constantly uses the concept of the so-called 'classics'.

The 'classics' who are now quoted exclusively are Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Until February 1956 Stalin was also a 'classic'. We know of no single philosophical text in which any other author is so called—in particular, this applies to Mao Tse-tung.

The role of the 'classics' may be described as follows. First, they are regarded as great, highly gifted, leading revolutionary thinkers. They mark the beginning of a completely new era in human thought. Secondly, they are always being quoted in all conceivable contexts. In this respect, however, there has been some progress: for some years now articles have been appearing in which no statement at all or only very few have been quoted from the 'classics'.

Thirdly, until recently it was forbidden to contradict the classics: what they had said was regarded as absolute truth. In this respect too there has been some progress in recent times: we know of two texts in which Soviet philosophers have attacked a classic—Engels—and have declared that he made false statements. The first of these is by E. A. Azratyan, and contains a criticism of a statement on the psycho-physiological problem; the second is a report on a controversy by E. Kolman, and this deals with an ontological problem. It is a striking fact that although other philosophers defended Engels, the controversy was relatively polite. It should be noted, however, that in both cases what was criticised was a single statement and at any rate in the case of Kolman the critic emphasised that in the text under discussion Engels had contradicted his own general doctrine.

The present situation may perhaps be described in the following way. The teaching of the classics continues to be regarded as absolutely true but it is the whole doctrine rather than individual statements which is so regarded. A few years ago every word of the 'classics' was 'sacred'.

Fourthly, a great deal of Soviet philosophy consists in the interpretation of the 'classics' and in attempts to adapt their teaching to the facts of science. Two examples may be cited to

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illustrate the above points. First, we propose to give some statements made by Soviet logicians in 1950-51 about Stalin's excursion into linguistics; then we shall give statistics on the number of quotations from the 'classics' that appeared in the two years 1950 and 1958.

The cringing attitude of the Soviet logicians in 1950-51 is profoundly shocking. And although Stalin's Ukase in fact gave them the chance to attack the dialectical 'nonsense', it is sufficient to read the following passages to realise how un-free their thinking or at any rate their speaking was at that time:

> K. S. Bakradze: Since the new works of Comrade Stalin on linguistics have appeared, which are intended to provide the basis not only for Soviet-Marxist linguistics but for all scientific knowledge, many debatable questions of logic have been automatically settled.

This word 'automatically'—from the lips of Bakradze of all men—is truly monstrous.

> I. I. Osmakov: The works of Comrade Stalin on linguistics open up wide perspectives not only for the development of linguistics but for other sciences as well, especially logic. Many problems of logic have now become so clear.
>
> P. S. Popov: Comrade Stalin's work of genius 'Marxism and the problems of Linguistics' also has a direct bearing on logic.
>
> N. I. Kondakov: Stalin's works on the problem of linguistics were an enormous help to the logicians. They illuminated the most difficult problems including the problems of logic with the light of Stalin's genius.

Our second piece of evidence consists in a summary of the quotations (only those which appear with footnote references) in three Soviet publications: two issues of *Voprosy Filosofii* (1950, 2 and 3); in the manual *Foundations of Marxist Philosophy* (end of 1958); in *Voprosy Filosofii* and *Filosofkie Nauki* for 1958.

The figures show that Stalin has fallen away from his dominating position (half of the quotations from the 'classics' and more than one-fifth of all the quotations) to a position of insignificance (less than 1%). The small role that Marx plays is equally obvious. Lenin is now predominant—and he alone is quoted more often than all the other 'classics' put together. The most impressive fact, however, is that the number of quotations from the 'classics' has not dropped but rather risen: in the first sample they constitute only a little over 2/5th; in the second they form nearly 70% of all the quotations.

'Criticism and Self-Criticism'

The enslavement of the Soviet philosopher consists not merely in the fact that he is bound to recognise the absolute truth of the 'classics' but also that he is forced to submit to the official interpretation of their teaching. That this is so is clear from the specifically Communist institution of 'Criticism and Self-Criticism'. These words have a completely different meaning from that which they bear in the West; they imply submission to the official interpretation of the teaching of the 'classics'. The 'critic' states the 'line' of the Party organs; the self-critic states openly that he has erred and he promises to mend his ways. Needless to say, it often happens that the critics really are in agreement with the Party line; whether this is so in the case of the 'self-critics' is more doubtful. If one remembers that the 'criticism' is often given by quite unqualified, not to say primitive men, against outstanding specialists (for example in the case of Tugarinov against Yanovskaya or Maksimov against Markov etc.) it is difficult to assume that the 'self-criticism' can represent the speakers' inner convictions. It is often a case of subjection to an alien human authority—against the speaker's conscience. The impressive fact, however, is that some of these 'conversions' do appear to be genuine. One such case was probably that of Professor L. S. Rubinstein, the leading Soviet psychologist who published an article after the Pavlov Conference in 1952 which to all appearances testified to an inner conversion to the Party line.

As in other contexts it is possible to observe a certain degree of progress in recent years. Even in 1948 Prof. V. F. Asmus is said, at a conference specially convened to criticise his work, not only not to have acknowledged his guilt but to have dared to defend himself. The subject was 'formalism in logic': a thesis which at that time was considered simply a deviation. We find a similar phenomenon among the

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physicists. It looked as if the same fate was being prepared for them in 1950 as the geneticists underwent in 1948 as a result of the Lysenko affair; but the physicists defended themselves and refused to practise self-criticism. Finally, after two leading logicians, K. S. Bakradze and N. I. Kondakov, were sharply criticised by the editor of *V. F.* in 1955 (it has to be remembered that *V. F.* is an official organ) the accused not only defended themselves but were even allowed to publish their replies.

As far as the immediate past is concerned the impression one gets may be summed up as follows. There are in the Soviet Union a number of philosophers who regard enslavement to the official ideology as inadmissible and are striving to reduce it to a minimum. So much appears to be beyond all doubt. It is more difficult, however, to define the extent to which they have so far succeeded. That there has been a certain amount of progress seems, again, to be certain—but it is highly likely that the results are still very far from what these thinkers themselves would like.

The Main Tendencies

A new phenomenon in Soviet philosophy is the strong emergence of various tendencies often sharply opposed to one another: it is possible to speak of real philosophical schools. There are in the main three such tendencies: we shall call them the reactionary, Hegelian, and Aristotelian tendencies.

1. The Reactionaries

First of all there is a prominent and numerous group of men belonging almost entirely to the older generation who now occupy the key positions in philosophical life and who adhere to the reactionary line in philosophy. A typical and blatant example is A. A. Maksimov, who is always denouncing his colleagues. Another is M. M. Rozental, a leading philosopher with a mania for quoting the 'classics', co-author of the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* and also a denouncer of other philosophers. A third example: F. V. Konstantinov, was editor-in-chief of *V. F.* for two years and is also editor-in-chief of the latest manual of 1958. These are only three among many others who could be mentioned.

We have called this tendency reactionary because its representatives try stubbornly to hinder all progress and to preserve the old theories of dialectical materialism. In every discussion the representatives of this school speak against everything that is in any respect new in philosophy; against the recognition of the theory of relativity; against formal logic; against the new interpretation of contradictions, etc. Very important because of its prominent position, it is philosophically not very significant. The men who form this group do not appear to think much and it is impossible to learn much from them.

2. The Hegelians

In our view a distinction should be made between the reactionaries and those philosophers who, though opposed to the onrush of new, scientific, Aristotelian ideas, use argument rather than quotation to support their position and argue from a well-conceived dialectical (i.e. basically Hegelian) point of view. The mathematical philosopher A. D. Aleksandrov may be quoted as a typical example. His comments on formal logic are unacceptable from a scientifically logical standpoint but only because they are Hegelian. As such they are no worse than similar theories which one often comes across in the West. There are few quotations in Aleksandrov and his attitude in the discussion on the theory of relativity was certainly rational and courageous. Another example is A. A. Karapetyan, the author of a fine work on Kant written from the Hegelian angle. A third example of genuinely Hegelian thought is to be found in the writings of A. N. Uemov.

3. The Aristotelians

There is also—and perhaps above all—an Aristotelian tendency in Soviet philosophy. This is not surprising, since the so-called 'materialism' which is contained in dialectical materialism is basically an interpretation of Aristotelianism; Aristotle was also highly esteemed by Lenin. Obviously, Aristotelianism fits in with the new kind of technical thinking much better than the reactionary nonsense and also better than Hegelianism. K. S. Bakradze is probably the leading Aristotelian. With great patience and much courage he has always clearly expounded

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the Aristotelian interpretation of logic, even going so far as to reject 'dialectical' logic, which he acknowledges only as a purely epistemological theory and nothing more. Another Aristotelian is the Nestor of the Soviet logicians, Prof. V. F. Asmus. His criticism of the contemporary 'idealistic' philosophies of logic is thoroughly Aristotelian; and so is his courageous and triumphant defence of formal logic. B. M. Kedrov, probably the most important contemporary Soviet thinker, is probably not far from this point of view. The only other thinker we propose to mention is I. V. Blauberg, who is notable for his reinterpretation of the law of universal relationships. Last but not least there are the mathematical logicians who—like A. A. Zinoviev—had the courage to deny that there are any genuine contradictions in existence. One's general impression is that this group is not only the largest of the three but also has the largest number of younger thinkers.

This classification of Soviet philosophy must be regarded as a provisional one—more a working hypothesis than a rigid fact. Up till now it has only been possible for individual Soviet thinkers to express their views clearly within a limited field. It often happens that a thinker who on one topic has advocated the Aristotelian approach makes extremely un-Aristotelian statements on another subject. The difference between the reactionaries and the two other groups seems to be more acute than that which divides the latter groups from one another. There is, for example, no possible bridge between the nonsense on Contradictions perpetrated in the *Osnovy* of 1958 and the deeply conceived scientific attitude of an E. Kolman and an A. A. Zinoviev; similarly, the loquacious B. M. Morochnik and the thoughtful Hegelian A. D. Aleksandrov belong to two quite different worlds. What B. M. Kedrov once wrote about A. A. Maksimov (for which he was made to suffer), demonstrates this unbridgeable gulf between the adherents of barbaric reactionary nonsense and the philosophers. Here too, however, one has to be careful. We know of at least one case, that of G. A. Kursanov, in which we have been able to discern a clear transition from reactionary stupidity to respectable philosophical work. As we have said, the difference between the thinkers I have called Hegelians and Aristotelians are less clearly marked and less consistent. Both groups are adherents of dialectical materialism, which is an irrational amalgamation of the two philosophies. Whilst some of these thinkers have succeeded in attaining complete clarity on some questions, they often fail and the picture they produce remains in some respects obscure.

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High Jinks and High Jumps

NOTES ON SOVIET SPORT

Henry W. Morton

THE importance of sport in the life of the Soviet citizen has not received proper emphasis or recognition, not even by those whose main concern is the study and analysis of Soviet life. Whereas literature, music, the theatre, the cinema, etc. receive continuing treatment by Sovietologists, the complex appeals of sport and the participation and partisanship it engenders in millions of Soviet citizens has remained relatively unexplored and unpublicised.

Still fresh in my mind is one memorable Sunday of last August which I spent in one of the most magnificent sport complexes in the world, in the Lushniki section of Moscow. It is situated along the Moskva river and was completed in 1956. It has many sports buildings of which the Lenin Central Stadium, a massive rotund structure, the largest in Europe, is the most impressive. Smaller in scale, but neatly structured, are many arenas, sports arenas and practice fields which include among others, an arena for hockey, seating 12,000 spectators, a giant swimming pool with concrete stands, a children's stadium, basketball and volleyball courts, etc.

It was a beautiful, warm summer day and a huge crowd had gathered early, choking the major and minor arteries leading from the Metro station to the Central Stadium, hustling and bustling in their characteristic fashion. Along the pathways and girding the major and minor stadia were hundreds of booths selling a great variety of goods: clothing, glassware, scarves, shoes, electrical appliances, books (the bookstall had the slogan 'Everyone should have his own library'). Many had come to Lushniki to shop and browse and the familiar queues formed, particularly in front of the food counters which dished out large quantities of red caviar and sliced sausages on open bread with beer and fruit soda.

Sport, however, is the main attraction at Lushniki, which because of its varied facilities is able to present a sports carnival practically every Sunday. The day's programme began in the morning with an international tennis match, held in the small arena, with players from Denmark, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union participating.

The major attraction of the day was reserved for the spacious Central Stadium and tickets ranging from three to ten rubles were sold at a brisk pace. The programme was divided into two parts. It started at three, with a dual track meet (the second and final day) which matched Soviet athletes against those of East Germany. The latter trailed their Soviet counterparts, in true satellite fashion, across the finish line to the quiet and polite approval of the spectators.

The stands were packed to capacity for the championship soccer match (not so for the track meet), which pitted *Spartak* of Moscow against *Zenit* of Leningrad. It was early evening by then, six-thirty to be exact, but the sky was still fairly bright and blue. The match left a memorable imprint on my mind. A tenseness and a feeling of excitement had taken hold of the crowd. The fans watched the moves of the players, as they scrambled for the ball, with the greatest attention, and the more excitable shouted words of advice, encouragement and derision at favourites and opponents. Whenever a goal was scored a great number of coloured balloons, bought for the purpose, were joyfully released and drifted serenely skyward while the fierce competition continued below. An inevitable part of the setting, perhaps more noticeable to the foreigner, was the solitary, gigantic banner, white on red, which covered an entire side of the stadium and proclaimed: GLORY TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE USSR.

At the end of the contest, which (to almost everyone's satisfaction) was won by the local *Spartak* team, the huge crowd filed out of the stadium. Although a water ballet went on as scheduled, most of the people hurried off to the Metro. They were flanked by a cordon of militia (police) and soldiers who were there to see that the thousands advanced to the station in an even-flowing line. Once below, however,

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with trains hurtling into the station in rapid succession, all semblance of order ceased. When the train doors were thrown open, everyone rushed to enter, there followed an animated pushing and crushing which lasted over three-quarters of an hour. It was done in the highest spirits and good humour, and only a few timid souls stood back aghast at the spectacle before them.

BEFORE Lushniki was built, major sports competitions took place, as they still do, at the Dinamo stadium of Moscow, which seats more than seventy thousand people. On that same Sunday, a soccer match was also in progress there, as were soccer matches in six additional stadia in various parts of Moscow. In fact, throughout the Soviet Union, a varied sports programme is maintained, as every large city has its own sports structures. The largest of these have become tourist sights (in addition to Lushniki and Dinamo stadia in Moscow, Kirov stadium in Leningrad and Khrushchev stadium in Kiev are two other examples) and are shown with a great sense of pride and achievement.

One should not, however, get the impression that all sports facilities are of the latest model or in the best of conditions, as the Soviet Union is still a land of marked contrasts. The two major physical culture institutes in the country, in Moscow and in Leningrad, are both housed in old buildings which are now being repaired. Having toured the Moscow Institute (which, incidentally, was named after Stalin in 1935, although no picture of the late dictator is visible today), I was surprised at the poor condition of the playing field and unimpressed by the gymnasium, although the classrooms were excellently kept, with elaborate pictorial displays of Soviet and pre-revolutionary Russian sport history and busts of Lenin. F. I. Samoukov, the assistant director of the Moscow Institute, hoped that at the end of the seven-year plan, the institute would be housed in a new building and that it would have a stadium seating fifty thousand people.

SPORT cuts deeply into the fabric of Soviet society, affecting millions, and spectator sports are only one aspect of the total sports programme More important to the Party is the enlisting of millions into active sports participation. Sport *kollektivy* (groups) are found everywhere. There are 200,000 of them in factories, offices, schools, collective and state farms, in labour reserve units, in the armed forces and in the Security Police. These are set up according to specific conditions and rules (as trade union and non-trade union sports societies) and receive their overall direction from the Union of Sports Societies and Organisations (formerly the All-Union Committee of Physical Culture and Sport).

The latest figures released on sport claim that more than twenty four and a half million persons actively engage in different sports.[1] At present there is a great drive to increase the number of active sports participants and improve their general mastery. Control figures announced in 1959 (yes, sports too are planned), call for fifty million sportsmen, thirty thousand Masters of Sports (there were 13,520 as of 1 January 1959), and seventeen million athletes who will have achieved one of the six sport categories below the master level, by the end of the seven-year plan in 1965.[2] This drive also has its special slogan, which is 'One Plus Two'. Every physical culturist is obliged, not only to improve his sport mastery, but to draw a minimum of two persons into the physical culture movement.

Even if an individual is not a member of a sports group, some aspect of physical culture may still be introduced into his daily life. In the morning, if so inclined, he can participate in the daily morning exercises (to the rhythmic chant of *raz, dva, tri, chetyre*) which are cheerfully broadcast over the radio; or peruse *Sovetskii Sport*, the central sports paper, which is popular because of its readability and appears six times a week. (*Sovetskii Sport* is only one of eighteen sports periodicals published in the USSR.)

Once at work, he may find himself doing callisthenics if he is one of five million employed in one of twelve thousand enterprises which are enlisted in the programme of on-the-job callisthenics.[3] This programme, which the

[1] *Soviet Weekly*, 20 August 1959, p. 10.
[2] *Sovetskii Sport*, 27 February 1959, p. 2; 18 August 1959, p. 1.
[3] *Sovetskii Sport*, 18 April 1959, p. 2.

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sports administration is trying to extend, consists of a series of exercises carried on for ten minute periods once or twice a day during work time. It is an effort to stimulate tired muscles and thereby raise labour productivity.

In addition, sports pavilions and pictorial displays of sport at Soviet exhibitions are commonplace, as is the fact that important roadways are habitually blocked off to stage mass relays, bicycle races, and other sporting events.

Impressive indeed were the monster sport demonstrations which had been held yearly to celebrate Physical Culture Day and which are still used today to dramatise important sports events, as the opening of the 1959 *Spartakiad*, a gigantic all-union pre-Olympic try-out which is held every four years and precedes the Olympic games by one year.

The spectacle in Moscow, always the most elaborate and ornate of all the Republics, in which thousands participate, is often reviewed by the Soviet leaders and by representatives from the fifteen republics. In what appears to be a never-ending production number (it may last five hours), the demonstrators stream by with banners unfurled proclaiming: UNDYING LOYALTY TO THE PARTY, TO PEACE, TO MEET THE TARGETS OF THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN, TO ACHIEVE NEW SPORTS RECORDS. The spectacle changes from young men standing on speeding motorcycles striking heroic poses, to hundreds of gymnasts, who in seconds set up acrobatic equipment and perform their exercises, to a gigantic float, held up by hundreds, which turns out to be a basketball court on which a game is in progress.

Foreign observers, who have witnessed such events, find it difficult to put their astonished reactions in words, and are even less able to estimate the amount of time and money that it necessitates to plan and stage a spectacle worthy of several De Milles.[4]

[4] For further descriptions see Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (N.Y., 1948), p. 461; Avery Brundage, 'What I Saw During Three Weeks Behind the Iron Curtain.' Speech to the Economic Club of Detroit, 7 February 1955 (mimeographed).

THE Soviet sports programme did not spring full-blown into Russian life in the 1950s when Soviet sport successes gained world notice. Nor was the programme developed because of a strong popular demand for sports.

Viewing sport in the broad sociological context of twentieth century life, one might suggest that mass sports and organised athletic activity, in the form of clubs, societies, leagues, is the by-product of modern industrial society. Urbanisation, increase in population, technological advancement, leisure time, modern transportation and communication (making inter-area and international competition possible), education, and physical education in particular, improved equipment and sports structures, etc., have made mass sports possible, desirable, and to some extent necessary.

This analysis, however, does not hold true for sport in a closed society. Here the *deus ex machina* for sport, as for anything else, is the Party. Consequently any programme, particularly such an ambitious one as sport, which affects millions, must have active Party sponsorship, and as a result Soviet sport is an integrated part of the Soviet *milieu*, and probably reflects Soviet life to a much larger extent than is appreciated by the outside world, which shows interest only in the Soviet performances at international competitions.

The reasons for conducting sport on a mass scale are many and go far beyond the traditional uses of sport to which we in the West are accustomed. The Soviet sports programme, which dates back to the early years of the revolution (and has some important antecedents in Tsarist Russia) has always had definite tasks and areas assigned to it by the Party. These were explicitly stated and detailed in a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1939, which stated:

> Physical culture must be considered not only from the point of view of physical training and health but as one aspect of the cultural, economic, and military training (target shooting, etc.) of young people, and also as one of the methods of training the masses (insofar as physical culture develops will-power, teamwork, persistence, composure and other valuable qualities), and also as a means of rallying the broad

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> masses of workers and peasants to the various Party, Soviet, and trade union organisations through which the working and peasant masses are drawn into social and political life. . . . Physical culture must play an integral part in the general political and cultural training and education of the masses.[5]

These fundamental tasks assigned to sport have remained unchanged and have been buttressed by subsequent Party resolutions and pronouncements, and new assignments, particularly the demand to beat and surpass bourgeois sports records, first announced *circa* 1934, have since been added.

Soviet sport, therefore, is a 'transmission belt' and has the mission to carry out specific Party designs and purposes of a varied nature. It cannot develop at its own speed nor does it necessarily follow popular demand.

The basic goals of Soviet sport, although never fully realised, are many.

Physical culture and sport should help to raise labour productivity. One frequently comes across statements like the following:

> Athletes are obliged to raise the productivity of labour by all means at their disposal, to perform exemplary work at their jobs, and at the same time help their friends achieve victories of production.[6]

Not only is sport considered essential for the physical fitness and mental alertness of the worker, but in addition, physical exercises should inculcate 'in young people a love of labour'.[7] Physical fitness has become the patriotic obligation of every citizen; it should help him perform his job with joy and greater efficiency and thus become 'an active builder of communism'.

Towards this end, too, on-the-job callisthenics is greatly encouraged by the Party. *Kommunist* recently bemoaned the fact that, 'unfortunately there are still many factories and plants where the introduction of callisthenics is proceeding at a snail's pace', and that many republics 'still continue to underestimate the importance of callisthenics as a means of improving health and raising labour productivity'.[8]

Secondly, physical culture is an essential factor in para-military training. All must learn to bear arms in case 'reactionary forces' will not permit the transition to communism to take place peacefully. 'Socialist society has an important task before it—to train the workers, especially the young generation, to defend socialism in case of military attack'.[9]

SOVIET physical culture has a long history as a subsidiary arm of the military. In 1931, the twin aims of higher labour productivity and military preparedness were incorporated into a mass physical fitness programme, appropriately called, 'Ready for Labour and Defence' (*Gotov k Trudu i Oborone*, usually abbreviated to GTO).

Since its inception, fifty million persons have passed through the GTO system. In addition to providing a mass physical culture base, the primary purpose of the GTO system is to attract the physically able—pupils in schools, students in higher education, workers and peasants, and in particular members of sports societies—to partake in a programme designed, in addition to its doctrinal purpose, to provide the country with soldier-workers, militarily capable and in good health.

Since training in military weapons and the fostering of a martial spirit are primary objects, the system of GTO contains such test categories (for all its divisions and for both sexes) as grenade-throwing for distance, rifle-shooting for accuracy, cross-country skiing with a time limit, and the scaling of physical obstacles. Gliding, parachute-jumping, and other 'sports' of military value are greatly encouraged.

In 1958, to help celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Komsomol, a nation-wide *spartakiad* in applied military sports was held, supervised by DOSAAF (all-Union Society for the Promotion of the Army, Air Force and Navy) in close cooperation with the sports administration. It received broad coverage in the Komsomol press, which stressed the import-

[5] Resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, 13 July 1925. Reprinted in *Kalendar Spravochnik Fizkulturnika na 1939 God* (Moscow, 1939), p. 5.
[6] *Sovetskii Sport*, 25 March 1951, p. 1.
[7] *Pravda*, 19 July 1954, p. 1.
[8] *Kommunist*, 1959, 13.
[9] G. I. Kukushkin (ed.), *Teoriia Fizicheskovo Vospitaniia* (Moscow, 1953), p. 42.

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ance of military preparedness of youth. Disarmament proposals notwithstanding, there has been no indication that the emphasis on the military application of sports is being reduced, or that it will be reduced in the immediate future.

Sport is used by the Party as a lever of social control. It offers a wonderful opportunity to exploit the genuine enthusiasm of its citizens and at the same time enables the Party to control and to channel leisure-time activities towards Party-inspired goals. All sporting activities are under strict Party supervision and are directed towards specific goals. Sports societies, for example, can be, and have been abolished when it is felt that they no longer serve Party purposes, and the spontaneous organisation of a sports group is impossible. All sports organisations are formed according to 'model statutes' to insure no deviation from the norm, and the selection of personnel is also strictly supervised.

Consequently membership in sports societies carries with it at least nominal allegiance and some obligation to the Party and the regime. Naturally this does not prevent people from joining; regularly held propaganda lectures can be passively ignored, and other controls, omnipresent in Soviet society, are accepted as normal. In fact, the individual interested in participating in sports will be most eager to join that society which offers him the best equipment and facilities. (One former Soviet citizen recalled that in his town every youngster wanted to join *Dinamo* —it is sponsored by the Security Police—despite parental objections, because its facilities were vastly superior to that of any other society.)

As increased leisure becomes available to the Soviet citizen, it will be more difficult to control the activities of millions and use them to the advantage of the regime. This is probably one of the reasons behind the most recent drive to treble membership of sports associations by the end of the seven-year plan.

PHYSICAL culture and sport is to play an important part in 'transforming' man. As an integral part of Communist education, they must help to train the coming generation 'physically and morally' in communist ideals.[10] As a result, the 'new Soviet man' will boast good health, physical fitness, and stamina. But this is not enough. Participating in sports should also nurture positive character traits: a spirit of collectivism, courage, will-power, the determination to win, patience, endurance, and discipline.[11]

Sport, basking in the glories of Soviet socialism, thus assumes new qualities and positive functions non-existent in other historical epochs. All the evil features of bourgeois sport (the argument runs that under capitalism sports divert the worker from the class struggle, arouse base instincts, and develop individualism, egoism, chauvinism, misanthropy and other traits of bourgeois morality)[12] are negated and transformed into positive functions under Soviet rule.[13]

In the optimistic gallery of socialist realism, Soviet citizens of all ages are painted gaily participating in sports under the benevolent direction of the Party, Komsomol, and trade unions. Rosy-cheeked, sport-loving Mishas and Natashas from all parts of the Soviet Union are seen engaging in honest, correct competitions on the highest cultural plane, maintaining at all times courtesy on the playing fields, and respect for their adversaries and referees. They extend the hand of indestructible friendship to one another, cementing the ties among the multi-nationalities of the USSR.

Soviet sportsmen (the fable continues), healthy and smiling, united in a national fervour, promote their countries' goals by competing abroad —active champions of peace and friendship, strengthening cultural ties with all nations, exuding Soviet warmth, fairness, and genial generosity (while at the same time scoring innumerable triumphs), and, always, unfailingly demonstrating the superiority of the Soviet socialist culture.

Enhancing the prestige of the USSR at home and abroad is indeed an essential consideration. Every victory, athletic achievement, and new world record supports the Bolshevik contention

[10] P. A. Rudik, *Fizicheskoe Vospitanie Sovetskoi Molodezhi* (Moscow, 1953), p. 9.
[11] *Sovetskii Sport*, 18 April 1959, p. 4.
[12] Rudik, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[13] I. M. Koriakovski (ed.), *Teoriia Fizicheskovo Vospitaniia* (Moscow, 1954), p. 9.

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that 'the triumph of our athletes . . . is proof of the superiority of the Soviet socialist culture over the rottenness of the culture of capitalist countries'.[14]

Participation and partisanship in sport undoubtedly excite strong feelings, and support for a Soviet team engaging in international competition arouses strong sentiments of national pride, a sense of satisfaction that in this area (as well as others) Russia no longer has to take a second place to the West. Such sentiments are of course consonant with Party aims, if not always expressed in precisely ideological terms, and the Soviet citizen is encouraged to identify team loyalty with state loyalty (a phenomenon not unknown elsewhere).

Since 1952, when Soviet athletes gained world prominence with an excellent showing in their initial Olympic appearance, they have earned world respect in sports. This has inflated Soviet prestige abroad, and the advantage so gained has been systematically exploited by the great increase in exchanges of sports delegations (in the past ten years 1,300 foreign sports delegations and more than 18,000 foreign athletes visited the Soviet Union, and in the same period 20,000 Soviet athletes travelled abroad).[15]

Sport devotees in the West have been concerned with the changing trend in world sports. But (quite naturally) they are asking such questions as, 'How can we beat the Russians?' 'Are Soviet athletes professionals and do they thus have an unfair advantage?' 'Is the Soviet Union using sport to help it win the cold war?' Questions of this nature can only yield superficial answers unless the dynamics of Soviet sport are fully understood; more inquiries need to be made into the role of sport in Soviet society and how it affects and influences the life of Soviet citizens.

[14] Iu. Mataev, *Fizicheskaia Kultura i Sport v SSSR* (Moscow, 1955), p. 26.

[15] *Kommunist, loc cit.*

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KIRCHENKAMPF IN EAST GERMANY

Melvin Croan

WHEN Karl Barth published an open *Letter to a Pastor in the German Democratic Republic* in late 1958, the heated controversy which it stirred served as another reminder of the predicament of organised Protestantism under the communist regime in East Germany. To commentators in the West, Barth seems to offer nothing less than a counsel of despair which, if accepted, would undermine what remains of the church's social influence and assure the success of the regime's attempt to rally the support of professing Christians. His advice to the anonymous East German pastor, troubled by such questions as the permissibility of submitting to the state's oath of allegiance, the advisability of praying for the passing away of the dictatorship, and the desirability of more immediate acts of self-defence, was compounded of quietistic theology and a distinct animus against the West. The required oath, Barth argues, can be accepted even as he himself swears an oath of allegiance to the Swiss Confederation *(sic!)*. Any attempt on the part of the church to defend itself against the regime's encroachments must be rejected because, in Barth's view, all such action is too likely to lead to negative anti-communism which would compromise the character of the Christian mission. As for praying for the regime's collapse, Barth contends that the only likely result of the granting of this supplication would be the onset of the 'American way of life', for him the present-day equivalent of the 'fleshpots of Egypt'.[1]

That so outstanding a Protestant theologian with a record of militant opposition to Nazism should advocate resigned acceptance of communist totalitarianism and even welcome it as 'a painful purgation' to which Christians ought to submit may indeed strike many as a violent paradox. Nevertheless, Barth's position should have come as no great surprise to those who are conversant with the eschatological and christological elements in his theology. If anything, in urging acquiescence to a communist regime, Barth is today more in line with his own theological tenets than he was twenty years ago when he was preaching a crusade against the Nazis.[2] All the same, Barth's current position owes its formulation to worldly animosities which have little to do with his theology. Reinhold Niebuhr is at least partially justified in observing that the price of Barth's absolute moral purity is irrelevance to the actual situation in East Germany and the price of relevance to West Germany and the United States is the betrayal of his capricious human loves and hates.[3]

Still, in a different sense, Barth's position is extraordinarily relevant to the actual situation in East Germany. Whatever its merit as doctrine, the fact is that leading churchmen in the DDR, most of them not at all of the 'Progressive Christian' camp, nevertheless do accept Barth's practical recommendations. As theologians and administrators, these men have to live with the daily political provocations and repressions visited upon the church by the regime. Yet they too preach resignation and counsel against open resistance. To one who does not share their theological premises, their optimistic conclusions concerning the prospects for the survival and strengthening of the church seem all too elusive.

FOR all practical purposes, Christianity in East Germany can be taken to mean Protestantism and, more specifically, the German Evangelical Church (EKD). Over eighty per cent of the population of the DDR is now nominally Protestant—predominantly Lutheran by confession, but with significant Calvinist pockets. However, for various reasons—theological, historical, and sociological—religi-

[1] Karl Barth, *Brief an einen Pfarrer in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (St. Gallen, 1958). A translation of Barth's letter, together with an essay by Pastor Johannes Hamel, *Christenheit unter marxistischer Herrschaft* (Berlin, 1959) has appeared in America under the title, *How to Serve God in a Marxist Land* (New York, 1959).

[2] For a perceptive assessment in these terms, see Charles C. West, *Communism and the Theologians* (Philadelphia, 1958).

[3] Reinhold Niebuhr, 'Barth's East German Letter,' *Christian Century*, LXXVI, 11 February 1959, pp. 167-68.

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ous sentiment does not run deep in East Germany today, having far less of a hold on the population than, for example, Catholicism exercises in Poland.[4] This, of course, does not mean that the regime is indifferent to the influence of Christianity that does exist, for the church represents a chink in the regime's totalitarian armour, if only because it still maintains an internal independence which offers the faithful shelter of a sort against the demands of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This is all the more true because German Protestantism currently enjoys an organisational cohesion greater than ever before in its history and unique in an otherwise divided country.

It is now possible to speak of a single Protestant Church in Germany. As a result of the common endeavour for True (or Confessing—*Bekennende*) Christianity against Nazi-inspired 'German Christian' ideology, the German Evangelical Church (EKD) was established in 1948 as an inter-confessional administrative union encompassing the whole of Germany. The EKD represents member churches in the ecumenical movement, administers charity and welfare institutions and, most important of all, functions as spokesman for the churches to 'secular authority'. It comprises both Lutherans and Calvinists, variously constituted as the Evangelical Church of the (Old Prussian) Union, the United Evangelical Provincial Churches, the United Evangelical Lutheran Chuch of Germany, and other autonomous (although regionally grouped) Lutheran and Reformed churches. Of its twenty-eight constituent churches, eight are in the DDR. The Chairman of the EKD's Executive Council, Bishop Otto Dibelius, whose own church, the Evangelical Church in Berlin-Brandenburg, includes West Berlin, is the titular head of German Protestantism.

[4] A simple but telling comparison illustrates the point sufficiently. When in 1956 the local authorities in Magdeburg undertook the reconstruction of a thoroughfare, two churches, one dating from the eleventh century, were torn down, even though the church administration had raised money to repair them. By contrast, when the Warsaw authorities recently offered to finance the removal of some wayside shrines to a new site to be determined by the clergy—a transfer made necessary by the proposed widening of Grojecka Street, there was a real threat of public disturbances. See *Zycie Warszawy*, 14 June 1959.

It is frequently suggested that the Ulbricht regime seeks to break up the all-German organisation of the EKD. The sustained attacks upon Dibelius as the 'NATO bishop', more frequent and violent now that the church is supplying chaplains for the West German army, are said to have precisely this as their purpose. But the existence of an organised, nation-wide EKD, by itself of little consequence to the regime, is not the main issue at stake. Indeed, any overt rupture of the EKD might even impair the SED's 're-unification through confederation' propaganda. What does matter, however, is that the independence of the church in East Germany has been sustained by the financial assistance of the EKD and the pastoral concern of Bishop Dibelius. Certainly the regime would like to see these factors eliminated, without necessarily disrupting the EKD itself. The more immediate goals of the regime, then, the isolation of the church *within* East Germany and the reduction of religion to complete social insignificance, are being pursued by other means and, as we shall see, with some degree of success.

THE situation of the church in East Germany today is in striking contrast to the provisions of the DDR Constitution. That document, invoked by West German opponents of the regime, devotes no fewer than eight articles to the guarantee of 'full freedom of faith and conscience' and to the recognition of religious associations as public law corporations entitled by tradition to claim the financial support of the state. Notably absent is any specific reference to the freedom of anti-religious propaganda. There is even an explicit provision granting the church 'the right to express an attitude in keeping with its own viewpoints towards issues vital to the people' (Article 41), and another which allows for religious teaching in public schools (Article 44). But such constitutional prescriptions are honoured only in the breach. Today the state curtails public religious education, refuses to collect the church tax or even to allow the church to examine the tax register. It further refuses to regularise the amount of state subsidy and, needless to say, does not tolerate any expression of opinion which differs from SED policies.

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Nor is this all. The regime is waging a campaign to wean members of the churches away from the church leadership, without however necessarily challenging the Christian faith as such. According to an authoritative formulation of the regime's current goals, announced as early as 1955, anti-religious propaganda is to be concentrated in the first instance upon workers, especially members of the SED, and is to be undertaken 'patiently and without insult to the feelings of religious believers'. The task of the party is 'not the struggle against religion but the winning over of Christian believers to the fight for the preservation of peace . . . for the democratic reunification of Germany, and for active participation in the work of peaceful construction of the German Democratic Republic'. But in this struggle the regime is obliged to draw a sharp line between church members and the national leadership of the EKD, and to denounce the latter as an enemy working on the side of West Germany and its social order.[5]

The more sophisticated intent of the present policy becomes immediately apparent when the earlier course of the regime's relations with the church is examined. There was a time when the issue in East Germany was openly proclaimed, both by the functionaries of the party and the pastors of the church, to be that of an open *Kirchenkampf*. Then, following the announcement of the policy of 'building socialism' at the Second SED Party Conference in July 1952, there ensued a direct frontal assault on church institutions and the clergy. Properties were confiscated, state subsidies withheld, religious instruction in schools totally prohibited, ministers imprisoned on charges of 'inciting to boycott', and members of young people's church groups *(junge Gemeinde)* ousted from high schools and universities. All of these measures were centrally directed and officially sanctioned by the party leadership and specifically by SED secretary Ulbricht himself, who in May 1953 publicly denounced the church as an incorrigible ally of 'monopoly capitalism and other war interests' against whom the party boss demanded 'a final end of patience'.

[5] Kurt Hager, 'Über den wissentschaftlich-atheistischen Charakter unserer Weltanschauung,' *Einheit*, 4 April 1955, pp. 333-343.

The frontal assault on the church, as was the case with so many other policies of the Stalinist period, had to be abandoned in June 1953. Although the regime lost this first round in its battle with the church and announced that it would rescind all the measures taken against the church in the previous months, it might be well to consider the background of the 'action' which misfired. When the regime undertook in 1952 to tighten the reins of totalitarian control over the whole of East German society, the church already presented something of a special problem. Early efforts to recruit 'progressive peace pastors' had failed dismally, despite the response of a few prominent professors of theology. Similarly, the appeal of 'Christian realism', an 'ideology' developed within the East German CDU as it came under SED domination, also remained singularly ineffective.[6] So it was that the regime gave up for a time the attempt to cultivate these positions and likewise overlooked the possibilities of exploiting the theological niceties which divide honest and essentially non-political churchmen on the question of the proper attitude towards communist power. Indeed, during the period 1952-53 the regime even neglected the popular dissemination of atheistic propaganda, but made its attack on the church through a series of repressive measures aimed at breaking the church in the baldest physical sense. Since 1953, by contrast, the regime has never risked another such open assault. It has proceeded more cautiously, combining a series of harassments and restrictions with a concerted effort to capture nominal church members, particularly among the young, for its own world view.

ALTHOUGH the regime's announced intentions stress the desire to avoid offence to Christian sensibilities, it was perhaps in the nature of things that such restraint proved im-

[6] 'Christian realism' advocates 'Christian responsibility in public as well as private life' and on this basis the East German CDU has declared its allegiance 'to the socialist order of society' and its determination 'to continue cooperation with the followers of Marxism-Leninism.' See the *Meissener Thesen der CDU* in *Christlicher Realismus* (Berlin, 1951). The 'Christian realist ideology' owes its formulation to a young careerist, Gerald Götting, the Secretary of the CDU, and had the endorsement of the late Otto Nuschke, CDU Chairman and a Deputy Minister-President of the DDR.

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possible. Systematic atheist propaganda, which began in earnest following the SED Politburo resolution assigning the party instruction course for 1955-56 the task of 'developing broad scientific-atheistic propaganda to unmask the reactionary essence of religious prejudices', has featured the production of vast quantities of anti-religious literature, some of it so intemperate in tone as to have evoked protests even from such progressive Christians as Professor Leipoldt of Leipzig University. High on the list of such publications is the German translation of A. P. Gagarin's *Origins and Class Character of Christianity*, published by the official SED house. Having set to the task at hand with proverbial Germanic thoroughness, the regime subsequently sponsored a flood of atheistic publications not only for study within the party but also for indoctrination in the schools and universities, the army, the Youth League and trade unions, and indeed all other mass organisations. They range from the writings of Feuerbach and Bebel to agitational broadsides attributing Soviet scientific successes in outer space to the superiority of the materialist over the idealist or religious outlook.

A central concern of the campaign is the winning over of youth from the church. It is upon the young that the SED, perhaps even more than other totalitarian regimes, must build its hopes for the future. To this the great importance attached by the regime to the unique ceremony of 'youth consecration' *(Jugendweihe)* bears suggestive witness. Although the ceremony was introduced only experimentally in 1955, it has now assumed permanent institutional forms At first voluntary in nature, the *Jugendweihe* has since 1957 had the organised support of the government and especially of the Ministries of Education and the Interior. Every kind of pressure is exerted by schools and other local authorities to ensure the maximum participation. Both parents and young people are made to understand that subsequent educational and occupational preferment depend upon it.

The ceremony of *Jugendweihe* is meant to be nothing less than a secular equivalent for confirmation. Amidst carefully contrived solemnity, designed to convey 'a festive and optimistic spirit', and in the presence of family, friends, and party and state officials, the candidate swears fealty to 'the cause of socialism, peace, and friendship with the Soviet Union', and is welcomed into the 'community of toilers of the German Democratic Republic' with an appropriate charge.[7]

Since the candidates for 'consecration' are required to devote a number of hours (called *Jugendstunden* and recently increased from ten to twenty-four, spread over a period of six weeks) to the study of materialist philosophy, preparation for the ceremony delivers to the regime the audience it most desires to indoctrinate. The subject is presented in a collection of basic essays entitled *Weltall—Erde—Mensch*, which together with the 'Ten Socialist Commandments' (a set of exhortations to follow collectivist morals and to support SED policies enunciated by Walter Ulbricht at the Fifth SED Party Congress in July 1958), are studied and discussed in the *Jugendstunden*.

Although the themes of the *Jugendweihe* ceremony and of the study which precedes it form an important component of the campaign to inculcate an anti-religious attitude, the reasons for instituting the ceremony itself were more practical ones. Participation in the *Jugendweihe* and in religious confirmation are, as both church and party agree, essentially incompatible. Most German Protestants have traditionally looked to the church chiefly to commemorate certain *rites de passage*, especially birth, confirmation, marriage, and death. Of these, confirmation is uniquely important for the obvious reason that instruction is a prerequisite for this occasion alone. By providing a secular alternative to religious confirmation and by exerting pressure to ensure its acceptance, the regime is trying to deprive the church of its most significant point of access to the majority of its congregation. The rise in the numbers participating in the *Jugendweihe*, notably in urban areas during the last two years, suggests that many nominally Christian families are being won away from the church on this issue.

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[7] For a recent official description, see *Vorschläge für die Ausgestaltung von Jugendweihe-Ferien 1959* (Berlin, 1959). For an earlier description, together with some of the basic documents, see U. Jeremias, *Die Jugendweihe in der Sowjetzone* (Bonn, 1956).

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THE logic of the introduction of a secular consecration of youth, aimed as it is at the allegiance of those who are members of the church in name alone, dictated the institution of still other competing ceremonies. Thus there is now also the possibility of substituting 'socialist name-giving' for baptism, 'socialist marriage' (in addition to the required civil ceremony) for a church wedding, and even 'socialist burial' for a Christian funeral. In Stalinstadt, a new 'socialist' town of supposedly 'advanced consciousness', a special official called the 'town speaker' (but already popularly known as the 'party pastor') undertakes to perform these rites of the secular liturgy. The purpose of all these ceremonies—the severing of contacts between the church and the people—is underscored by the efforts of the regime to facilitate their acceptance. In addition to the variety of pressures already mentioned, cash bonuses and other benefits are available to those who participate in the new forms. Then an effort is made to get them to terminate their church affiliation formally and finally.

The legal termination of church membership is doubtless important to the SED as a tangible manifestation of the popular acceptance of its goals and propaganda, but its wider significance may be doubted, since church membership by itself at present entails few if indeed any concrete legal obligations. It is extraordinarily difficult to describe the exact legal status of the church in the DDR today, and almost impossible to present an accurate review of the changing restrictions governing its activities. This very situation, however, is itself highly symptomatic of the nature of post-Stalinist totalitarianism in East Germany. In matters of day-to-day regulation of the church there has been a kind of anarchy which serves the regime only too well. A general pattern does, however, exist. In essence, the SED connives to allow regional and local organs of the party to sponsor anti-religious demonstrations. The Ministry of the Interior and the education authorities issue arbitrary and often contradictory instructions to curtail the church's social and educational work. Finally, the SED on occasion uses the secret police to arrest clergy and lay leaders on a variety of essentially political charges. But in each of these areas the regime, acting through the State Office for Church Affairs, has often granted redress of various grievances in return for the church's renewed professions of recognition of the state's authority and the clergy's renewed promise not to meddle in economic and political affairs. Yet the very sequence of repression and reprieve, plus the expectation of more to come, are enough to paralyse the church's extra-liturgical activities.

Consider for example the case of the EKD's Railroad Missions. In January 1956, these missions were closed down on the charge that they had transmitted military and economic intelligence, distributed Western propaganda, and assisted the flight of refugees to West Berlin. But within the year, following negotiations between Provost Grüber, the EKD representative to the DDR Government, and Otto Nuschke, then State Secretary for Church Affairs, imprisoned Railroad Mission workers were released and the charges against them quietly dropped. Significantly, however, only six of the former ninety-seven persons engaged in Railroad Mission work were able or willing to return to it.

Similar incidents could be related in abundance. There have been arrests for improper receipt of funds from West Germany, for maintaining contacts with West German seminaries, and even for having opposed in public the state's quasi-sacraments. But it has also proved possible to have the imposed sentences lifted. Travel of ministers and theological students to the Federal Republic and elsewhere outside the DDR is similarly subject to the same kind of humiliating negotiation between the church and regime, as indeed is the whole range of the church's educational, pastoral, and social activities. Not even the conduct of divine group worship is exempted. Police surveillance of religious services, practised for some years, was dropped in precisely this way. Each time the church has only too gladly paid the tribute required, a public announcement of its satisfaction.

THE undeniable result of this policy—now one of erratic 'pin-pricking' rather than a direct *Kirchenkampf*—is the present weakened position of East German Protestantism, not only in terms of its restricted social role but

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also in such concrete internal matters as finance, personnel, and organisation. First of all, the church is simply too poor to carry out effectively even its present activities, much less the traditional substances of the Protestant mission. Official regulations encroaching on the church tax and the absence of any provisions for the state subsidy reduce the church to virtual dependence upon the voluntary contributions of its membership, augmented by financial and material assistance from West German sources. But the flight of large numbers of the middle classes and the impoverishment of those who remain in the DDR, combine with the difficulties and dangers entailed in receiving outside funds to plague the church with continuing and growing financial distress. Secondly, as a result of the departure of pastors and the reduced number of students in training for the ministry, the church is inadequately staffed. Finally, although the EKD continues to function throughout the whole of Germany, contacts with the West have been reduced to a bare minimum. Ever since the EKD signed a contract with the Federal Government providing for the military chaplaincy, the East German regime has denied the church permission to hold any kind of conference or otherwise to transact the affairs of the national EKD within the DDR. Furthermore, the government has prohibited the visits of Bishop Dibelius and other West German church leaders, and sharply circumscribed the number of East Germans permitted to travel on church business to the West. Thus less than ten per cent of those who wanted to attend the most recent all-German Laymen's Assembly *(Kirchentag)*, held in August 1959, received permission to travel to Munich.

Despite all this, the repeated declarations by leaders of the EKD in East Germany to the effect that Christians ought to regard the DDR as the 'rightful secular authority' are honestly conceived and freely given. These churchmen may shrink from so polemical a formulation of their tenets as was offered in Karl Barth's open letter. Nevertheless they do agree with the Barthian imperative of Christian subordination to state power viewed as a manifestation of God's purpose in history. Only Bishop Dibelius, now effectively excluded from East Germany, advances the directly contrary notion that a totalitarian state can lay no legitimate and binding claim to Christian obedience. Denying the relevance of Romans: 13 ('The Powers that Be are Ordained of God. . . .') to the communist regime in the DDR, he rejects all its laws and ordinances as immoral. To give point to this rejection, Dibelius even goes so far as to announce that he will violate East German traffic regulations. But in all of this, Bishop Dibelius is speaking for himself only, a fact which is indisputably demonstrated by the alacrity with which EKD leaders repudiated his remarks and by the general belief that when Dibelius retires, as he soon will, his critically important office will have to be filled by a considerably less outspoken churchman.[8]

The church's precept to its communicants in the DDR: 'Obey the state within the limits of Christian conscience . . .' may perhaps be interpreted as nothing other than the traditional Lutheran justification of established state power. Such an interpretation is at best only partially valid. The church's acceptance of state power, even the power of the totalitarian regime, is also derived from Barth's theology, and especially from his influential eschatology. In short, authoritative spokesmen for the church preach the traditional conclusions on the basis of more sophisticated theological argumentation than was previously the case. And, ironically enough, they accept this particular regime all the more readily for their conscious disavowal of the consequences of the earlier Lutheran acquiescence in the established political order. The legacy of ingrained social and political conservatism, so long the hallmark of German Protestantism, is now attributed to the church's earlier alliance with the imperial state and bourgeois society, and is accordingly rejected. In turn, such spokesmen see in the church's present distress a unique challenge to improve

[8] Dibelius made known his position in a privately printed essay, entitled *Obrigkeit?*, which he dedicated to Bishop Lilje, the presiding Bishop of the United Evangelical-Lutheran Church. Lilje (whose office is in Hannover) and East German church leaders immediately and publicly dissociated themselves from Dibelius. See 'Der Bischof und die Gewissennot,' and 'Der Bischof und die Obrigkeit,' *Die Zeit*, 9 and 16 October 1959. For the public discussion which followed, see 'Apostel Paulus und die DDR', and 'Schuldet der Christ dem Zonenregime Gehorsam?', *Die Zeit*, 23 October and 6 November 1959.

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upon the lip-service Protestantism of the age of 'throne-and-altar' and thus to transcend what Karl Barth has termed 'hyphenated Christianity.'[9]

Superintendent Günter Jacob of Cottbus speaks for the East German church, if not the EKD as a whole, when he applauds the final passing of the 'Constantinian era' of special privileges, and expresses the ultimate hope that out of what was formerly a *Volkskirche*, embracing the entire population, there may develop a church of deeply committed servants of God. The loss of membership, of state support and social position, are thus even welcomed as a necessary purgatory through which the church must pass in order to attain that regeneration of faith which may transform the church into 'a magnetic core in the amorphous mass of the anonymous church public'.[10] Since the agent precipitating this regenerative transformation is none other than the atheistic dictatorship, it follows that its power must be acknowledged as rightful and meaningful to God's eschatological purposes. It further follows that even as God is outside the history through which He operates, so the church must remain outside the politics of the day, which is another way of saying that political neutralism excludes anti-communism. Thus the notion that Christianity is or ought to be a 'bulwark against Communism' is totally and unreservedly rejected: specific repressions of the SED regime must not provoke the church to ideological opposition, for the regime's measures are accounted not only components of a greater divine scheme but are also accepted as expiation for 'the historical guilt of the church towards the workers.'[11]

[9] Günter Jacob, *Das Licht scheint in der Finsternis* (Stuttgart, 1954), p. 80.

[10] Günter Jacob, 'Deutsche Volkskirche im Ernstfall,' in *Evangelische Kirche jenseits der Zonengrenze* (Berlin, 1957), p. 26.

[11] Jacob, 'Deutsche Volkskirche im Ernstfall,' *loc. cit.*, p. 15. For a witty and perceptive account of the church's earlier reaction to Marxism and the rise of socialism, see Karl Kupisch, *Das Jahrhundert des Sozialismus und die Kirche* (Berlin, 1958).

IT is all too easy for the observer who shares neither the Barthian theology of the East German church nor the experience of its continued vexations to dismiss this position as little more than a sophisticated rationalisation of the church's accommodation to unpleasant but inescapable political reality. Certainly a quietistic theology does not prepare its adherents for the experience of resistance. Nevertheless the tenacity and faith of those who remain active in church affairs in East Germany, despite every kind of political pressure and personal disadvantage, cannot be denied. Open statements against the abuse of power and refusal to participate in demonstrations and elections testify to the civil courage of the churchmen who thus risk denunciation and worse at the hands of the regime. But East German Protestantism is far from being a church of martyrs. The need to threaten disciplinary action against pastors who leave the DDR without ecclesiastical permission (in effect denying them reassignment in West Germany), points the conclusion only too adequately. Under the deftly applied pressures of the regime, the church has proved not resilient but brittle. Spontaneous initiative and independent leadership at the level of the individual parish is all too rare a phenomenon, still another reflection of the Lutheran heritage, this time as it applies to the structure of the church itself.

Yet the larger tragedy of East German Protestantism is written in other terms. Without a full comprehension of the psychological peculiarities of the totalitarian regime, the church cannot but fail to perceive that a spiritual regeneration of the desired magnitude, should it come about, would willy-nilly bring the church into opposition and resistance to the regime. To the extent that the church may, in fact, develop into a 'magnetic core' of attraction for all those who seek to escape the politicisation of daily life, its very success would presage a new and more violent period in the confrontation between Communism and Protestantism in East Germany.

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Through the Upheaval

THE HUNGARIAN INTELLIGENTSIA

François Fejto

'THERE is not, and there cannot be, any question of the working class transferring its function of leadership to the intelligentsia. It is the revolutionary party that must direct the working class in the exercise of its power.'

Deszo Nemes, a former Rakosiist who went over to the camp of Kadar, wrote those words in the *Nepszabadsag of* 14 June 1959. Published in the official Party organ, this pronouncement, by an editor who is regarded as one of the best qualified theorists of the regime, has the merit of stating the problem without hypocrisy. It shows, indeed, that if during recent years certain representatives of the intelligentsia in Hungary (as in Poland and, if more sporadically, in the USSR), have been formulating revisionist ideas, and casting doubt upon the capacity of the working class *as such* to take over the function of leadership, they were criticising the Party hierarchy far more than the proletariat—which, as everyone knows, is regimented, depersonalised, and deprived of any effective means of action. And it can be said that one of the most characteristic facts about social life in contemporary Hungary is the divorce between the Party organisation (the communist 'power élite') and the intelligentsia, which regards itself as the *real* élite of the country. Hence the rivalry, sometimes muffled, sometimes bitter and violent (as it was in 1956), that sets the intelligentsia against the 'new class' whose competence it denies and whose privileges it attacks. But, before going into the details of this particular 'class-struggle', let us specify what we mean—what in Hungary *is* meant—by the term 'intelligentsia'.

The official ideologists base their refusal to recognise the intelligentsia as a true class, or at least as a distinct social stratum, upon the great diversity of elements that enters into it. The intelligentsia comprises, in fact:

(1) The technical or technological intelligentsia, whose numerical and social importance has never ceased to grow during the last few years. Thus, in Hungary in 1958, there were 28,000 certificated engineers and 35,000 technicians, compared with 10,000 and 2 to 3 thousand respectively in 1938.

(2) The intellectuals properly so called, writers, journalists, artists, students of the faculties of letters and philosophy—unlike the former category, whose preoccupations are mainly of a professional or 'salarial' order —are more or less politicised; they want liberalisation and democracy and tend to regard themselves as the vanguard of the intelligentsia as a whole.

(3) The teachers constitute yet another distinct component, characterised in Hungary by its traditionalism and its attitude of passive resistance to the present regime.

(4) The survivors from the liberal professions, lawyers and doctors, who often retain a nostalgia for the vanished bourgeois world.

(5) The officials of the civil or economic administration, as well as the clerical workers and others who have some education and intellectual interests.

The heterogeneity of these groups, which the official propaganda likes to make so much of (as if the working class also were not made up of disparate elements!), is further accentuated by the dichotomy that is set up—somewhat artificially as we shall see—between the 'old intelligentsia' with its manifest bourgeois attachments, and the 'new intelligentsia' that emerged from the ranks of labour and owes its social promotion to the activities of the regime.

SINCE the liberation, the Communist Party has been reckoning that a new generation of intellectuals would arise from the proletariat, in conformity with Stalin's idea that 'the working class ought to have its own intelligentsia'.

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In any case, some renovation of the intelligentsia had become a political and social necessity in the Hungary of 1945. Indeed, a great many of the intelligentsia (and especially of the administrative, political, and military personnel they produced) found themselves gravely compromised either by their servitude or opportunist conformism to the Horthy regime, or by their fascist sympathies. This intelligentsia had, in effect, been largely responsible for the disastrous policy of the old regime. To some degree, its reactionary behaviour, hostile to any progressive idea and even to bourgeois democracy, can be traced to its social origins. The nucleus of the Hungarian intelligentsia (which liked to call itself the 'historic middle class') had been formed from descendants of the impoverished minor landed nobility. It was this nucleus—especially retrograde—that tended to set the style for the peripheral elements of the intelligentsia recruited from the petty and middle bourgeoisie.

This intelligentsia, which monopolised the administrative functions—on that point the communist criticism is fully justified—failed to fulfil its national mission, which was to carry on the tradition of Kossuth and Petöfi, to work in favour of the reforms needed by the country, on the national plane as much as in the social sphere (the agrarian question) and in that of economics (industrialisation).

It is of interest to note that this conservative, provincial, and retrograde intelligentsia abandoned to the Jews (whose immigration rose to mass proportions after 1848) not only most of the commercial, financial, and industrial careers (the larger capitalisation of Hungary was chiefly the work of Jews), but also the function of the national intellectual élite. Men like Andre Ady, Sigmund Moricz, Michel Karolyi, authentically Hungarian and progressive minds, are but exceptions that prove the rule. Much the greater part of the intellectual vanguard was composed of Jews. Most of the leaders of the social-democratic party, of the trade unions, and, later, of the communist party, were Jews. It was Jewish traders, lawyers, doctors, artisans, and employees who were the regular electoral supporters of the little parties of bourgeois liberals or democrats that used to vegetate in Budapest. Such men as Ady, Attila Joszef or Bela Bartok, who expressed the deepest and noblest aspirations of the people, met with but little understanding among the Hungarian intelligentsia who—like the ruling class and the clergy whom they devotedly served—regarded them as renegades. Their public was Jewish.

But the Horthy regime, inasmuch as it was a 'national' reaction (in reality a feudal, military, and bureaucratic one) to the democratic outburst of 1918, only accentuated the retrograde, conformist character of a great part of the *Magyar* intelligentsia. Before the first world war, the latter preferred to present itself (as did the ruling class on which it depended) in a 'liberal' and 'tolerant' light; it included elements that had come under freemasonic influence. Under Horthy, liberalism was no longer in fashion: nationalism became irredentist, chauvinistic, completely unrealistic (the Hungarian youth were taught to dream of restoring the Kingdom of St. Stephen); anti-Semitism was promoted to the rank of a great social idea. Industrialisation was supposed to be a dangerous menace. Budapest, with its cafés, theatres, concert-halls and commerce, went on all the same, flourishing like a Babylon.

IT was only after the agricultural crisis of 1929, the repercussions of the American crisis, and the advent of Hitler, that certain new tendencies began to appear in the midst of the Hungarian intelligentsia, now perturbed about the national future and the meaning of Fascism and Socialism. It was then that the 'populist' movement came to birth, formed by young writers who came from the rural intelligentsia or the peasantry; their ideology had much in common with that of the *narodniks* of pre-revolutionary Russia. The central motive, with these writers—Gyula Illyes, Peter Veres, Ferenc Erdei, Zoltan Szabo and others—was the necessity for a great agrarian reform. They presented themselves as spokesmen for the poor and the landless peasantry. Feeling little sympathy with the 'judaised' bourgeoisie, they also displayed certain prejudices against the working class, because, having incorporated numerous Slav and Germanic elements, it was ethnically impure. Politically, the populist movement was

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characterised by its search for a 'third way' between Fascism and Socialism—for a 'Hungarian way'.

Later, some of the populist writers—like Joseph Darvas, Rakosi's Minister of Culture—went over to the communists. Others—like Geza Feja—compromised themselves with the swastikas. But the majority, whether in exile or remaining in the country, remained true to their vocation as 'third force', national progressive reformists. Unlike the communists who, like Lukacs, renewed contact with the country after long absence abroad and expressed themselves in a repellent Marxist jargon, the populists, notably Laszlo Nemeth and Istvan Bibo, spoke a language easily understood by the young and the intelligentsia. Moreover, their influence predominated, after 1945, in the 'popular colleges'—the boarding schools created in order to produce an intelligentsia from gifted sons of the peasant class.

Thus, owing to the intellectual radiation from such minds as Nemeth, Bibo, Gyula Illyes and other populists who were gradually disembarrassed of the 'Horthyist' heritage, the process of the transformation of the Hungarian intelligentsia was well begun by 1945. One could even hope that, thanks to a discreet and patient propaganda, the best elements of the old intelligentsia would rally to democracy.

Then it was that the communists began to multiply the sectarian mistakes which have brought about their present divorce from the intelligentsia—first, by giving to the inevitable purge of the administration a hasty and invidious character. Instead of making a judicious selection and separating the wheat from the tares, they committed countless excesses and injustices, producing a climate of insecurity that forced the shaken intelligentsia to consolidate itself. Against such arbitrary communism, reactionaries and liberals found themselves in the same camp.[1] The situation grew still worse after 1949, when thousands of intellectuals, without any valid reason, were subjected to measures of revocation, demotion, internment, or deportation.

As for the 'new intelligentsia' born of the regime itself, this did not take the path traced for it by the communists: as one communist leader lately admitted, 'far too many members of the new intelligentsia have come under the influence of the old bourgeois intelligentsia.'.[2]

Nevertheless, the work done by the regime, in giving the nation a new social structure, is far from negligible. It can be illustrated from the results of an enquiry by the Budapest Statistical Office, which shows that in 1958 more than a third of the certificated engineers employed in the capital were of working class origin, against only 2.9% in 1938. Ten per cent of the engineers were of peasant origin. In 1958 more than half the high school and University students were recruited from the ranks of the proletariat or the peasantry (in addition to the self-styled 'worker cadres' which enjoy a privileged status).

BUT the events of 1956 have demonstrated that an important number of the new intelligentsia (and of the student youth of popular stock) made common cause with the old intelligentsia to demand the reform, if not the abolition, of the people's democracy. In spite of its undeniable heterogeneity and its divisions, the intelligentsia has become conscious of being a class apart, a class with ideas and common interests to defend. One may contest, as the communists do, the genuineness of this new selfconsciousness; but to us it seems more useful to analyse the reasons for it.

First among these reasons is the general movement of industrial society. 'In the process of building up Socialism', wrote *Szabad Nep* (15 July 1956), 'the importance of the functions of organisation and education never cease to grow; and step by step with this the intelligentsia, too, increases in number and importance.' That is a fact. It is true that industrialisation also increases the front-line workers by a massive recruitment of rural and female labour; but the number of managers, of officials and clerical workers has increased still more rapidly. Side by side with the proletariat, it is the intelligentsia that is the great rising class of collectivist industrial society. The intellectuals take

[1] On this subject, see the remarkable analysis by Istvan Bibo in the review *Valasz*, January 1947.

[2] D. Nemes in *Nepszabadsag*, 26 May 1959.

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on the position of the old middle class as naturally as the 'top people' of the regime (of whom the 'worker cadres' are the nucleus) take the place of the old upper bourgeoisie, occupy their residences and lead their kind of life.

But the attitude of the communists towards this rising class (which moreover extends widely into the Party, so that the latter is losing its proletarian character) is ambivalent. The Party favours it and belittles it at the same time. While reinforcing the intellectuals, the Party denies them any political self-expression: it entrusts them with important functions and pays them badly; it demands that the scientists, the technicians, should constitute a 'vanguard', while it cuts them off from indispensable sources of information—imported books and foreign travel.[3] It creates professional schools, high schools, and universities, at the same time considerably lowering the standards of teaching. It promotes the spirit of criticism and yet imposes, by courses of Marxist education and re-education, an abominable dogmatism. By its excessive centralisation of the political and economic structure, it subjects managers, engineers, professors and others to constant vexations from the upper bureaucracy.

The main cause of the discontent of the intelligentsia was the position it had been given, that of dependence on the Party organisation. The latter, as we know, appropriated all the key positions in society, ostensibly in order to impose the dictatorship of the proletariat. Very often, it is true, the managers, heads of factories, service chiefs, under-secretaries, principals of schools, etc were not working men but old intellectuals or officials. The party appealed to the 'worker cadres' only in order to have a social alibi. But the essence of the situation was that the recruitment for the higher positions was determined, not by criteria of competence, but by standards of political zeal. And the political managers were not content only to slight the competent technicians and assert superiority: often enough, to curry popular favour, they tried to pit the workers against the technicians, by denouncing the latter as 'bourgeois'. In this way they created an anti-intellectual climate: the 'new class' very often pointed to the engineers and technicians working under their authority as scapegoats for their own deficiencies.

But the tension between the technical intelligentsia and the political managers had a manifestly paralysing effect upon economic development. Imre Nagy was one of the first openly to admit this in his governmental speech of 4 July 1953, inveighing 'against the atmosphere of suspicion that surrounds the intelligentsia; against the unjustifiable purges it has undergone'. He declared that 'the intelligentsia ought to become an esteemed component of our people's democracy'. And in fact Nagy's actions, so long as he remained in the government (from the above date until February 1955) were aimed primarily at the appeasement of the intellectuals. He tried to draw them out of their passive resistance, their dumb antagonism to the regime, by inviting them to take part, in Budapest as well as in the provinces, in the organisation of a new *Popular Front;* and even to become 'the directive force on that Front' (*Magyar Nemzet,* 26 September 1954).

Nagy was severely enough reproached for it: his 'liberalising' activities in 1953, his reiterated appeals to co-operation, played an important part in the intelligentsia's growing awareness of its importance and its national vocation.[4]

The intelligentsia had, it is true, no political organisation of its own. But it expressed itself within the frame of the existing institutions; in the Communist Party itself (which was soon to be split open by its pressure), as well as in the various professional, trade union, and student organisations. It was through the debates of the organisations of the *Popular Front*—and then, after these were taken in hand by Rakosi, through discussions organised in circles (such as the Petöfi circle) and clubs all over the country, following upon the XXth CPSU Congress—that the Hungarian intelligentsia, or at least its most active members, became aware of its common aspirations—its ideas were suffused

[3] Cf. the resolution passed at the end of a reunion of 25 scientific and technical associations and published in *Magyar Nemzet,* 23 September 1956.

[4] The authors of an excellent monograph on Imre Nagy, Miklos Molnar and Laszlo Nagy, justly observe that 'the best collaborators of Nagy came from the intelligentsia, and particularly from among the intellectuals of the Party'. *Imre Nagy, réformateur ou révolutionnaire.* (Geneva, 1959), p. 87.

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with a nationalism in the liberal, progressive traditions of 1848. It is significant that the first debate organised by the Petöfi Circle after the XXth Congress was about 'the situation of the young engineers and technicians'.[5]

The socialist and nationalist agitation of 1956 in Hungary arose precisely from the political awakening of the intelligentsia, communist or other, and its demand that the regime should be transformed in a direction corresponding with its interests.

In the course of the risings of October and November 1956, the national and revolutionary committees, which everywhere to some degree superseded the local authorities, were in large part composed of representatives of the intelligentsia, new as well as old, bourgeois as well as proletarian. They were all united under the sign of what was later described by Gyula Kallai, a collaborator of Kadar, as 'an illusion concerning the leading rôle of the intelligentsia'. This 'illusion' was even shared by a considerable portion of the working class; indeed, in the 'workers councils' elected during that revolutionary period, a great many representatives of the technical intelligentsia were called upon to sit side by side with workmen. In many cases these councils elected engineers as chairmen: we were witnessing the birth of an alliance between the intelligentsia and the proletariat against the Party set-up and the self-styled 'worker cadres' whose communist leaders themselves now admitted that they had often been completely out of touch with the proletariat.

PASSING on to the period after the insurrection, this has been characterised first of all by the restoration of the social, economic, and political power of the 'new class', on the pretext of 'strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat'.

The 'worker cadres', now back in position, tried to get a hearing again by exploiting such irritations of an economic nature as might be felt by specially unfortunate workers towards members of the intelligentsia who were benefiting by the rise in salaries, etc. Another gust of sectarian folly swept through factories and offices. Members of the intelligentsia were again denounced as 'strangers to the class' (meaning the working class), or 'class-enemies'. Denunciations, revocations, and condemnations rained in torrents, as in the high days of Rakosiism. And on the other hand, administrative pressures were frequently exerted to bring members of the intelligentsia into the bosom of the party (*Nepszabadsag*, 1 November 1957).

In the end the leaders of the Party were themselves worried by the disastrous consequences of this new sectarianism: 'Where shall we come to, if we continue to treat as counter-revolutionaries all the technicians who disapprove of such and such a measure, or do not sympathise with this or that responsible administrator; but who, on the whole, are ready to co-operate with the regime?' asked a leader-writer in the *Nepszabadsag* (1 November 1957). Later, on 29 May 1958, the head of the cultural and scientific department of the Central Committee, Laszlo Orban, returned to the question in the same journal, deploring the 'apathy' which, he said, was coming over an important part of the intelligentsia, whose representatives no longer dared—for fear of reprisals—to open their mouths at meetings in which they were invited to take part. Even while putting the intellectuals 'in their place', the leaders were trying to normalise the situation by conciliating, if not the writers, journalists, and artists who remained irreducibly hostile, at least that technical intelligentsia to which Khrushchev himself, during his visit to Hungary in 1958, appealed again and again for appeasement and co-operation. But in vain! The anti-intellectual campaign had been begun; the 'new class', humiliated in 1956, wanted to take their revenge; and it was they who set the tone for the intermediate ranks. Thus the *Nepszbadsag* of 25 June 1959 was once more protesting that 'the struggle against the counter-revolution was degenerating into another witch-hunt'. (Note also that this 'hunt' sometimes picked up an anti-Semitic scent.) But the intelligentsia was the chief victim of the measures of educational discrimination passed in 1959, which, by establishing a sort of *numerus clausus*, excluded non-proletarians from higher education.

However, one result of the anti-intellectual campaign was a sudden diminution in the number of sons of workmen and peasants asking for

[5] Cf. 'My Generation' by Paul Jonas, a former secretary of the Circle, in *East Europe*, July 1957.

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University places (*Nepszabadsag*, 15 February 1959). The reasons for this unexpected decline were explained in an 'open letter' addressed to the journal by a young engineer 'of peasant stock', Laszlo Szalai, to which the editor-in-chief took the trouble to reply in person. 'As a skilled workman, I used to belong to the working class, the recognised leading class of the country,' wrote Szalai, 'but now that I have an engineer's diploma, which is a higher qualification, I am only an intellectual. This means that I have been pushed down from the first rank in the social hierarchy to the last, below the workers and peasants. . . . But we others, the young people, simply cannot swallow the idea that competent persons should be ordered about by the less competent. Why was I worth more, as a locksmith, than I am now as an engineer?'

That is a thorny question; the problem of 'competence' is the old war-horse of the intelligentsia. Moreover, Szalai makes no attempt to hide the fact that, despite his working-class origin, he feels a solidarity with 'well brought-up, cultivated people'; that he prefers their company to that of his old companions; and he asks 'whether the conception according to which all power and glory should go to the working class is not quite mistaken?' To which Nemes replies by asserting that 'the working class is the leading class; not at all because all its members can actually attain leading positions, but because it is the class which leads the revolutionary struggle against capitalism and for the building up of socialism. . . . Who would dare to say that the intellectuals claim the leading part in that struggle?'

It would be easy to refute this argument by recalling the leading part played by intellectuals in the democratisation and socialisation of Hungary in 1848, 1918-19, in 1945 and 1956. Were not the effective groups of the tiny clandestine communist party, between 1919 and 1945, composed chiefly of intellectuals? But that is not the question. The challenging fact is that the idea of the leading function of the working class in socialist countries appears, in the eyes of the intellectuals of those countries, to be a myth, serving only to cloak the monopolistic pretensions of those who direct the Party—that is, of the 'new class!'

In order to govern, however, the Party of the 'new class' needs the intelligentsia; it offers to include some of its members in the upper hierarchy. 'The leading rôle of the proletariat certainly does not mean', writes Nemes, 'that intellectuals cannot rise to leading positions, if they are capable, experienced, and loyal towards the established power'. But they must bow before the fact that 'the highest positions are often occupied by old working men who have no diplomas'. Nemes insists, however, that the Party does its best to persuade these managers who have risen from the ranks to learn their business and acquire technical knowledge.

This exchange of views clearly illustrates the continuance, under the present regime, of the antagonism between the intelligentsia and the Party system. It also shows that, on the whole, the 'new intelligentsia', although it derives certain privileges from that system, lines up with the 'old intellectuals'. It also refuses to believe in 'the leading rôle of the proletariat', and claims for 'the élite' (meaning the non-communist intelligentsia) the status of the leading social class.

THUS the Hungarian Party has not found out how to become what a Rajk, for instance, or an Imre Nagy wanted to make of it —the assembly and the instrument of the élite —writers, journalists, scientists, professors, teachers, doctors, jurists, and agronomists—all fraternally united with the skilled workers and the progressive peasants, to modernise and rejuvenate the country. This failure of the Party —by reason of the countless errors and crimes of the Rakosi period—is certainly much more marked in Hungary than in Czechoslovakia where, at the moment of the transfer of power, the Communist Party and the revolutionary trade unions had at their disposal numerous cells that were not only 'reliable' but competent. In the latter country, the intelligentsia were, in a great majority, 'integrated' with the bureaucracy; the leaders of the Party had treated them with a certain flexibility. True, some tensions showed themselves here too, notably between the intellectuals properly so called and the students on the one hand, and the Party system on the other; but the technical intelligentsia is relatively satisfied with its lot; it does not, as a class, feel oppressed or humiliated. On the

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contrary, it is thankful to the dictatorship of the proletariat for having facilitated the transition to the kind of collectivist technocracy which the old Marxist revolutionary Machaisky foresaw before the first world war. He predicted, in fact, 'that the intellectuals would substitute themselves for the exploiters, and continue the exploitation of the working class under cover of collectivist slogans'. And again, in a recent study, devoted to the situation of the intelligentsia, an emigré, Daniel Kubat (see *Rencontre*, May 1959) has come to the conclusion that 'the greater part of the Czechoslovak intelligentsia has gone over to the Party in power, and remains more loyal towards it than it is generally thought to be'.

Such is not the situation in Hungary, as we have seen. In that country, just as in Rumania —and, in spite of some relative relaxations, in Poland—the new technical intelligentsia, with the exception of a small number of scientists in the Party who occupy high bureaucratic posts, is as much alienated from the Party as is the rest of the people.

To conclude: If the example of Czechoslovakia proves that the intelligentsia can accommodate itself, at least during an initial phase, to the servitude imposed upon it by the theory and practice of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (when also benefiting by it), the example of Hungary demonstrates that if the intelligentsia is not treated, by the holders of collective power, with due regard for its effective social contribution, its awakening to consciousness— as a distinct class or stratum—is accelerated. Then it intransigently rejects the totalitarian and technocratic system, repudiates 'the Soviet way' and transforms itself into the vanguard of social democracy. Moreover, the realisation of this has induced the Soviet leaders to re-think, and in a great measure to rectify, their tactics with regard to the intelligentsia—the new tactics being to show favour to the technicians and scientists, to speed up their fusion with the specialised intelligentsia and the bureaucracy, while still closely watching and isolating the recalcitrant elements in intellectual life—writers, poets, and non-conforming students.

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

RED PRELUDE

David Footman

In *Roots of Revolution*[1] we have an excellent translation of Professor Venturi's great work on Russian revolutionary Populism, first published in Italy in 1952 and now described by Professor Berlin as 'the fullest and most authoritative account in any language of a decisive phase in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement'.

Populism is not an easy term to define. In the preface to the original Italian edition it was suggested that it might be described as the Russian reaction to (or perhaps counterpart of) the romantic socialism of the West. It is thus appropriate that the book should start with 1848 in view of the impact of the European revolutions of that year upon those Russians who were to provide the main inspiration for the movement later to be known as Populism. The book closes in 1881, when the Emperor Alexander II was assassinated by the most effective and most devoted of the Populist conspiratorial groups, and when indeed most of the active revolutionaries were rounded up by the police. 1881 was by no means the end of Populism. But, as the author says, 'it marks a break. . . . Between 1848 and 1881 Russian socialism was populist. Later it was to become social-revolutionary, social-democrat, menshevik, bolshevik, anarchist'. It is our loss that Professor Venturi makes no promise of continuing his history to a later period.

The opening chapters are concerned with the ideological origins and inspiration—with Herzen, Bakunin, Chernishevsky and the writers who came after them. But the core of the book is 'the inner life' of the movement, the aims and struggles of the hundreds of young men and women who fought for their ideals, from the first illegal groups in Moscow and Kharkov in the fifties to the climax of 1881. The field to be covered is vast; the source material, though voluminous, is patchy and mostly hard of access. Professor Venturi has shown both tireless industry and remarkable skill in giving us an account that is so exhaustive, so clear, so balanced, and so moving in its inherent drama.

It is the work of a young man, and the author's meticulous regard for facts does not conceal his warm sympathy for the revolutionaries. Nechaev is treated extremely kindly. To liberals and liberal-minded officials the author is chilly. It is not untypical that when both the administration and the revolutionaries were seeking means of appeal to the public, the official deliberations are described as an 'extremely vulgar form' of the conspiratorial debate. Yet the Government's difficulties are stated fairly. On the one side there were the limitations of the machine as built up under Nicholas I—'strong only when it remained quite static and weak as soon as it tried to take action'. On the other was the temper of the opposition: 'According to popular ideas freedom consists in complete lack of all authority and submission'. So wrote the Minister of the Interior in 1845; and in the late seventies a revolutionary journal was referring to 'the element of anarchism latent in the Russian people'. In 1869 it was the Petersburg School of Medicine—outside the control of the Minister of Public Education and run on tolerant lines—that was the main centre of student disorders. Throughout the period, if given an inch, the opposition would grab for an ell.

To the earnest and dedicated founding fathers of the movement, as to the young zealots who followed them, compromise would have seemed a betrayal. They were not politicians concerned with the art of the possible. They were apostles of a faith, and viewed life through

[1] Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*. A History of Populist and Socialist Movements in nineteenth-century Russia. Introduction by Isaiah Berlin. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960.

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spectacles of a passionate intensity. The novels of George Sand were 'intoxicating poems, sacred hymns in which she sang of the appearance of a new revelation'. In the 'Going to the People' movement of the seventies the emotional element became overwhelming. Professor Venturi writes: 'The ideology of the movement was vague. . . . A number of different tendencies met here and so the critical element contained in each of them was diluted, or rather burnt to ashes, in a great impulse of dedication'. The number of Populist revolutionaries who finished their days in lunatic asylums is striking, and not by any means to be explained by official brutality.

Professor Venturi rightly warns us against exaggerating the importance of naïve, and at times ridiculous, episodes. And with the formation of the *Narodnaya Volya* group in the late seventies there came a conscious effort towards realist thinking with regard to both conspiratorial techniques and long-term aims. But it so happened that just when the movement was developing its greatest technical skill the tide of revolutionary feeling in wider circles was, for the moment, receding. So far from having mass support, the *Narodnaya Volya* could not attract recruits to maintain its cadres. They were a small and isolated group. In their plans to transform society they were thinking into empty air.

In the course of years the tide of feeling turned again. And the revolutionary movements in which that feeling was to find expression largely carried the emotional imprint of their Populist forerunners. Again and again we find the same rigidity of faith, the abhorrence of compromise, the romantic belief in the instrinsic virtue of revolution, the preoccupation with moral issues—indeed those qualities that were to make the other revolutionary leaders such easy prey to Leninist realism and ruthlessness. And so (to quote from the brilliant conclusion of Professor Berlin's introduction) 'In due course the Bolsheviks . . . transformed the cells of dedicated revolutionaries—perhaps the most original contribution of Populism to revolutionary practice—into the hierarchy of centralised political power, which the Populists had steadily and fiercely denounced, until they were finally—in the form of Socialist Revolutionaries —proscribed and annihilated. Communist practice owed much, as Lenin was always ready to admit, to the Populist movement; for it borrowed the technique of its rival, and adapted it all too successfully to the precise purpose which it had been invented to resist'.

AFTER STALIN

W.Z.L.

Seven years have passed since Stalin's death —a period of time equal to that between the storming of the Bastille and Baboeuf's conspiracy, or between Hitler's *Machtergreifung* and the German victory in France. But while in 1796 many shelves might already have been filled with books on the French Revolution, and in 1940 even more works had been written on the Third Reich, the number of serious studies of Russia since Stalin (as distinct from travelogues and personal reportage) is curiously small. Somehow, Stalin's rule seems very recent, and outside observers are reluctant to go on record with an analysis of recent events (let alone a prognosis).

The attempts recently made in Germany independently by Klaus Mehnert[1] and Wolfgang Leonhard[2] (neither of whom need be introduced to SURVEY readers) to fill this void should therefore be welcomed. The two books to a certain degree complement each other. Mehnert's book is more impressionistic and includes many fascinating observations made during his recent trips to the Soviet Union. Leonhard gives a more systematic review of events in the Soviet Union which, while lacking recent first-

[1] Klaus Mehnert; *Der Sowjet-Mensch*, Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1959.
[2] Wolfgang Leonhard; *Kreml ohne Stalin*, Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, Köln, 1959.

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hand experience, draws intelligently on an enormous quantity of Soviet books and periodicals. Both, in particular Mehnert, devote considerable space to the political and social interpretation of some of the more controversial Soviet novels written and published after Stalin's death. Leonhard is mainly preoccupied with unravelling recent political developments inside the Kremlin, while Mehnert is more interested in the extent to which recent changes have affected society (or, to put it more simply, people) in the Soviet Union.

Mehnert attributes less importance to ideology than does Leonhard, and states in effect that we 'exaggerate the significance of ideological matters in the Soviet Union'. He is primarily interested in the mental make-up of Soviet people, and in a study of this kind it may be in order to find the name Yuri Trifonov mentioned more often than the name Karl Marx. Granted that the measure of political interest revealed by the average Soviet citizen has frequently been overrated in the West; such generalisations are however misleading when it comes to the analysis of policy-planning and policy-making in the Soviet Union. This is something on an altogether different level—not unlike the old French dichotomy between *pays réel* and *pays légal* (with the difference that in the Soviet system the balance is heavily tilted towards the Soviet *pays légal*; until Stalin's death one could not be quite sure that the *pays réel* still existed. Now it has come into its own again and been rediscovered by foreign observers; the *shirokaya natura* may be the same as it used to be, but our acceptance of it is not much help to our understanding of Soviet policy on, for instance, Berlin).

Leonhard believes that ideology will be increasingly adapted to the real political exigencies of Soviet development, but that it will continue to play an important part in the foreseeable future. He overestimates, in the opinion of the present writer, the significance of the shifts in power between the various pillars of Soviet society (party apparatus, state, army, economy, police) that have taken place since Stalin's days. For one thing it is impossible to interpret power in the late Stalin period in sociological terms, for it rested with one man, and not with any specific social stratum. Over and above that, there is no evidence that 'army' or 'economy' has indeed emerged as an identifiable interest group with definite political ambitions. There may be trends in that direction, limited demands on an *ad hoc* basis, perhaps occasional resentment among generals and managers of undue outside interference. But all this does not yet mean that 'army' and 'economy' have in any way become factors of political influence comparable to the Party apparatus. If Mehnert is perhaps too exclusively concerned with Soviet people, in contrast to the leadership and its policy, Leonhard tends to neglect the *pays réel*. It is all very well to argue that what has taken place since Stalin's death is not liberalisation of the regime, but modernisation, that the system itself has not changed, that no definitive break with Stalinism has taken place, and that whatever democratic and liberal reforms have taken place have been incidental by-products of the efforts to streamline the regime. All this is only too true, but for the ordinary Soviet citizen these 'by-products' are of the very greatest importance; he prefers enjoying these advances to worrying about their extent and historical significance.

These issues are topics of legitimate controversy, and do not affect the value of two books that will be read with profit by all students of Soviet affairs as well as the general reader.

BOOKS ON ASIA

W.Z.L.

Soviet publications on the contemporary East have multiplied rapidly during the last five years. The Academy of Sciences and the publishing house for Eastern Literature now release books and booklets on Asia at the rate of about two a week, and they do not by any means have a monopoly in the field. There is, however, as yet no textbook covering the most recent history of the East. Moscow University prepared what was to become the authoritative work in the

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early fifties.[1]. The first volume, covering the period between 1917 and 1929, appeared in 1954; the second volume, which brought events up to the second world war, was published the following year. Volume III was published in 1956, but is unobtainable in this country, and the projected fourth volume is apparently not to be issued. Restrictions on export were probably introduced, and the series discontinued following the criticism voiced after the publication of the first two volumes. These had been prepared when it was fashionable to attack the 'national bourgeoisie' in the East as tools of Western Imperialism, when Gandhi and Nehru, Kemal Atakurk and the Arab nationalist leaders were still regarded with distrust and disfavour. The new course in Soviet policy made these books obsolete, and a new approach and a new literature were needed.

One of the more interesting general textbooks recently published is the *Modern History of the countries of Asia and Africa*[2], which provides a general introduction up to 1870 and then reviews in some detail developments between 1870 and 1917, where it ends. This study was prepared by Leningrad University, and it is of some interest to compare it with its predecessor which appeared in 1952[3] under Moscow University auspices and covering roughly the same period. There is a difference in style: the 1952 edition does not omit a single Stalinist cliché whereas the 1959 volume, while not dispensing with Stalin quotations altogether, is more matter-of-fact and less clumsy. The subtitle of the 1952 publication reads as follows: 'The countries of the East in the Period of Capitalist Decline, of the Transition from the Old "Free" Capitalism to Imperialism, and of the Overthrow of Capitalism in Russia'. The new textbook simply says 'The Countries of the East from the Seventies to the Great Socialist October Revolution'. The 1959 edition does not fail to stress the obligation of Soviet historians to 'unmask the bourgeois falsifiers of Eastern history', but at the same time it makes extensive use of Western sources and acknowledges them in a number of bibliographical notes (which were notably absent from the 1952 work). In addition there is a shift in emphasis on almost every page. A few illustrations chosen at random should suffice. Sun Yat-sen, according to the 1952 version, was born into a 'comparatively well-to-do peasant family'. Now it is said that he was born into 'a peasant family' without qualification as to income bracket. According to the 1952 work Sun Yat-sen 'did not yet appreciate the significance of the popular masses and did not appeal to the people'. Such derogatory comment is omitted in 1959. The 1952 *History* describes Tilak as a 'petty bourgeois patriot', sharply criticises his reactionary views and beliefs, and goes on to say that he 'was afraid of agrarian unrest and revolutionary movements'. In 1959 Tilak is introduced as an 'outstanding patriot [petty bourgeois or not], democrat, and savant'. His religious beliefs are mentioned in one sentence, but the emphasis is on the over-riding 'progressive significance' of his movement. The national liberation movement in Egypt was covered in slightly more than one page in the earlier work, while the 1959 *History* allocates ten pages to the same topic. Mustafa Kamil, the leader of pre-World War One Egyptian nationalism, is described as a 'young journalist who was afraid of the activities of the popular masses', whereas in 1959 he has become 'the famous Egyptian patriot', the 'Tribune of Egypt', and the social and political limitations of his movement are noted in much more cautious terms.

Agrarian relations in the Countries of the East[4] is another textbook of a more general character published by the Academy of Sciences. Current political predilections are again obvious: there are essays about Syria and Malaya, but none about Japan and Indochina, where far-reaching agrarian reforms are 'progressive on the whole, but have a limited character'. Similar conclusions are reached with regard to Egypt ('The final solution of the agrarian problem in Egypt cannot be achieved without the destruction of the rule of the imperialists and the feudal remnants'), and Indonesia ('The Sastroamidjojo government has been compelled to

[1] *Noveyshaya Istoriya stran zarubezhnovo Vostoka.*

[2] *Novaya Istoriya stran zarubezhnovo Azii i Afriki.* Izd. Leningradskovo Universiteta, 1959. 592 pp.

[3] *Novaya Istoriya stran zarubezhnovo Vostoka,* Vol. II, Izd. Moskovskovo Universiteta, 1952. 460 pp.

[4] *Agrarnie Otnosheniya v stranakh Vostoka.* Izd. Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1958. 627 pp.

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listen to the voice of the people under the pressure of the workers' and peasants' movement'). Of Burma it is said that agrarian reform in that country is closely connected with the growth of the state sector in the national economy. Agrarian reforms in other parts of Asia (such as the Philippines) are dismissed as mere eyewash.

A major work recently published is the *Recent History of India*[5] (editors A. M. Dyakov and V. V. Balabushevich—a team that has collaborated for many years and commented on Indian affairs in accordance with shifting political exigencies). This work covers events in India from 1918 to the present, and concludes with a 140 page section on recent trends in Indian culture. The tenor is favourable on the whole; there is no criticism of Nehru and almost none of the Congress party. The only public figures that fare rather badly are ex-communists (like Roy) and competitors from the left (the Congress Socialists). The references show that not only Russian and English sources have been employed (as was customary in the past) but also books and periodicals in various Indian languages. *Independent India*[6], published in connection with India's tenth anniversary, is a less ambitious collection of essays of a more general character; several deal with Indo-Russian relations. Much more specialised is *India and Afghanistan*[7], a collection of historical and economic essays which range from the internal and external trade of the North-East areas in the 16th century to the situation of the railway worker during the 1929-1933 crisis. The most topical article is the one dealing with the problem of drawing India's internal frontiers according to linguistic lines.

The differences in the Soviet political approach towards India and Pakistan are strikingly reflected in Soviet writing.[8] In Soviet literature on India, even the right-wing Congress elements are hardly if ever subjected to criticism, while Soviet writers find fault even with the left-wing oppositionists in Pakistan, who are rebuked for their inconsistency, lack of decisive action, etc.

Among recent books on the Far East and South East Asia the following deserve brief mention: *Problems of Contemporary Japan*[9], a collection of six essays analysing economic and political trends in Japan since the second World War. The articles on Japanese finances and the internal struggle for power within the Socialist party are perhaps of most interest. A. P. Shiltova's and V. F. Mordvinov's *National Liberation Movement in Vietnam 1858-1945*[10] is a pioneering work as far as Soviet historiography is concerned, and is partly based on indigenous sources. V. S. Rudnev's *Outline of the recent History of Malaya*[11] is a much slighter affair, based on the standard works in English, the *Daily Worker*, and some quotations from the *Straits Times*.

There have been several handbooks on the Middle East during the last year, geographical, economic, and historical, providing essential information on countries such as Turkey and Syria.[12] Theodor Rothstein's *Egypt's Ruin* (published in English in 1910, first Russian edition 1924) has been republished[13] with an introduction by A. F. Miller, the Soviet expert on Turkey. K. Ivanov's and Z. Sheinis's book on Israel[14] (first published in 1958, second revised edition in 1959) is the first Soviet book-length study of that country. It reveals a more thorough knowledge of facts than previous Soviet writings on the subject but is entirely polemical in character (and published, significantly, not by the Academy of Sciences but by the State Publishing House for Political Literature, which is in charge of propaganda). The *Essays on the history of the Arab coun-*

[5] *Noveishaya Istoriya Indii.* Izd. Vostochnoi Literaturi, 1959. 758 pp.

[6] *Nezavisimaya Indiya.* Izd. Vostochnoi Literaturi, 1958.

[7] *Indiya i Afganistan*: Ocherki istorii i ekonmiki. Izd. Vostochnoi Literaturi, 1958.

[8] *Pakistan, Istoriva i Ekonomika.* Izd. Vostochnoi Literaturi, 1958.

[9] *Problemy sovremennoi Yaponii.* Izd. Vostochnoi Literaturi, 1958. 242 pp.

[10] *Natsionalno-osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie vo Vietname.* Izd. IMO, 1958. 199 pp.

[11] *Ocherki noveishei Istorii Malaii.* Izd. Vostochnoi Literaturi, 1959. 118 pp.

[12] Such, as, for instance, *Sovremennaya Turtsiya.* Izd. Vostochnoi Literaturi, 1958. 290 pp.

[13] *Zakhvat i Zakabalenie Egipta.* Izd. Vostochnoi Literaturi, 1958. 367 pp.

[14] *Gosudarstvo Izrail: Evo Polozhenie i Politika,* Gospolitizdat, 1958-59. 148 pp.

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tries,[15] published by Moscow University, are more scholarly in character and range from studies of Mohammad Ali's agrarian policy to essays on the National Liberation Movement in Syria (1925-27—Lutskii's perennial subject), and Iraq (1920). Soviet writings on Asia are now usually produced by teams; the monograph written by one individual expert has become a rarity, with the exception of doctoral dissertations. This Asian literature has not only become much more abundant, but also shows a distinct change in approach and much more use is made of both Western and local, Asian sources.

Western authors, on the other hand, still frequently ignore Soviet sources. A recent otherwise competent study of Communism in South-East Asia, for instance, disregards the vast amount of Soviet literature on the subject. *cf.* J. H. Brimmell *Communism in South-East Asia* (London, 1959).

[15] *Ocherki po Istorii Arabskikh Stran.* Izd. Moskovskovo Universiteta, 1959. 255 pp.

SMALL SCREEN IN MOSCOW

Leo Paladini

TELEVISION in the Soviet Union is six years old. It was in 1953, shortly after Stalin's death, that the new medium emerged from the experimental stage, and from then on transmissions became regular. The development of television during the past six years has been noteworthy. The number of stations grew from three major ones in 1953 to fifteen at the beginning of 1956, while by the beginning of 1959 the figure had increased to sixty. Simultaneously, the number of subscribers or owners of a television set who have paid their subscription fee grew from 200,000 in 1953 to 820,000 at the beginning of 1956, and by 1959 had reached the figure of 3 million.

But since the country is so vast, it is unlikely that a nation-wide network will be achieved soon, despite the fact that much stronger transmitters are being used than in Western networks. The television antennae which can be seen in such numbers on the roofs in Moscow and Leningrad and various European regions of the USSR are totally absent in the regions beyond the Urals and the Caspian Sea. According to a recent official survey, 42% of all television sets are to be found in or near the capital, and according to the same source the programmes are being received over a territory with 50 million people, i.e. roughly one quarter of the entire population. In area, however, this last figure accounts for only one tenth of the USSR, from which it can be concluded that only the heavily populated areas of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, as well as those of Belorussia, the Baltic Republics, Georgia, and Armenia are included in the network. Television has not yet reached the regions north of Moscow, and is to be found only thinly to the east, along the Volga and in the Urals. In Central Asia there is only one relay station (located in Tashkent), whilst the immense regions of Siberia and the Soviet Far East are still completely without television.

In his theses on the seven-year plan for 1959-65, Khrushchev also mentioned the future development of television. The Soviet Prime Minister declared that the government plans to construct 109 additional transmitting stations of the standard type in use amongst the sixty stations in operation at the beginning of 1959. 'Standard' transmitting stations are those which do not send out programmes of their own, but are linked with a 'production centre'. They are in fact nothing but relay stations. It is furthermore planned that by 1965, television should be in service in all the 15 capitals of the Union republics as well as in the principal industrial towns. This should multiply the number of subscribers by four and reach the figure of 15 million. Once this programme is in action, it should cover a territory comprising half of the entire population of the USSR.

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FROM the subject of the actual and future dimensions of the Russian television network it is interesting to go on to a short survey of the contents and character of the transmissions. What has to be borne in mind, first and foremost, is that the other means of mass communication designed for instruction and propaganda—as for instance the daily press and the radio—have a more far-reaching network at their disposal. Television has simply joined their ranks, without any hint of competing with them. This is all the more easy to understand if one remembers that press and radio, as well as the theatre and the cinema, are state-owned and wholly under government control. In western countries somewhat difficult problems of co-existence have arisen between television, radio, the press, the theatre, and the cinema. There is nothing of the sort in Soviet Russia: since 1953 there has simply been one more technical medium that could be harnessed to the aims of the government. Consequently, only a complementary part has been allotted to television, largely because of its restricted range. The press is in the privileged position of being able to reach the public everywhere, whilst the absence of an electricity supply restricts the radius of television as well as radio to half the Russian villages only. The voice of the radio is dominant wherever people work or meet each other, in factories, in trains, and in hotel rooms. On the other hand, television wields its influence at home; government exponents have at various times and very explicitly pointed out that television was to be the medium to carry mass propaganda to that section of the population which does not spend its day at work, or take part in collective life. Housewives, pensioners, and the aged are especially singled out.

A confirmation of this policy can also be found by examining the television sets themselves. The great majority of them have a screen of 9 inches only (that is, not larger than a postcard), whilst the sizes used in Europe and America are rare, and were adopted later for expensive sets only. The 9 inch screen has kept the price of television sets low, and has thus facilitated the wide distribution of the new propaganda medium.

It is extremely interesting to note that the authorities have refrained from making extensive use of television. This may not appear surprising to the British reader, but is an agreeable surprise to those who have had occasion to see how, for instance in Italy, television has invaded public places, restaurants and hotels, with the result that screens are growing larger and larger, and reproduction louder and louder. In the Soviet Union television has remained a feature of home life: not only is it absent from public places, but even in Party club houses and cultural institutes many more members are engaged in reading or playing chess than in watching television.

From the point of view of indoctrination, television—compared to radio and press—clearly has but a supplementary function, and it plays a similar part in relation to the theatre and the cinema. Since there is a scarcity of cinemas in the USSR, films transmitted by television are a welcome substitute for building new cinemas and theatres: here, too, the reasons which—in the West—limit the number of transmissions of films and plays do not exist. During 1958, the television public in Moscow could see 100 full feature films (this figure excludes documentary or educational films), and 60 plays. In the same year, the city of Moscow had 62 cinemas with a seating capacity of not more than 25,000. A maximum of 150,000 people could go to the cinema in one day, whilst a far greater number were able to watch television.

TO give the reader an approximate idea of how Russian television works, let us have a look at a typical programme. Moscow, the greatest production centre, puts on two daily programmes of an average of 5 hours. A little bulletin, which is always quickly sold out, provides details of the various programmes of the week. More than 15% of the transmission time is dedicated to films or plays. Russia's solid theatre tradition calls for very careful production, and television has profited by this, sometimes at the cost of the specific claims made by this medium. Thus more than half of the plays shown on television in 1958 came from the repertoire of Russian classics, from Ostrovski to Chekhov. Of course there is no lack of modern plays, written in defence of a political theory or frankly designed as propaganda. All actors with even a remote resemblance to Lenin (and until a short time ago to Stalin) can

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be sure of getting a job all the year round. On the other hand, productions of foreign plays are rare. The propaganda tendency is more marked in the cinema than in the theatre, and this is reflected also in television. With a few praiseworthy exceptions, Soviet films and films from the satellite countries fall into two categories, dedicated to two equally misleading myths: historical costume films (which were also in favour in Italy during the years of fascism), and films allegedly depicting 'modern life' and showing a non-existing world of *kolkhoz* farms with dancing harvest girls and workers who spend their free time enthusiastically discussing how to increase the production of cast-iron. Both categories are an escape from reality. Since for two days each week the programmes are given over to films, there is a 50% chance of watching such an essay in 'socialist realism' once a week.

It is not that no foreign films are transmitted, but again only two kinds are shown: historical films like Robin Hood, that is to say, films entirely divorced from reality, or else films showing the seamy side of life. Misery and illness, bad housing and unemployment: these are the elements most appreciated in foreign films by those who select them, since they serve to reinforce the usual picture of the evils of capitalism presented to the Russian people. It is, however, uncertain whether this kind of propaganda really achieves anything. When I was in Moscow recently and went to see the Italian film La Strada, I overheard a neighbour on my side say to his wife: 'It seems to me not much different from our *Oktyabrskoe Polye*!' These are the usual dramas and films of Soviet television. However, another 20% of the time is given to the transmission of opera, ballet, and concert performances, which in 1958 amounted to not less than 250. Opera and ballet are largely taken up with the classic repertoire, whilst concerts often bring to the public artists who are the fashion of the moment. Folk art is represented in choirs and dances, when dancers from Georgia and other regions can be seen, and there is always the voice of the master of ceremonies to remind the spectator of the unity and fraternity prevailing amongst all the Soviet peoples. Here we touch the borderline that divides entertainment from propaganda, a fragile borderline that is broken through by the transmissions of news.

With the exception of sports events, the news service is limited strictly to politics. The simple news items of the day are banished from television, radio, and the press. Nor is there any show of curiosity or weakness. Political news and documentaries, which take up another 20% of the transmission time, show the Soviet Union as a country clad in the grey uniform of conformism. This accounts for the technically very mediocre presentation: if, for instance, a political meeting is shown, the camera is constantly focused on the face of the speaker, and in documentaries all one sees, over and over again, is a factory, an electrical power plant, or a *kolkhoz*, with strong and proud workers, children in their Sunday dresses, and the usual young men bent over pages that speak of the output of coal, of peaceful coexistence, of thousands of sheep, and of the victories of the *Komsomol*.

All these shows reveal the fundamental characteristic of Russian propaganda, that didactic tone of voice so typical in the USSR. Just as the photographs in the newspapers show a political meeting in eternally the same way, with the speaker's rostrum surmounted by a huge portrait of Lenin, just as the radio without any interruption harps on the official aspects of whatever subject is being reported, so television has become an immovable eye fixed on the general, totally lacking in any understanding for the particular and the individual.

News commentaries and political or scientific discussions make up another 15% of the total transmission time in Russian television. In 1958, more than 200 conferences were televised in Moscow, all dedicated either to the national economy (execution of the plan, progress in industry and agriculture, etc.), or to major international events. These discussions are invariably presented according to the technique of delivery well known to readers of the Soviet press: the same statement is repeated over and over again, with an insistence and monotony that makes no attempt to attract attention, illustrations are totally excluded, and the vocabulary is limited to the familiar 1,000 words of the stereotyped official language. The political leaders of the various regions hold an important

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place among the speakers, as do the specialists who have received as an award the right to speak of their new inventions. Then there are the directors of factories, the chairmen of *kolkhozes*. In all these cases, television pours forth long speeches totally devoid of anything that might appeal to the imagination.

FINALLY, there are programmes specially aimed at the army, at housewives, and at children, which take up the remaining part of the transmission time. These merely accentuate the boring and didactic atmosphere prevailing in Soviet television, Soviet radio, and the Soviet press. All give the impression of an elderly schoolmistress who goes on teaching what has long become a political commonplace, and who apart from politics has no other aim but that her pupils should behave decorously. Soviet television continually gives lessons on 'how to', how to sew a dress, how to behave at table, the best way to weave a basket, and the correct way to dance the foxtrot or tango: in the latter case the commentator never ceases to admonish, whilst a couple slowly dance out their geometrical paces and show 'that it is not nice to hold the lady too tightly'. In itself this ideal of good manners, this respect for a standard of behaviour no longer always adhered to in the restless West, is not something to be despised. It has to be stressed, however, that it conforms to an image of the past; the emphasis on teaching people how to behave suggests an hierarchic and austere society made up of people who are mostly poor and modest in their aspirations.

The grey domestic reality portrayed by Soviet television is certainly a far cry from the revolutionary affirmations of an ardent imagination; it is not the first time that reality turns out to be far more modest than myth, and it is interesting to note that the pedantic and traditionalist attitudes of Soviet propaganda as a whole find their reflection in the field of television. Soviet television makes virtually no attempt to stimulate the public's interest and curiosity: it limits itself to giving orders. Nor does it make use of the technical possibilities of the medium; it has simply taken over the rules of the theatre, the lecture hall, the public meeting.

A certain dissatisfaction with the declining standards in various theatre companies and dance and choir groups came to light during the 21st CPSU Congress, early in 1959, when V. Semichastny, leader of the communist youth organisation, criticised the expenditure of so much public money on actors and dancers 'who would have done better to change their profession'. The attack on that occasion did not go beyond the usual polemics about work badly done (*khalturnaya rabota*, which so often crops up to indicate bad quality or industrial waste). The periodical *Kommunist* returned to the argument in greater detail, with specific reference to television (1959, 8), but little more came out of this than the repetition of what was already amply clear, i.e. that the authorities do not care if television programmes are boring and pay no heed to the interests of viewers. The merits in Soviet eyes of this kind of television are obvious and significant: it carries propaganda to those sections of the population who are otherwise difficult to reach, and it makes the investment of funds in the construction of new theatres and cinemas unnecessary. These positive aspects, however, are heavily counterbalanced by deficiencies in the daily programmes. Amongst these, *Kommunist* lists especially the following: (1) the plays are not often enough related to contemporary problems—and it is certainly true that only one third of the plays transmitted by Moscow in 1958 were inspired by themes of recent Russian history; (2) in documentaries and newsreels the importance of the seven-year plan and of reaching the planned targets before 1965 is not sufficiently underlined; (3) in conferences and political commentaries the evils of capitalism are inadequately emphasised, and since the foreign films (largely utilised for this purpose) do not show the misery and degradation of the working classes in capitalist society clearly enough, *Kommunist* recommended an increase in the number of discussions of this theme. It is also deemed very important to stress the richness and happiness of life in the USSR, and to illustrate adequately the building programmes that are being carried out, whilst showing that in the West the poorer classes live in slums in a state of general despair.

As can be seen from this brief summary, the criticisms levelled at television by the authorities

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are chiefly aimed at making it more exclusively a channel of propaganda. In the field of entertainment the call is for more 'builders of communism', in the field of documentaries for more propaganda for Khrushchev's race against the major capitalist countries, and in the field of political commentary for more pressure on the audience to convince them of the superiority of the Soviet system. As far as the technical side of television transmissions is concerned, the only criticism made was to urge a higher level of skill and more precise, less clumsy presentation; but it was clear that these were matters of only lesser moment.

IT would be unfair to criticise the laziness of the producers without dwelling at the same time on the responsibility of those who stand behind them. If propaganda is given top priority, programmes are bound to bear the massive, clumsy, and unimaginative character typical of this activity in the communist regime. Television in Soviet Russia has from the very beginning been severely handicapped in its development by the State's monopoly, exercised in all information media. From the first there was no need to court the favour of the public, to try to speak its language, to consider it as a public different—even if in a purely abstract way—from the public of radio and press. The absence of this initial hurdle encountered by all Western television has been a definite drawback, encouraging laziness instead of initiative.

The type of criticism made by the authorities against television makes it all too clear that the volume of propaganda in television will not be lessened. If, in English, one speaks of propaganda, the word usually refers to an inferior form of political reasoning. In the Soviet context propaganda has a specific character, inasmuch as it is not limited to political life alone, but has as its object total indoctrination. Organised pressure is exercised in fields beyond the political sphere, influencing moral convictions, aesthetic values, in fact man's whole life. The communist State dictates its rules to writers on how to write a book, to mothers on how to teach table manners to their children, and establishes the correct view to be held both about past historical events and about the width of trousers!

Under these conditions, the real and serious criticism that could be offered to television loses all significance. Psychologists and educators in the West have observed that television is employed more often to teach conformism than to encourage critical views. Russian television needs no coaching in this direction, as the communist State intervenes in all fields of human activity. Another criticism often heard in connection with television in Western countries is that there is a tendency—whether television is run by the government or by a private body—to neglect the bond with the public, to lose continuous contact with the audience. No solution to this problem can be expected in the USSR. For the public to have an influence on television, it must live within the framework of a society that is very different from the one historically established on Soviet territory, a society, in fact, which allows people to make their own decisions, and where the relations between the citizen and the state are not determined by an all-powerful and self-perpetuating oligarchy. Any dialogue between television and the public is made impossible if there is official and sacred truth on one side, and a total lack of autonomous means of expression on the other. Although the directors of Soviet television periodically announce the receipt of thousands of letters from the public, *Kommunist* makes it clear that these are unlikely to have any say in the development of Soviet television.

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